James S. Fishkin

Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain

This article presents the results of the first Deliberative Poll, in which a national British sample discussed the issue of rising crime and what to do about it. We describe Deliberative Polling and its rationale, the representativeness of the deliberative sample, the extent to which the participants acquired factual information about the issue and about politics generally, and how much and how they changed their views. We also weigh the extent to which such changes of view hinge on small group influences versus information gains.

Debating Deliberative Democracy

Notes on Contributors. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. Deliberation Day: Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin. 2. Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process: Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. 3. Democratic Deliberation Within: Robert E. Goodin. 4. The Law of Group Polarization: Cass R. Sunstein. 5. Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy: Iris Marion Young. 6. Optimal Deliberation?: Ian Shapiro. 7. Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma and Republican Theory: Philip Pettit. 8. Street-level Epistemology and Democratic Participation: Russell Hardin. 9. Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice: David Miller. 10. Deliberation Between Institutions: Jeffrey K. Tulis. 11. Environmental Ethics and the Obsolescence of Existing Political Institutions: Peter Laslett. Index.

Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place: Deliberative Polling in China

Talk of democratic reform sometimes focuses on talk. The aspiration of ‘deliberative democracy’ is for the mass public to influence policy making through public discussion. The common presumption is that this is an advanced version of democracy, possible only in established democracies. Even there, there are doubts. Some contend that ordinary citizens cannot deal with complex policy issues, others that their deliberations will be distorted by gender or class inequalities, and yet others that they will be ineluctably polarizing. In less fully democratic societies like China’s, the prospects may seem slimmer.

Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls

Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. Deliberation can protect against majority cycles—not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower- versus higher-salience issues and for individuals who seem to have deliberated more versus less effectively. They are not merely a by-product of increased substantive agreement (which in fact does not generally increase). Our results are important, quite apart from their implications for majority cycling, because single-peakedness can be naturally interpreted in terms of an underlying issue dimension, which can both clarify the debate and allow a majority-winning alternative to be interpreted as a median choice and thus as an attractive “compromise.”

The Televised Deliberative Poll: An Experiment in Democracy

The concept of the televised deliberative poll is outlined. Its first realization—in Britain by the television network Channel Four in May of 1994—is described. Ordinary polls model what the public is thinking even when it is disengaged or inattentive. The deliberative poll attempts to model what the public would think, if it were truly engaged by the issues. A national random sample is brought to a single place where its deliberations, in small group sessions and with competing experts and politicians, can be broadcast nationally and where it can arrive at considered judgments. The 1994 British experiment was held on the issue of crime. The sample was highly representative, both attitudinally and demographically, and its opinions changed dramatically. Implications for future experiments are discussed, particularly for the National Issues Convention, the January 1996 PBS experiment based on the same concept.

Deliberating Across Deep Divides

Deeply divided societies would seem to be infertile ground for mass deliberation. ‘Enclave deliberation’, among people on the same side, may well occur. But people on opposing sides may not trust one another, they may not listen with an open mind, or they may regard the other sides arguments as insincere cover for sectional interests. Perhaps, though, we underestimate their deliberative capacities? This article examines a deliberative poll (DP) in the Omagh area of Northern Ireland, a society having only recently emerged from protracted violence, reflecting and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants. The topic – the future of the local schools – was one on which many of the issues were heavily impinged by the Catholic–Protestant divide. We examine the extent to which a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, was able to deliberate constructively and how the experience changed their policy attitudes and their opinions of one another.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONS

This paper examines the potential role of deliberative democracy in constitutional processes of higher law-making, either for the founding of constitutions or for constitutional change. It defines deliberative democracy as the combination of political equality and deliberation and situates this form of democracy in contrast to a range of alternatives. It then considers two contrasting processes—elite deliberation and plebiscitary mass democracy (embodied in referenda) as approaches to higher law-making that employ deliberation without political equality or political equality without deliberation. It finally turns to some institutional designs that might achieve both fundamental values at the same time, or in the process of realizing a sequence of choices.

The EuroPolis deliberative poll

This special issue focuses on EuroPolis, a unique experiment in ‘deliberative democracy’ at the European level convened in Brussels soon before the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. A European wide random sample of the 27 member countries at the time was gathered to deliberate about two key issues--climate change and immigration as well as its voting intentions. The articles in the special issue focus on this Deliberative Poll, both quantitatively and qualitatively to assess what it tells us about ambitious versions of a ‘European wide public sphere.’ Can the citizens of Europe deliberate together across all the barriers of language and nationality? Can there be a credible process of European wide ‘public will formation’ about substantive policy issues and about voting?

Beyond polling alone: The quest for an informed public

Abstract Converses seminal 1964 article explored three crucial limitations of public opinion as it is revealed in conventional polls: information levels, belief systems, and nonattitudes. These limitations are significant from the standpoint of democratic theory, but it is possible to design forms of public consultation and of social‐science research that will reveal what public opinion might be like if these limitations were somehow overcome. Deliberative Polling is an effort to explore the contours of such a counterfactual public opinion—one that is more informed and engaged than is the mass public. Doing so requires going beyond “polling alone.”

Liberty Versus Equal Opportunity

Liberalism has often been viewed as a continuing dialogue about the relative priorities between liberty and equality. When the version of equality under discussion requires equalization of outcomes, it is easy to see how the two ideals might conflict. But when the version of equality requires only equalization of opportunities, the conflict has been treated as greatly muted since the principle of equality seems so meager in its implications. However, when one looks carefully at various versions of equal opportunity and various versions of liberty, the conflict between them is, in fact, both dramatic and inescapable. Each version of the conflict poses hard choices which defy any systematic pattern granting priority to one of these basic values over the other. In this essay, I will flesh out and argue for this picture of fundamental conflict, and then turn to some more general issues about the kinds of answers we should expect to the basic questions of liberal theory.