Robert G. Patman

September 11 and the rise of political fundamentalism in the Bush administration: domestic legitimatization versus international estrangement?

This article explores the tension between the role of religious language as a domestic legitimising device for the Bush administration and its adverse impact on Washingtons foreign policy image. It argues that President Bushs political fundamentalism after 9/11 has become a major obstacle to effectively addressing the challenge of international terrorism. It examines the interface between religion and the traditional idea of US exceptionalism, considers the political rise of the Christian right in American politics since the 1970s, shows how 9/11 served as a transformative event in the emergence of political fundamentalism in the White House and explores the impact of the construction of President Bushs ‘war on terror’ policies on the domestic and international environments. The conclusion acknowledges a substantial gulf between the domestic and international responses to President Bushs brand of political fundamentalism, but concedes that these differences have been narrowing over time.

Paul Kennedy’s Conception of Great Power Rivalry and US-China Relations in the Obama Era

According to Paul Kennedy, the international standing of a great power depends on a delicate balance between its military expenditure and economic capability. He posits that military overstretch and a relative political decline are the constant twin threats facing powers whose ambitions and military commitments exceed the capacity of their economic resource base. Does the evolution of the US-China relationship during the Obama era confirm the Kennedy thesis that no great power can exercise its dominance permanently?

Debating New Zealand’s foreign relations: the role and impact of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School 1966–1976

ABSTRACT For over half a century, the internationally recognised University of Otago Foreign Policy School has annually drawn together a mix of government officials, diplomats, academics, students and members of the general public to discuss issues of international significance. This article considers the establishment of the Foreign Policy School, and analyses its impact on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy between 1966 and 1976. Michelle Hale Williams’ conceptual model is employed to assess the School’s influence on public and political debate. It is argued the School’s influence was directly and most clearly evident at what Williams defines as the agendas and institutional levels. There was a gradual but definite shift in New Zealand’s foreign policy outlook between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, which is reflected in questions raised and discussed by the School. Public engagement with foreign policy questions, in which the School played an enabling role, was also transformed in the course of this period. The School rapidly became an important forum for foreign policy discussions between groups that had previously had little interaction. This article shows that, while it generated few concrete results at the level of policy, the School certainly played a part in helping to foster a national world-view that was increasingly based on New Zealand values and interests, paving the way for the emergence of a more independent foreign policy.

The Somalia Syndrome and U.S. National Security

The unhappy demise of the U.S.—United Nations (UN) humanitarian intervention in the failed state of Somalia in 1993 had a profound impact on U.S. foreign policy in the post—Cold War era. If the Somali intervention had succeeded, the history of many parts of the world might have been quite different. But it did not succeed, and the hopes of those observers who saw Somalia as a possible model for dealing with the disorder and conflicts of the new era were dashed. Instead, President Clinton’s decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Somalia in March 1994 generated a new foreign policy disposition in Washington—“the Somalia syndrome”—that signaled a deep skepticism of multilateral intervention in civil conflict situations, especially when such intervention risked American casualties. However, according to President George W Bush (2003b), 9/11 was a transformative event that fundamentally changed the strategic thinking of the United States. Declaring an all-out “war” on what was called global terrorism, President Bush pledged to spend “whatever it takes, whatever it costs” (Stout 2002) to win that struggle. Such statements convinced many observers, including former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, that 9/11 ended the Somalia syndrome in U.S. foreign policy and what she called “the time of antiseptic warfare” (Albright 2001, 44). On the one hand, the Bush administration recognized the security threat posed by failed or failing states, which initially reduced political concerns about sustaining battlefield casualties in such places.

Uneasy Coexistence: Globalization and the US National Security State

According to President George W. Bush “September 11 changed [US] strategic thinking/”1 yet a closer look at the President’s “new war” against terrorism reveals a great deal of continuity with earlier administrations.