Robert W. Weisberg

Handbook of Creativity: Creativity and Knowledge: A Challenge to Theories

An important component of research in creativity has been the development of theories concerning the mechanisms underlying creative thinking. Modern theories of creative thinking have been advanced from many different viewpoints, ranging from Guilfords pioneering psychometric theory (e.g., 1950; see also Runco, 1991) to those developing out of clinical interests, broadly conceived (e.g., Eysenck, 1993). Other theories have developed out of Gestalt psychology (e.g., Wertheimer, 1982), traditional associationistic experimental psychology (e.g., Mednick, 1962), Darwinian theory (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1988, 1995); social-psychological perspectives (e.g., Amabile, 1983), investment perspectives (e.g., Sternberg & Lubart, 1995), and modern cognitive science (e.g., Martindale, 1995). In this chapter, I examine one critical issue confronting all such theories: the role of knowledge in creativity. Although the various theoretical views proposed by psychologists appear on the surface to be very different, there is among many of them, including all those just cited, one critical assumption concerning the relationship between knowledge and creativity. Since creative thinking by definition goes beyond knowledge, there is implicitly or explicitly assumed to be a tension between knowledge and creativity. Knowledge may provide the basic elements, the building blocks out of which are constructed new ideas, but in order for these building blocks to be available, the mortar holding the old ideas together must not be too strong.

The Role of Content and Abstract Information in Analogical Transfer

Analogical transfer in problem solving is one example of analogical cognition, which also includes metaphors, similes, and case-based reasoning. The dominant theories in this area posit that abstract schemata mediate transfer (K. J. Holyoak, 1984a, 1985) or that problem solving by means of analogy is accomplished through application of the formal or deep structural characteristics of one problem to another (D. Gentner, 1983, 1989). More recently, exemplar-based accounts (D. L. Medin & B. H. Ross, 1989; B. H. Ross, 1987) have emphasized problem content and exemplar-specific details in the various stages of transfer. The present article reviews research on analogical transfer and analyzes the theoretical models in light of this evidence

Context-dependent effects on analogical transfer.

The role of context in facilitating analogical transfer was investigated in two experiments. In both experiments, subjects first read two stories that were analogous to Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem. Later, subjects attempted to solve the radiation problem. In Experiment 1, the radiation problem was presented in a different context than that of the stories, and followed them by 6 min. Transfer was observed in subjects who were prompted to use the earlier stories in solving the problem. However, the solution frequency of subjects not given such prompts did not differ from control levels. In Experiment 2, the radiation problem was presented in the same context as the earlier stories to some subjects, and in a different context to others. The timing of the radiation problem also was varied. When a 6-min interval separated the stories from the radiation problem, transfer was a function of context, with weak transfer being observed in the samecontext condition, and no transfer being observed in the different-context condition. At a 45-sec delay, transfer was again observed in the same~ontext condition, and a nonsignificant trend toward transfer was observed in the different-context condition. The results were interpreted as indicating that context facilitates the retrieval of relevant problem-solving schemas, and as suggesting that the possession of relevant schemas is not sufficient to produce analogical transfer.

Variables influencing the occurrence of naming errors: Implications for models of lexical retrieval.

Abstract Stage models of language production (e.g., Garrett, 1975 , Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 9 . New York: Academic Press; Levelt, 1983, Cognition , 14 , 41–104) maintain that lexical retrieval occurs in two independent stages: retrieval of semantic and syntactic information and retrieval of phonological form. Interactive activation production models (e.g., Dell, 1986 , Psychological Review , 93 , 283–321), on the other hand, assume that the processes involved in the retrieval of semantic and phonological information are nonindependent, and that these two factors interact with syntactic and frequency variables to influence lexical retrieval. Predictions of each model regarding the relative influence of semantic and phonological variables on lexical retrieval were tested in an analysis of laboratory-induced naming errors. In Experiment 1, color- and shape-naming errors were elicited in a paradigm introduced by Levelt (op. cit,) in an attempt to replicate his findings, which supported an independent levels model of lexical retrieval. The results were consistent with Levelts findings that substitution errors are influenced by semantic similarity, but not by phonological similarity. Also consistent with Levelts results, no frequency effect was obtained for color errors. Frequency effects were obtained for shape-naming errors, but this effect may have been confounded by semantic and phonological similarity of two low frequency shape targets. In Experiment 2, the same paradigm was used to elicit errors, but stimuli were pictures of objects rather than colored shapes. The composition of the picture patterns was controlled to provide subjects with opportunities to make errors reflecting both individual and interactive influences of semantic and phonological information. The combined effects of semantic and phonological similarity were demonstrated to be interactive and not additive, indicating that semantic and phonological processes do not operate independently on lexical retrieval. These results, which were most consistent with an interactive model of lexical retrieval, were replicated with a different set of materials in Experiment 3.

The use of verbal protocols as data: an analysis of insight in the candle problem.

In the present study, we examined the use of verbal protocols as data in the study of the cognitive processes underlying insight. Fifty-eight Temple University undergraduates attempted to solve Duncker’s (1945) candle problem either silently or while thinking aloud. Solution rates, solving times, and solution types were comparable between conditions, suggesting thatverbal overshadowing (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993) did not occur when the participants attempted to solve the candle problem. Subsequent analysis of verbal protocols provided a catalogue of solutions generated by the participants, as well as empirical support for the occurrence of impasse and restructuring. Although restructuring was present in the majority of protocols, including those of the participants who later produced the box solution, the presence of impasse occurred with less frequency and was not associated with production of the box solution. These results provide information concerning how the candle problem is solved and suggest that verbalization can be used to examine how individuals solve insight problems and to evaluate existing theories of insight.

Transferring Old Associations to New Situations: A Nonautomatic Process.

Three experiments examined the influence of previously established associations on production of the box solution to the candle problem. In Experiment I, experimental subjects learned candle—box as one of a list of verbal paired associates before attempting to solve the candle problem; control subjects learned the pair candle—paper. The candle—box association was effective in cuing box solutions only when the experimental subjects were informed that one pair from the just-learned list would help them solve the problem. In Experiments II and III these findings were replicated using physical objects in the paired associate task: learning to place a candle in a box as a paired associate had no effect on later production of the box solution to the candle problem, unless subjects were informed that one of the paired associates was relevant. The results were intrepreted on the basis of a neo-Selzian model of problem solving.

On Structure in the Creative Process: A Quantitative Case-Study of the Creation of Picasso's Guernica:

This article presents a quantitative analysis of Picassos preliminary works for his painting Guernica, to examine the nature of the thought processes underlying creation of this great work of art and to demonstrate the usefulness of quantitative methods in studying creation of a single work of art. Results indicated that the preliminary works for Guernica were drawn from a very limited subject matter, which was closely related to the event that stimulated the painting. In addition, the overall structure of the painting can be seen from the very first sketches. Finally, the idea which served as the core for Guernica came out of Picassos work at that time. These findings indicate that Picassos creative process can be looked upon as elaborating a kernel idea, rather than generating numerous different ideas, and culling the final direction from them at a later stage. These results have two implications. Specifically, they indicate that it is possible to analyze the structure in Picassos thought processes; more broadly, they demonstrate that development of individual works of art can be analyzed using quantitative methods to test hypotheses concerning the creative process.

Toward an integrated theory of insight in problem solving

The study of insight in problem solving and creative thinking has seen an upsurge of interest in the last 30 years. Current theorising concerning insight has taken one of two tacks. The special-process view, which grew out of the Gestalt psychologists’ theorising about insight, proposes that insight is the result of a dedicated set of processes (the “insight sequence”) that is activated by the individuals reaching impasse while trying to deal with a problematic situation. In contrast, the business-as-usual view argues that insight is brought about by the same processes that underlie ordinary thinking (analytic thinking). Although those two views are typically treated as being in opposition, it has recently been proposed that a complete understanding of insight will require bringing together aspects of both views. The present paper carries that proposal further. Critical analysis of those two viewpoints demonstrates that each has a positive contribution to make to our understanding of insight, but also is unable to deal with certain phenomena. An integrated view of insight is presented and implications are discussed.

Insight versus analysis: Evidence for diverse methods in problem solving

Since the Gestalt psychologists made the distinction approximately 100 years ago, psychologists have differentiated between solving problems through analysis versus insight. The present paper presents evidence to support the idea that, rather than conceptualising insight versus analysis as distinct modes of solving problems, it is more useful to conceive of insight and analysis as two approaches within a set of possible solving methods. In the present research, 60 participants solved insight problems while thinking aloud, which provided evidence concerning the processes underlying problem solution. Comparison with performance of a nonverbalisation control group (n = 35) indicated no negative effects of thinking aloud on insight in problem solving. The results supported the idea that various methods are utilised in solving insight problems. The “classic” impasse–restructuring–insight sequence occurred in only a small minority of solutions. A number of other solution methods were found, ranging from relatively direct applications of knowledge, to various heuristic methods, to restructuring arising from new information gleaned from a failed solution. It is concluded that there is not a sharp distinction between solving a problem through analysis versus insight, and implications of that conclusion are discussed.

Keeping It Short and Sweet: Brief, Ungraded Writing Assignments Facilitate Learning

Can short, ungraded, free-writing assignments promote learning of course material? We randomly assigned introductory psychology recitation sections (N = 978 students) to writing or thinking conditions. For all sections, teaching assistants presented students with a discussion topic based in current coursework. Students either wrote or thought about the topic for 5 min. All sections then discussed the topic for approximately 10 min. Exams included questions related to the discussion topics. Students in the writing condition attended class more often and performed better on factual and conceptual multiple-choice exam questions than students in the thinking condition, even after controlling for measures of student quality. The results suggested that brief free writing improved factual and conceptual learning.