Roderick I. Swaab

Social influence in small groups: An interactive model of social identity formation

The present paper tries to overcome the dualism of group-level vs. individualistic analysis of small group processes, by presenting a model of social identity formation that incorporates factors at both levels of analysis as well as their interaction. On the basis of prior theorising in the social identity tradition and a programme of research spanning several interactive group research paradigms, we suggest that within small groups a social identity can operate as a contextual given, which shapes the behaviour of individuals within the group, as much as the behaviour of individuals within the group can shape social identity. This proposal is supported by a programme of research into social influence within small interactive groups. This research explores deductive (top-down) processes through which existing identities influence group processes, but also shows a reciprocal influence through which intragroup discussion creates a sense of group identity in the apparent absence of any direct intergroup comparison (an inductive, or bottom-up, path). It is the interaction between these two forces that we believe is characteristic of the way in which small groups achieve a sense of social identity. Supporting this view, we describe research that suggests that processes of identity formation play a key role in decision making, productive collaboration, consensualisation, integrative negotiations, and the development of shared cognition.

Shared Cognition as a Product of, and Precursor to, Shared Identity in Negotiations

Three studies examined the hypothesis that shared cognition and group identification can be each other’s catalysts as well as driving forces behind multiparty negotiation outcomes that might not otherwise be realized. Experiment 1 demonstrates that clear links exist between communication, the development of shared cognition and group identification, and integrative outcomes. The subsequent experiments isolated the causal directions of these links. Experiment 2 showed that stronger group identification before interaction was associated with the development of shared cognition in a subsequent phase of negotiation, which then increased the attainment of integrative outcomes. Conversely, a direct manipulation of shared cognition in Experiment 3 resulted in stronger identification during negotiation, which then led to more integrative outcomes. Thus, we find support for the theoretical claim that group identification can be both the product of, and precursor to, the development of shared cognition, with communication functioning as the interface between the two.

The Communication Orientation Model Explaining the Diverse Effects of Sight, Sound, and Synchronicity on Negotiation and Group Decision-Making Outcomes

Two quantitative meta-analyses examined how the presence of visual channels, vocal channels, and synchronicity influences the quality of outcomes in negotiations and group decision making. A qualitative review of the literature found that the effects of communication channels vary widely and that existing theories do not sufficiently account for these contradictory findings. To parsimoniously encompass the full range of existing data, the authors created the communication orientation model, which proposes that the impact of communication channels is shaped by communicators’ orientations to cooperate or not. Two meta-analyses—conducted separately for negotiations and decision making—provide strong support for this model. Overall, the presence of communication channels (a) increased the achievement of high-quality outcomes for communicators with a neutral orientation, (b) did not affect the outcomes for communicators with a cooperative orientation, but (c) hurt communicators’ outcomes with a noncooperative orientation. Tests of cross-cultural differences in each meta-analysis further supported the model: for those with a neutral orientation, the beneficial effects of communication channels were weaker within East Asian cultures (i.e., Interdependent and therefore more predisposed towards cooperation) than within Western cultures (i.e., Independent).

The Too-Much-Talent Effect Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent Is Too Much or Not Enough

Five studies examined the relationship between talent and team performance. Two survey studies found that people believe there is a linear and nearly monotonic relationship between talent and performance: Participants expected that more talent improves performance and that this relationship never turns negative. However, building off research on status conflicts, we predicted that talent facilitates performance—but only up to a point, after which the benefits of more talent decrease and eventually become detrimental as intrateam coordination suffers. We also predicted that the level of task interdependence is a key determinant of when more talent is detrimental rather than beneficial. Three archival studies revealed that the too-much-talent effect emerged when team members were interdependent (football and basketball) but not independent (baseball). Our basketball analysis also established the mediating role of team coordination. When teams need to come together, more talent can tear them apart.

The remarkable robustness of the first-offer effect: across culture, power, and issues.

The first-offer effect demonstrates that negotiators achieve better outcomes when making the first offer than when receiving it. The evidence, however, primarily derives from studies of Westerners without systematic power differences negotiating over one issue—contexts that may amplify the first-offer effect. Thus, the present research explored the effect across cultures, among negotiators varying in power, and in negotiations involving single and multiple issues. The first two studies showed that the first-offer effect remains remarkably robust across cultures and multi-issue negotiations. The final two studies demonstrated that low-power negotiators benefit from making the first offer across single- and multi-issue negotiations. The second and fourth studies used multi-issue negotiations with distributive, integrative, and compatible issues, allowing us to show that first offers operate through the distributive, not the integrative or compatible issues. Overall, these results reveal that moving first can benefit negotiators across many organizational and personal situations.

Identity formation in multiparty negotiations

Based on the recently proposed Interactive Model of Identity Formation, we examine how top-down deductive and bottom-up inductive identity formations influence intentions and behaviour in multiparty negotiations. Results show that a shared identity can be deduced from the social context through recognition of superordinate similarities. However, shared identities can also be induced by intragroup processes in which individuals get acquainted with one another on an interpersonal basis. Both top-down and bottom-up processes led to the formation of a sense of shared identity, and this in turn exerted a positive influence on behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in multiparty negotiations.

The Language of Coalition Formation in Online Multiparty Negotiations

The purpose of this study is to examine how language affects coalition formation in multiparty negotiations. The authors relied on communication accommodation theory for theoretical framing and hypothesized that language can help coalition partners reach an agreement when it is used to increase a sense of unity. Findings of an experimental study support this hypothesis, demonstrating that greater linguistic convergence and assent increase agreements between potential coalition partners whereas the expression of negative emotion words decrease agreement. The implications for coalition formation and the study of language in negotiations are discussed.

The Micro-Dynamics of Coalition Formation

We present an experimental approach to study the micro-dynamics of coalition formation in an unrestricted bargaining environment. Specifically, we investigate a fundamental feature of sequential coalition bargaining models: expectations about future bargaining behavior will influence current bargaining outcomes. To do so, we test the hypothesis that coalition bargaining may lead to inefficient outcomes as agents are unable to effectively commit to preliminary agreements during the bargaining process. We conjecture that communication plays an important role in establishing such commitments. We then experimentally manipulate the communication channels and show that restrictions undermine trust and lead to decreased efficiency.

The pros and cons of dyadic side conversations in small groups: The impact of group norms and task type

This research explores the impact of dyadic side conversations on group norms within three- and four-person groups. The authors propose a link between dyadic communication and group norms such that the absence of dyadic communication enhances a norm of group unity, whereas its presence enhances a norm of faction-forming. In two studies, we demonstrate that the presence of dyadic communication opportunities can both help and hurt group performance and that this depends on a fit between the content of the norm and the wider social context. In negotiation tasks that benefit from group unity, the absence of dyadic communication results in a stronger focus on the group and its future as well as increased group performance. However, in problem-solving tasks that benefit from faction-forming, the mere presence of dyadic communication opportunities leads to increased openness to unique information, disagreement, and group performance.

The first-mover disadvantage: the folly of revealing compatible preferences.

The current research establishes a first-mover disadvantage in negotiation. We propose that making the first offer in a negotiation will backfire when the sender reveals private information that an astute recipient can leverage to his or her advantage. In two experiments, we manipulated whether the first offer was purely distributive or revealed that the sender’s preferences were compatible with the recipient’s preferences (i.e., the negotiators wanted the same outcome on an issue). When first offers contained only distributive issues, the classic first-mover advantage occurred, and first offers predicted final prices. However, a first-mover disadvantage emerged when senders opened with offers that revealed compatible preferences. These effects were moderated by negotiators’ social value orientation: Proself negotiators were more likely to take advantage of compatible information than were prosocial negotiators. Overall, the key factor that determined whether the first-mover advantage or disadvantage emerged was whether the offer revealed compatible preferences. These results demonstrate that first offers not only provide numerical value but also convey qualitative information.