Roger Straughan

Hypothetical Moral Situations

Abstract: Hypothetical moral situations are often used by teachers and researchers in order to simulate real‐life moral problems. This article draws some logical distinctions between different types of moral conflict and the different types of question that can be asked about them. It is suggested that this approach must have serious limitations if it is assumed that there is a direct and straightforward connection between hypothetical and real‐life moral judgments, as the former necessarily lack the situational features of the latter.

Genetic Manipulation for Food Production: Social and Ethical Issues for Consumers

The issue of the genetic manipulation of plants, animals and microbes is addressed within the context of food production. Genetic manipulation is defined within the wider area of biotechnology and some of the main benefits of its use are summarised; safety and risk are examined and some of the socioeconomic problems it can create are discussed. It is concluded that the technique can offer great potential benefits in terms of increased quantity and improved quality of food, but it raises social/ethical concerns which can be summed up by asking: Is it safe? Is it fair? Is it natural?

What′s your poison?

Examines various problems concerning the practical implementation of the principle of free choice. These are exemplified in a specific everyday context – the consumer′s freedom to choose food and drink products. Identifies a number of actual constraints on that freedom before the main question is tackled: what further restrictions might be considered justifiable and desirable? Suggests three categories of factor which might justify such restrictions – psychological factors associated with the maximizing of freedom of choice; safety factors concerned with the minimizing of risk; and ethical/social factors involving such issues as animal welfare and socio‐economic needs. Concludes that certain restrictions on the consumer′s freedom of choice may at times be justified by an appeal to other principles and considerations.

Ethics, Morality and Crop Biotechnology. 1. Intrinsic Concerns

There are a variety of intrinsic concerns about the ethics of crop biotechnology, These concerns stem from a number of separable but loosely linked assumptions about the religious and moral status of the natural world and about the relationship that mankind should have with that world. Assumptions of this kind, some of which appear to be widely held, cannot be proved right or wrong, but they should be analysed in order to clarify the concepts and principles on which they depend. Some of the key questions are: Should religious believers see modern biotechnology as a blasphemous affront to God or a creative opportunity to work with him? Can any moral guidelines be provided by what happens in Nature? Can any charges of intrinsic moral wrongness be brought against crop biotechnology which are not equally applicable to traditional methods of selective breeding?

Ethics, morality and crop biotechnology. 2. Extrinsic concerns about consequences : Biotechnology

This paper looks at extrinsic concerns about biotechnology. These extrinsic concerns are more open to debate than intrinsic concerns, as they invite discussion about what the most likely consequences really are and suggestions about how they might be avoided or modified. In practice, however, they appear to be expressed as vehemently and dogmatically as the intrinsic variety, and so stand in equal need of detached ethical appraisal. These extrinsic concerns include issues such as the balance between risks and benefits, the ethics of patenting life-forms and the likely socioeconomic impact of biotechnology.

Values, Behaviour and the Problem of Assessment

Abstract This paper, which is intended as a brief and provocative discussion piece rather than a fully developed argument, discusses the nature of the logical relationship between childrens moral values and their behaviour. I suggest that this relationship is less tight than is often supposed, and that there are no necessary behavioural or motivational criteria to determine whether or not a particular value is held, for there must always remain the possibility of a gap existing between the holding and the enactment of a moral value. Feelings of guilt and remorse are examined to see if they can provide an alternative criterion. Finally, three important educational and methodological implications are drawn for teachers and researchers in the area of ‘values education’, underlining the dangers of assuming that values are unfailingly revealed and recognized in overt behaviour.1 1 An earlier version of this paper was read at the World Congress in Education on the theme of ‘Values and the School’, held at the ...

Are values Under‐valued? A reply to Christopher Ormell

Abstract This paper challenges Christopher Ormells claim that an explicit distinction should be drawn between a “hard” and “soft” sense of “having values”. It is argued that holding values is better portrayed in terms of a continuum representing degrees of difficulty and sacrifice, for the holding of any value implies a possible tension between obligation and motivation. Making choices lacks this necessary feature and so cannot be equated with any sense of “having values”. Ormells claim that values but not Values are relativistic is also questioned. Finally, an important implication of this debate for moral education is drawn, concerning ways in which children may learn to hold and act upon values.

Social and Ethical Issues Surrounding Biotechnological Advance

The application of genetic manipulation to food production raises many social and ethical problems. Here the questions is it safe? is it fair? is it natural? are tackled from a philosophical perspective. The arguments against using the new technologies are examined critically, and the implications for consumers, such as labelling of the products of biotechnological processes, are considered.

Private and Public Morality: Some Misconceptions Explored. A Reply to John Sword

Abstract Some objections to an earlier article of mine concerning the use of hypothetical moral situations in moral education are first examined. It is then argued that to characterize morality as a wholly ‘public’ or ‘private’ affair is mistaken, as moral decision‐making must involve a combination of both features.