Ronald W. Langacker

Nouns and Verbs

The universal grammatical categories NOUN and VERB are held susceptible to notional characterization. The traditional objections to this claim are overcome by an appropriate view of linguistic semantics, one based on cognitive processing and the structuring of conceptual content. Reasonably precise semantic descriptions of the noun and verb categories are proposed in the context of the COGNITIVE GRAMMAR framework. The distinction between COUNT and MASS nouns is explicated, and is shown to be a direct analog of the fundamental aspectual distinction between verbs that designate PERFECTIVE and IMPERFECTIVE processes. The analysis permits the elucidation of subtle semantic contrasts and the explanation of various grammatical phenomena.

Reference-point constructions

Bö i h image-schematic abilities and conceptual ar ehe type s are essen tial t o the chciracierization of linguistic structures. Especially signißcant in this regard (and so ubiquitous in our everyday experience t hat we are largely oblivious t o it) is our capacity t o invoke t he conception of one entity äs a cognitive reference point for purposes of establishing mental contact with another. This image-schematic ability is proposed äs the abstract basis for possessives and affords a revelatory account of a broad ränge of possessive constructions. Other manifestations of this reference-point ability include topic and topic-like constructions, pronoun-antecedent relationships, metonymy, and the discrepancy typically encountered between t hose entities t hat ßgure rnost directly in a relationship and the explicitly coded relational participants. It is suggested that a wide array of linguistic and psychological phenomena might all be interpreted äs reflecting a fundamental aspect of cognitive processing. As one of its organizing principles, cognitive linguistics asserts the nonautonomy of linguistic structure. It Claims, in particular, that fundamental cognitive abilities and experientially derived cognitive models have direct and pervasive linguistic manifestations, and, conversely, that language structure furnishes important clues concerning basic mental phenomena. In recent years, cognitive linguists have in fact found strong linguistic evidence for positing a number of constructs whose general psychological significance is quite apparent. Examples include the notion of force dynamics (Talmy 1988); that of image Schemas (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987); of subjective vs. objective construal (Langacker 1985, 1990b); and of correspondences across cognitive domains (äs in metaphor) or mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985). My objective here is to explore the linguistic ramifications of another such construct: that of a cognitive reference Cognitive Linguistics 4-1 (1993), 1-38 0936-5907/93/0004-0001

Discourse in Cognitive Grammar

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THE FORM AND MEANING OF THE ENGLISH AUXILIARY

Abstract Cognitive Grammar presupposes an inherent and intimate relation between linguistic structures and discourse. Linguistic units are abstracted from usage events, retaining as part of their value any recurring facet of the interactive and discourse context. Linguistic structures thus incorporate discourse expectations and are interpretable as instructions to modify the current discourse state. There are multiple channels of conceptualization and vocalization, including the symbolization of attentional framing by intonation groups. An expression is produced and understood with respect to a presupposed discourse context, which shapes and supports its interpretation. Particular contextual applications of linguistic units become entrenched and conventionalized as new, augmented units. As discourse proceeds, conceptual structures are progressively built and modified in accordance with the semantic poles of the expressions employed. While initially manifesting the specific conceptual structuring imposed by these expressions, the structures assembled undergo consolidation to reflect the intrinsic conceptual organization of the situations described. This conceptual organization has to be distinguished from grammatical constituency, which is flexible, variable, and in no small measure determined by discourse considerations.

On the continuous debate about discreteness

This paper introduces selected concepts from a theory of linguistic structure called SPACE GRAMMAR, and employs these concepts to seek an integrated account of the form and meaning of the English auxiliary. It is argued that the form of the auxiliary, apart from certain morphological adjustments, reflects each step of the conceptual path leading from the speaker to the objective situation described by the main verb. Observations are made on the nature of auxiliary status, classes of predicates, and the semantic value of individual auxiliary elements. The analysis enables one to explain many properties of simple and complex sentences.*

Cognitive (Construction) Grammar

Abstract The issue of discreteness vs. continuity comes into play in all domains of linguistic analysis and at multiple levels. The distinction’s experiential basis is discussed, as well as various means of discretization and continuization. Most phenomena are sufficiently complex that treatments emphasizing discreteness and continuity both have some validity—it is not a matter of choosing between them, but of determining what each contributes and how they relate to one another. These notions are applied to a number of specific problems, including genetic relationships, constituency, constructions, grammaticality, and grammatical categories. Special attention is devoted to the network model of complex categories. Like any metaphor, it can be misleading if pushed too far. An alternative is proposed which arguably represents a more appropriate mixture of discreteness and continuity.

Grammatical traces of some ‘invisible’ semantic constructs

Abstract Goldberg overstates the differences between Cognitive Grammar and Cognitive Construction Grammar. The former does not claim that a clause invariably inherits its profile from the verb; it has merely been suggested that the latters preference for monosemy may have been pushed too far. The matter can only be addressed given a specific definition of what is meant in saying that a verb “has” a certain sense. Also, the schematic meanings proposed in Cognitive Grammar for basic grammatical notions do not imply a “reductionist” or “essentialist” view based on classical categorization. Instead they complement the characterization of these notions as “metageneralizations over construction-specific categories”, which otherwise begs the question of why the distributional patterns supporting such generalizations should be observed in the first place.

The English present tense

Abstract This paper briefly introduces some basic notions of cognitive grammar. It emphasizes the importance to linguistic semantics of the way in which we ‘construe’ a conceived situation, and explores the reasons why the nature of the construals we impose are largely ‘invisible’ to us. They can, however, be made visible by the careful analysis of linguistic data. Several examples are given of constructs useful for semantic description which first become apparent from the attempt to explicitly characterize particular grammatical constructions. It is concluded that developing an optimal account of semantic structure and an optimal account of grammatical structure are best conceived as simultaneous, mutually informative enterprises.

Sequential and summary scanning: A reply

It is generally agreed that the English ‘present tense’ is not appropriately analyzed as indicating present time: present-time events often cannot be expressed in the present tense; conversely, the present tense is often used for nonpresent occurrences. I will argue, however, that these problems are only apparent, arising from a failure to appreciate the numerous conceptual factors that are crucially involved. When these are properly elucidated, using notions available in cognitive semantics and cognitive grammar, the characterization ‘coincidence with the time of speaking’ proves remarkably adequate in accounting for present-tense usage.

Proto-Aztecan Vowels: Part I

Abstract It is quite legitimate for Broccias and Hollmann (2007) to question the characterization of verbs in terms of sequential scanning. However, they have not advanced any cogent arguments against it. Although experimental evidence is certainly to be desired, there is no doubt about the psychological status of sequential scanning: it amounts to nothing more than the sequentiality inherent in the real-time experience of events. Its sequentiality should be most fully manifested when a verb is directly apprehended as a grounded clausal head (hence most salient); owing to general effects of compression, a more holistic view should prevail when a verb is subordinated to other elements. The arguments made by B&H concerning the English auxiliary, causatives, and path prepositions are discussed and found to be invalid. Nonetheless, their critique has shown the need for clarification and refinement and has directed attention to important issues.