Roni Michaely

Payout Policy in the 21st Century

We survey 384 CFOs and Treasurers, and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional two dozen, to determine the key factors that drive dividend and share repurchase policies. We find that managers are very reluctant to cut dividends, that dividends are smoothed through time, and that dividend increases are tied to long-run sustainable earnings but much less so than in the past. Rather than increasing dividends, many firms now use repurchases as an alternative. Paying out with repurchases is viewed by managers as being more flexible than using dividends, permitting a better opportunity to optimize investment. Managers like to repurchase shares when they feel their stock is undervalued and in an effort to affect EPS. Dividend increases and the level of share repurchases are generally paid out of residual cash flow, after investment and liquidity needs are met. Financial executives believe that retail investors have a strong preference for dividends, in spite of the tax disadvantage relative to repurchases. In contrast, executives believe that institutional investors as a class have no strong preference between dividends and repurchases. In general, management views provide at most moderate support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play only a secondary role. By highlighting where the theory and practice of corporate payout policy are consistent and where they are not, we attempt to shed new light on important unresolved issues related to payout policy in the 21st century.

Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis

We show that repurchases have not only became an important form of payout for U.S. corporations, but also that firms finance their share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. We find that young firms have a higher propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in the past and that repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. Although large, established firms have generally not cut their dividends, they also show a higher propensity to pay out cash through repurchases. These findings indicate that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. Our results also suggest that before 1983, regulatory constraints inhibited firms from aggressively repurchasing shares.

Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity

Firms that increase (decrease) dividends experience a significant decline (increase) in their systematic risk. The dividend-increasing firms do not increase their capital expenditure and experience a decline in profitability in the years after the dividend change. The positive market reaction to a dividend increase is significantly related to the subsequent decline in systematic risk. In the long run, the dividendincreasing firms with the largest decline in systematic risk also experience the largest increase in price over the next three years, suggesting that the market reaction to dividend changes may not incorporate the full extent of the decline in the cost of capital associated with dividend changes.

When the Underwriter Is the Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in the IPO Aftermarket

This paper examines aftermarket trading of underwriters and unaffiliated market makers in the three-month period after an IPO. We find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker; he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co-managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading. The lead underwriter engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs, and uses the overallotment option to reduce his inventory risk. Compensation to the underwriter arises primarily from fees, but aftermarket trading does generate positive profits, which are positively related to the degree of underpricing. Copyright The American Finance Association 2000.

The Accuracy of Trade Classification Rules: Evidence from Nasdaq

Researchers are increasingly using data from the Nasdaq market to examine pricing behavior, market design, and other microstructure phenomena. The validity of any study that classifies trades as buys or sells depends on the accuracy of the classification method. Using a Nasdaq proprietary data set that identifies trade direction, we examine the validity of several trade classification algorithms. We find that the quote rule, the tick rule, and the Lee and Ready (1991) rule correctly classify 76.4%, 77.66%, and 81.05% of the trades, respectively. However, all classification rules have only a very limited success in classifying trades executed inside the quotes, introducing a bias in the accuracy of classifying large trades, trades during high volume periods, and ECN trades. We also find that extant algorithms do a mediocre job when used for calculating effective spreads. For Nasdaq trades, we propose a new and simple classification algorithm that improves over extant algorithms.

Does the Choice of Auditor Convey Quality in an Initial Public Offering

To investigate the effect of reputation on auditor business decisions, we look at the relationship between auditor reputation and the characteristics of the IPOs that auditors take to the market. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that: 1) More prestigious auditors are associated with IPOs that seem a priori less risky; 2) the market perceives as less risky the IPOs that are associated with more prestigious auditors; and 3) IPOs long-term performance is related to the prestigious of the auditor employed.

Do Price Discreteness and Transactions Costs Affect Stock Returns? Comparing Ex-Dividend Pricing Before and After Decimalization

By the end of January 2001, all NYSE stocks had converted their price quotations from 1/8s and 1/16s to decimals. This study examines the effect of this change in price quotations on ex-dividend day activity. We find that abnormal ex-dividend day returns increase in the 1/16 and decimal pricing eras, relative to the 1/8 era, which is inconsistent with microstructure explanations of ex-day price movements. We also find that abnormal returns increase in conjunction with a May 1997 reduction in the capital gains tax rate, as they should if relative taxation of dividends and capital gains affects ex-day pricing. Copyright 2003 by the American Finance Association.

Investors' Heterogeneity, Prices, and Volume around the Ex-Dividend Day

This paper analyzes the relationship between tax heterogeneity and the behavior of stock prices and trading volume around the ex-dividend day within an equilibrium framework. We conclude that, even in a world without transaction costs, the price drop on the ex-day need not be equal to the dividend amount. Our model accounts for the higher market trading volume around the ex-day, and shows this to be a function of tax heterogeneity among traders. We show that the volume of trade around the ex-day contains information about investors tax preferences above and beyond the information contained in the ex-day price alone. Consistent with the models predictions, our empirical analysis reveals that as the risk associated with the ex-dividend day increases, or tax heterogeneity decreases, trading volume decreases.

Caveat Compounder: A Warning about Using the Daily CRSP Equal-Weighted Index to Compute Long-Run Excess Returns

This paper issues a warning that compounding daily returns of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equal-weighted index can lead to surprisingly large biases. The differences between the monthly returns compounded from the daily tapes and the monthly CRSP equal-weighted indices is almost 0.43 percent per month, or 6 percent per year. This difference amounts to one-third of the average monthly return, and is large enough to reverse the conclusions of a paper using the daily tape to compute the return on the benchmark portfolio. We also investigate the sources of these biases and suggest several alternative strategies to avoid them. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.

The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks

This paper provides an analysis of the nature and evolution of a dealer market for Nasdaq stocks. Despite size differences in sample stocks, there is a surprising consistency to their trading. One dealer tends to dominate trading in a stock. Markets are concentrated and spreads are increasing in the volume and market share of the dominant dealer. Entry and exit are ubiquitous. Exiting dealers are those with very low profits and trading volume. Entering market makers fail to capture a meaningful share of trading or profits. Thus, free entry does little to improve the competitive nature of the market as entering dealers have little impact. We find, however, that for small stocks, the Nasdaq dealer market is being more competitive than the specialist market. Copyright The American Finance Association 2002.