Rory Cormac

Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security

Abstract This article introduces, places in historical context and publishes selected extracts from chapter one of the Report on Colonial Security, which deals specifically with intelligence organisation both in London and overseas. Written by General Sir Gerald Templer in 1955, the report (particularly the intelligence aspects) is significant for the following reasons: it highlights the centralized and colonial intelligence failures in a particularly frank and candid manner; it details channels of communication and liaison between London and the colonies which remain classified elsewhere; and it had a substantial impact on the subsequent reorganisation and reform of intelligence in Whitehall and across the British Empire.

Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency

Abstract Focusing on British involvement in the 1960s Yemen Civil War, this article examines the centralised mechanisms developed in Whitehall to coordinate covert action interdepartmentally. It therefore sheds new light on Londons security and intelligence machine and its input into clandestine operations. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews, it uncovers various important but secretive actors, which have been overlooked or misunderstood in the existing literature, and outlines their functions in the most detail yet available. In doing so, it considers how these bodies evolved in relation to competing threat assessments of the local situation and the impact they had on Britains covert intervention in the theatre. This article assesses the utility of the system and argues that it provided an effective means to ensure that any covert action sanctioned was properly scrutinised so as to reduce risks and best meet national interests.

A Whitehall ‘Showdown’?: Colonial Office—Joint Intelligence Committee Relations in the Mid-1950s

This article sheds light on the somewhat hostile relationship between the Colonial Office (CO) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the mid-1950s. Assessing the reforms recommended following a number of counterinsurgency difficulties, it discusses the role of the CO in the centralised intelligence assessment process. This article argues that relations between the CO and the JIC were underdeveloped and that reforms aimed to allow a greater coordination and a more active JIC input into colonial affairs. However, in doing so, the committee threatened to encroach into CO territory, bringing with it military conceptualisations of the Cold War and an allegedly narrow focus on communist subversion which marginalised more complex colonial problems. This resulted in the threat of a Whitehall ‘showdown’.

Much Ado About Nothing: Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Mechanics of Threat Exaggeration

Through its ability to transcend not only national boundaries but so too departmental jurisdictions and the traditional public-private security divide, the rise of international terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s posed a number of challenges to the British intelligence machinery which remain relevant today. This article focuses on the dangers and mechanics of threat exaggeration and the importance of intelligence coordination to ensure that threats are assessed and reports are disseminated in a realistic manner. Using the over-emphasised threat of maritime terrorism in 1970 as a case study, this article is able to examine the intelligence cycle as a whole and consider the importance of source validation, the dangers of incremental analysis, and the need for coordinated advice disseminated coherently to consumers both inside and outside of the government.

A modern-day requirement for co-ordinated covert action

Covert action can be an important weapon in a state’s arsenal. It is, however, inherently controversial and risky. Rory Cormac, Michael S Goodman and Tom Holman argue that when considering covert action, Whitehall should look to lessons from the recent past. The UK has long used covert action, and how best to manage and co-ordinate such sensitive activity was for many decades a key preoccupation of its policy-makers and politicians. Given the secrecy involved, these lessons, and the machinery created, have been lost to history. Yet with covert action seemingly now back on the agenda, previous experience and hard-learnt lessons have assumed renewed importance.

Covert action failure and fiasco construction: William Hague’s 2011 Libyan venture

ABSTRACT In 2011 William Hague, then British Foreign Secretary, authorized Special Forces to enter Libya and contact rebels opposed to Muammar Gaddafi in the unfolding civil war. However, its members were detained by the rebels and ejected from the country. This article puts the literature on public policy failures into dialogue with that on covert action as a tool of foreign policy. It asks: why did this not develop into a fully fledged policy fiasco when journalists and politicians judged it to have been a major error of judgement on Hague’s part? Using narrative analysis of the contemporary reporting of this incident, we argue that the government – possessing the advantage of information asymmetry accruing from operational secrecy – was able to win the battle of narratives in a frame contestation process. The article reflects on how the study of information asymmetry can enhance the recently revivified research into foreign policy failures.

Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and special forces in contemporary British policy

The United Kingdom has long engaged in covert action. It continues to do so today. Owing to the secrecy involved, however, such activity has consistently been excluded from debates about Britain’s global role, foreign and security policy and military planning: an important lacuna given the controversy, risk, appeal and frequency of covert action. Examining when, how and why covert action is used, this article argues that contemporary covert action has emerged from, and is shaped by, a specific context. First, a gap exists between Britain’s perceived global responsibilities and its actual capabilities; policy elites see covert action as able to resolve, or at least conceal, this. Second, intelligence agencies can shape events proactively, especially at the tactical level, while flexible preventative operations are deemed well suited to the range of fluid threats currently faced. Third, existing Whitehall machinery makes covert action viable. However, current covert action is smaller scale and less provocative today than in the early Cold War; it revolves around ‘disruption’ operations. Despite being absent from the accompanying debates, this role was recognised in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which placed intelligence actors at the heart of British thinking.