Rosita P. Chang

The Effects of Trading Methods on Volatility and Liquidity: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange

This study contrasts the call and continuous auction methods using Taiwan Stock Exchange data. Volatility under the call market method is approximately one-half of that under the continuous auction method. The call market method is more effective in reducing the volatility of high-volume stocks than low-volume stocks. This contradicts conventional wisdom which suggests that the call market method is superior for thinly traded stocks, while the continuous auction method is preferred for heavily traded stocks. The call market method does not impair liquidity and price discovery. The call market appears more efficient than in the continuous auction market. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999.

The Microstructure of Asian Equity Markets

This study provides an overview of six stock markets in Asia, including Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. We find that the Asian stock exchanges have adopted numerous new concepts in terms of market structure, trading method, and the clearing and settlement system. As a group, they provide an intersting setting for empirical investigation due to their unique characteristics not found in the stock exchanges in advanced countries.

Price volatility of Indonesian stocks

Abstract The first-order serial dependence between overnight returns and following daytime returns and between overnight returns and preceding daytime returns is evaluated to gain insight into the intraday volatility behavior of Indonesian stocks. The pattern of price reversals and price continuations observed for Indonesian stocks is different from the U.S. and Japanese markets, reflecting differences in market microstructure of the three markets. Price reversals are dominant over price continuations at the market open as well as market close for Indonesian stocks. These results are different from the U.S. experience since high-volume U.S. stocks tend to show price continuity at the market close, an attribute that is associated with the stabilization activities by market-makers. These results are also different from the Japanese experience which also shows strong price continuations at the market close.

Executive Incentive Compensation and Economic Prosperity

This paper analyzes the existence of a potential link between the prevalence of long term incentive compensation schemes and the economic prosperity of a country. This issue is previously not addressed in the literature. In a panel regression with fixed effects a strongly significant, positive effect is found between growth of GDP/capita in real terms and this prevalence, while controlling for general investment and institutional variables. However, when the 22 countries of the study are divided into European and non-European, the growth effect found for the entire material accrues only to the non-European countries. It is concluded that long term incentive contracts seem to have no effect in the European countries due to labor market and cultural reasons.

Inflation-Caused Wealth-Transfer: A Case of The Insurance Industry

This paper examines the insurance industry for evidence of the inflation-caused wealth-transfer hypothesis originally formulated by Irving Fisher and John Keynes. Contrary to the prediction of this hypothesis, net creditors (mostly property-liability insurers) showed better performance during periods of positive unexpected inflation while net debtors (mostly life insurers) showed no significant effects from either positive or negative unexpected inflation. In summary, the statistical evidence for a wealth transfer due to unexpected inflation is absent for most insurers and, where it exists, it is contrary to that predicted by the Fisher-Keynes hypothesis.

The Impact of CEO Long-Term Equity-Based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist Versus Individualist Countries

This study examines the impact of the prevalence of long-term equity-based chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on GDP growth, and we address the moderating role of individualist versus collectivist cultures on this relationship. We argue that long-term incentives given to CEOs in some firms may convey to other CEOs that they too may be able to receive such incentives and rewards if they emulate the incentivized and rewarded CEOs. In a longitudinal study across 22 nations over a 5-year period, we find that the higher proportion of CEOs in a country are awarded long-term equity-based incentive compensation, the greater future real GDP growth, particularly in collectivist countries.