Rostislav Staněk

Modely a metody regulace konkurenčního prostředí na trhuželezničních dopravních služeb.

Kniha podava souhrnný přehled o soucasnem stavu teoretickeho poznani a modelovani v oblasti fungovani a regulace intermodalni a intramodalni konkurence na trhu železnicnich dopravnich služeb s důrazem na evropske realie a o metodach detekce poruseni regulacnich pravidel a možnostech aplikace napravných opatřeni. Kapitoly obsahuji komentovaný souhrn teoretických konceptů dane problematiky založený na resersi publikovaných odborných textů a přiklady využiti popisovaných metod na zakladě vlastniho výzkumu autorů knihy. Prvni kapitola se zabýva soucasným stavem teoretickeho poznani v oblasti zavaděni konkurence na evropských, původně statnich, monopolnich trzich železnicni dopravy a dale praktickou implementaci železnicnich reforem v clenských zemich EU. Druha kapitola shrnuje kvantitativni techniky použitelne pro empiricke zkoumani stavu a intenzity konkurence na železnici a modelovani poptavky po železnicni dopravě; v zavěrecne casti kapitoly je provedena komparativni analýza jednotlivých modelových přistupů na zakladě dat evropských železnicnich dopravců. Ve třeti kapitole jsou představeny mikroekonomicke přistupy k modelovani struktury odvětvi železnicni dopravy, cenove regulaci a investic do infrastruktury s aplikaci statickeho a dynamickeho efektu režimů regulace. Ctvrta kapitola popisuje metody vymezovani relevantniho trhu na zakladě SSNIP testu, cenových testů, analýzy kriticke ztraty a spotřebitelských setřeni a analyzuje specifika tzv. bidding markets; v zavěru kapitoly je provedena prakticka aplikace vymezeni relevantniho trhu v osobni železnicni dopravě. Pata kapitola se zabýva geografickými přistupy k modelovani železnicniho dopravniho trhu a aplikaci geograficke metody vymezeni relevantniho trhu. Posledni, sesta kapitola dava přehled o využiti dřive popsaných metod ve skutecných postupech soutěžnich autorit ve vzorových zemich Velke Britanii a Německu a o aplikaci soutěžni politiky Evropskou komisi.

Competition and Risk-taking in Banking Industry

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between competition and risk-taking in the banking industry. The paper provides a general theoretical model that incorporates the charter value models and models with contracting problems. In particular, the model contains a moral hazard problem and it enables investments into the risk-free asset. Competition on the loan side of the market is modeled as spatial competition. The model predicts that the relationship between competition and the probability of bank failure is non-monotonic and U shaped. The prediction of the model is verified by the empirical analysis conducted using the data from Czech banking sector. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is used as a measurement of competition and the Z-score is used as measurement of the probability of bank failure.

A dual-fMRI investigation of the iterated Ultimatum Game reveals that reciprocal behaviour is associated with neural alignment

Dyadic interactions often involve a dynamic process of mutual reciprocity; to steer a series of exchanges towards a desired outcome, both interactants must adapt their own behaviour according to that of their interaction partner. Understanding the brain processes behind such bidirectional reciprocity is therefore central to social neuroscience, but this requires measurement of both individuals’ brains during real-world exchanges. We achieved this by performing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) on pairs of male individuals simultaneously while they interacted in a modified iterated Ultimatum Game (iUG). In this modification, both players could express their intent and maximise their own monetary gain by reciprocating their partner’s behaviour – they could promote generosity through cooperation and/or discourage unfair play with retaliation. By developing a novel model of reciprocity adapted from behavioural economics, we then show that each player’s choices can be predicted accurately by estimating expected utility (EU) not only in terms of immediate payoff, but also as a reaction to their opponent’s prior behaviour. Finally, for the first time we reveal that brain signals implicated in social decision making are modulated by these estimates of EU, and become correlated more strongly between interacting players who reciprocate one another.

Time preferences, cognitive abilities and intrinsic motivation to exert effort

ABSTRACT The experimental literature has found a positive relationship between patience and performance in cognitive tests that are not incentivized by money. It has also been shown that unincentivized cognitive tests capture not only cognitive ability (CA), but also intrinsic motivation related to the test takers’ personality traits. In order to determine whether the relationship between patience and test scores is driven by intrinsic motivation or CA, we run an experiment in which subjects take either incentivized or unincentivized cognitive tests. We find that while incentivized test scores positively correlate with patience, the unincentivized scores are not related to the time preferences of our subjects. The observed correlation between patience and cognitive test scores therefore seems to be driven by CA rather than by intrinsic motivation related to personality traits.

Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic

Abstract This paper explores the effect of various contract-awarding procedures in public procurement on the price of the contract. We provide a theoretical model that compares prices in different procedures and tests whether there is a significant price difference between the procedures using data from Czech public procurement. The model predicts that auctions are more efficient than negotiations given the same number of suppliers, and open procedures are more efficient than closed procedures if high-cost firms are selected for the closed procedure. In accordance with the first prediction, we find that open auctions are more efficient than open negotiations. Concerning the second prediction, we find that closed procedures are less efficient than open procedures, which suggests that procurers tend to select relatively more costly firms to participate in closed procedures. Comparing all four awarding procedures, we find that open auctions are the most efficient procedure used in the Czech Republic. We estimate that the inefficiencies due to the use of other contract-awarding procedures are substantial.

Access Pricing Under Imperfect Competition Reconsidered

Abstract This paper claims that Onemli’s results published in “Access Pricing under Imperfect Competition”, Review of Economic Perspectives, 2012, are incorrect. Contrary to Onemli, we claim that in an industry, where a monopoly incumbent produces a key input used by itself and its competitors on a downstream market which is Cournot oligopoly, the regulator should set the second-best access charge such that the incumbent’s total profit is zero if the first-best access charge is not feasible. The competitors’ ability to produce the key input themselves does not change the outcome since no competitor chooses to use this option under this regulation. We also discuss some limitations of the Onemli’s model.