Roy May

Reconstructing Sierra Leone

Sierra Leones ten-year civil conflict ended in 2001 and was followed by a substantial reconstruction project. This article considers how far that programme addresses the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict and to what degree signs of genuine reconciliation are emerging. To do so, three indicators of reconstruction are examined, namely youth alienation, state corruption and national reconciliation. The article concludes that although there has been successful demobilisation, disarmament and infrastructure building, factors that contributed to the conflict have not been tackled and the signs of reconciliation are still slight. Such a foundation is not sufficient to rebuild the nation or to guarantee its future security.

Peacekeeping: the African dimension

Following the end of the cold war there developed a general perception that the United Nations would now be able to adopt a more enhanced role as the worlds peacekeeper and peacemaker, especially if it enjoyed the support of the US. This view appeared to be vindicated following the successful US led UN operation to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1991. However, since then the reluctance of the West to become involved in Africas conflicts unless it is for their own ends, points to establishing an African peacekeeping structure. Yet as this article demonstrates, the political and military structures are not yet in place, nor is there any likelihood that there is any organisation to fill the post‐cold war security vacuum.

Dallas to Doba: Oil and Chad, External Controls and Internal Politics

In 1969 the American oil company Conoco obtained 100 per cent of the rights to explore for oil over 20m acres of Chadian territory. Initial investigation led to the discovery of potentially workable reserves near the town of Doba in southern Chad. Further aerial surveys were conducted around the sedimentary basins of Doba, Lake Chad and Salamat. In 1971 Royal Dutch Shell bought a 50 per cent share of the exploration rights. Two years later President François Ngarta Tombalbaye inaugurated the first test wells summoning the image of the – as yet unbuil t – derr icks establ ishing “firm signposts to development” (www.cefod.org). In 1975, modest reserves, sufficient for domestic needs, were discovered at Sedigui, north of Lake Chad, leading to small-scale extraction. In 1980 the field yielded 1 500 barrels per day (b/d). At this time the US companies Chevron and Exxon bought into the consortium. However, after one year’s operation, the intensification of civil conflict led to the suspension of extraction and the withdrawal of the consortium from further exploration. Under President Hissène Habré the country remained volatile and insecure. Even so, in 1988 the consortium signed a Convention Agreement with the Chadian government that granted exploration rights until early 2004 and provided for a 30–year concession to develop the oilfields around Doba and to produce and transport the oil to market, assuming the success of the exploration effort (www2.exxonmobil.com). The generous tax concessions and low royalties negotiated by the consortium in the event of exploitation have been described as “abusive” by the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (2000:17–21). At the same time another agreement was signed with the same consortium to address Chad’s dependence on petroleum imports and its chronic electricity shortfall by linking the Sedigui oil field to a mini-refinery at Farcha outside N’Djaména. This agreement was suspended in 1993.

African peacekeeping: Still dependent?

While at the moment African armies have some significant experience of peacekeeping, the structures are not yet in place that would enable African states to establish and maintain a peacekeeping force. The existing problems of command and control, organization, logistics and coordination need to be overcome before an effective force can come into existence. The continuation of these problems reinforces the dependence of African states upon Western nations for mounting peacekeeping operations, particularly in the area of logistics. The article investigates the capacity of Africas militaries to carry out peacekeeping operations and indicates the type of assistance they continue to require and the offers of help they have received.

The limits of democracy in commonwealth Africa

For the new democracies there was no clean slate to begin with. The past was scribbled all over it. Yet assessing the degree to which structure, as opposed to agency, determined the current varied levels of democracy is not possible. Like watching a staggered start of a race of parents and children at the school sports day, one is not sure if the finishing positions are determined by the muscle power of the runners or their starting positions on the track. Certainly the Commonwealth shows contrasting points of departure for the new democracies. For instance, in places the current ruling party and executive leadership predate redemocratisation. Their political experience in securing and exercising political control was non-democratic, including military coups (Ghana and The Gambia), armed rebellions (Uganda and Mozambique), ethnic confrontation (Kenya) and general authoritarian practices. On the other hand, some contemporary leaders have their roots in pro-democracy movements and have always extolled the virtues of democratic values (Zambia, South Africa). This, however, is not a fully satisfactory approach to explaining current differences in democratic performance. Its premise that every former pro-democracy campaigner must be beyond mixed motives, is unsustainable and naive. If it were true, then we would expect from the case studies that former authoritarian leaders, like Rawlings or Museveni, make worse democratic rulers than former pro-democracy leaders like Chiluba. As a point of departure, the previous conduct of todays leaders of democracies makes a poor forecaster of democratic performance.

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Chad's Protracted 'Transition to Democracy'

Chad’s politicians value democracy. At least, this would seem a reasonable deduction from the number of parties that allude to democracy in their official titles. Out of 48 political organizations listed in a recent edition of Africa South of the Sahara (1998), the terms ‘démocratique’ or ‘démocratie’ are included in the names of 29 of them. Chad’s leading party, the Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS) of President Idriss Deby, is not one of them. Deby’s defeat of Hissène Habré’s authoritarian regime engendered hopes for an end to the civil war that has been a feature of Chadian life for almost all the country’s post-colonial existence, and also led to hopes that a workable democratic model could be set up, which would finally give Chadians a say in the governance of the country. Was this optimism justified?

The Chadian Party System: Rhetoric and Reality

In Chad a pluralist system of political parties rather than factions has been over a decade in gestation. After an examination of the background to Chads democratic transition, the rules governing party formation are considered and the relative implantation of the five main parties assessed. The performance of the parties in the two sets of elections held since President Idriss Deby came to power in 1990 is outlined and evaluated. A final analysis considers five potential functions that Chadian parties might perform to contribute to democratic consolidation: representation, conflict resolution, making government accountable, institutionalizing democracy and regime legitimization. It concludes that Chadian parties remain personalist, regional and ideologically shallow. Many parties retain factional tendencies and the return to a politico-military posture remains an option.