Rubens Nunes

Food‐Retail Development and the Myth of Everyday Low Prices: The Case of Brazil

This article analyses the changes in Brazilian food retailing by investigating the co‐existence of, and the pricing variation across, large supermarket chains and small independent supermarkets. It uses cointegration tests to show that, despite the widespread belief that small supermarkets are inefficient and charge higher prices, they in fact charge lower prices. Accordingly, in contrast to the prevailing literature on food‐retail development, competition in food retail is complex and cannot be described as a simple Darwinian process of market concentration. The article explores the survival of small retail and its consequences for the current discussion on modern food retail in developing countries.

The Contractual Nature of Two-Sided Platforms: A Research Note

The present paper investigates the organizational nature of two-sided platforms. The article departs from the classical case of an industry that presents some intrinsic characteristics which give to it the status of a two-sided market. Specifically, the paper considers that the decision of a firm to operate as a traditional merchant or as a platform is based on a bargaining process between the firm and its suppliers, resulting in an incomplete contract which is supported by a particular combination of price and non-price instruments. Founded on this approach, this essay addresses some fundamental issues in the economics of hybrid forms in two-sided platforms through the examination of the decision of a supermarket to operate as a conventional retailer or as a platform.

A Natureza Contratual de Plataformas de Dois Lados: nota de pesquisa DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v5n1p153-165

The present paper discusses the organizational nature of two-sided platforms. The article departs from the classical case of an industry that presents some intrinsic characteristics which give to it the status of a two-sided market. Specifically, the paper considers that the decision of a firm to operate as a traditional merchant or as a platform is based on a bargaining process between the firm and its suppliers, resulting in an incomplete contract which is supported by a particular combination of price and non-price instruments. Founded on this approach, this essay addresses some fundamental issues in the economics of hybrid forms in two-sided platforms through the examination of the decision of a supermarket to operate as a conventional retailer or as a platform.