Rui A. Albuquerque

Optimal Dynamic Lending Contracts with Imperfect Enforceability

In this paper we have developed a general model of borrowing constraints based on the idea of limited enforcement. I our model, borrowing constraints arise as part of the optimal borrowing and lending contract. Our model extends previous theories of borrowing and lending , such as Hart and Moore (1994) allowing for uncertainty and dynamic effects of the resulting credit constraints.

Economic News and International Stock Market Co-Movement

We analyze the effects that real-time domestic and foreign news about fundamentals have on the co-movement between stock returns of a small, open economy, Portugal, and a large economy, the United States. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find that US macroeconomic news and Portuguese earnings news do not affect stock market co-movement, whereas Portuguese macroeconomic news lowers stock market co-movement. We find that US news affects Portuguese stock market returns, though less so when US stock market returns are included in the regression. We provide evidence, contrary to common wisdom, that this last result does not derive from contagion. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Advance information and asset prices

This paper provides a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model in which investors have heterogeneous information and investment opportunities. Informed investors privately receive advance information about future earnings that is unrelated to current earnings. In response to good advance information, stock prices increase and informed investors act as trend chasers, increasing their investment in stocks. Informed investors also buy other investment opportunities that are positively correlated with stocks, bearing more aggregate risk. The expected risk premium increases generating short-run momentum. Uninformed investors sell stocks, acting as contrarians. When the advance information materializes in the future, excess returns fall, generating long-run reversals.

On the dynamics of trade reform

The empirical evidence on trade reforms suggests that these have a surprisingly small impact on the countrys industrial configuration. This industrial structure inertia is difficult to rationalize in standard trade models. This paper develops a two-sector industry dynamics model in which industrial composition inertia arises naturally. The model is then used to study the consequences of different types of trade reforms (e.g. permanent, temporary, gradual, pre-announced) on investment, employment composition, and income distribution.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms have a choice to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR as an investment to increase product differentiation that allows firms to benefit from higher profit margins. The model predicts that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value and that these effects are stronger for firms with high product differentiation. We find supporting evidence for our predictions. We address a potential endogeneity problem by instrumenting CSR using data on the political affiliation of the firms home state.

Optimal Currency Hedging

This paper characterizes optimal currency hedging in several models of downside risk. We consider, in turn, three models of hedging: (i) a firm that chooses its hedging policy in the presence of bankruptcy costs; (ii) an all equity firm that faces a convex tax schedule; and (iii) a firm whose manager is subject to loss aversion. In all these models, and contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that forwards dominate options as hedges of downside risk.

The Value of Control and the Costs of Illiquidity

An inherent difficulty in valuing controlling blocks of shares is the illiquidity of the market. We explore the pricing implications associated with the illiquidity of controlling blocks of shares in the context of a search model of block trades. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a less efficient acquirer. Second, this sale may occur at a fire sale price. Third, absent a liquidity shock, a trade occurs only if a potential buyer arrives. We use a structural estimation approach and U.S. data on trades of controlling blocks of public corporations to identify these dimensions of illiquidity. We obtain estimates of counter-factual valuations that would result in the absence of illiquidity that are used to measure the blockholders’ marketability discount and the dispersed shareholders’ illiquidity-spillover discount.

Trade Credit and Cross-country Predictable Firm Returns

We investigate the role of trade credit links in generating cross-border return predictability between international firms. Using data from 43 countries from 1993 to 2009, we find that firms with high trade credit located in producer countries have stock returns that are strongly predictable based on the returns of their associated customer countries. This behavior is especially prevalent among firms with high levels of foreign sales. To better understand this effect we develop an asset pricing model in which firms in different countries are connected by trade credit links. The model offers further predictions about this phenomenon, including stronger predictability during periods of high credit constraints and low uninformed trading volume. We find supportive empirical evidence for these predictions.

International Corporate Governance Spillovers: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions

We test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country non-target firms. Using firm-level data from 22 countries, we find that cross-border M&A activity is associated with subsequent improvements in the governance of target firms’ rivals. The spillover is more pronounced when the acquirer’s country has stronger investor protection than the target’s country, and when the target operates in a competitive industry. Cross-border M&As also lead to increases in valuation and reductions in overinvestment of non-target firms. Our results suggest that the international market for corporate control promotes functional convergence in corporate governance.

The Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly dealing with the existence of both block premia and block discounts in the data. We find evidence that the occurrence of block premia and block discounts depends on the controlling block holders ability to fight a potential tender offer for the targets stock. Private benefits represent 3% of the target firms stock market value. Private benefits increase with the targets cash holdings and decrease with its short term debt providing evidence in favor of Jensens free cash flow hypothesis. A counterfactual policy evaluation of the Mandatory Bid Rule suggests that it fails to add value to shareholders because it fails to prevent welfare decreasing transactions and, by forcing inefficient tender offers, it deters welfare increasing transactions.