Rupprecht Podszun

The Arbitrariness of Market Definition and an Evolutionary Concept of Markets

Market definition is highly relevant in European case practice in competition law. Yet the tools and also the concepts are far from being very sophisticated. The critique of market definition by Richard Markovits is far-reaching: not only is market definition arbitrary, but current approaches also have an in-built bias towards a static snapshot understanding of the economy. Yet it would be wrong to give up this important step in antitrust analysis, since otherwise antitrust loses its function as the fundamental set of governing rules for markets. Instead, it is necessary to develop a more evolutionary concept of markets.

The More Technological Approach: Competition Law in the Digital Economy

The claim that the internet has changed everything is a commonplace in blogs and presentations. It is definitely untrue, though, for competition law. If one compares the rules and the application of the rules in Europe in 2014 and in 1994 it is hard to spot a principal difference that is causally linked to the rise of the internet—apart from the facts of some cases: nowadays, mobile phones are more important than landlines, media houses fight for advertising budget in the net, and big brands force their distributors to polish their virtual stores instead of brick-and-mortar-stores. So, mainstream competition law has it that a website essentially is nothing but a high-street shop.

Nach Huawei/ZTE: Die kartellrechtliche Zwangslizenz im Patentverletzungsprozess

Zusammenfassung Der EuGH hat mit der Entscheidung in der Sache Huawei/ZTE die Diskussion um die kartellrechtliche Zwangslizenz nicht etwa geklärt, sondern nur in eine neue Bahn gelenkt. Die zentrale Frage bleibt, wie die Zwangslizenz im Verfahren operationabel gemacht wird. Nach einem Überblick über die Grundlagen (II) wird anhand der Neuerungen der Entscheidung des EuGH die kartellrechtliche Zwangslizenz als Verfahrensproblem betrachtet (III). Im Anschluss werden die wesentlichen inhaltlichen Problemfelder identifiziert, deren Lösung das durchzuführende Verfahren zu leisten hat (IV). Dazu werden alternative Konfliktlösungsmöglichkeiten vorgestellt (V). Ein Fazit schließt die Betrachtung ab. Die Huawei-Entscheidung ist bereits Gegenstand zahlreicher Aufsätze geworden. Der vorliegende Text soll die Diskussion erstens um eine weitere Auswertung der inzwischen ergangenen Folge-Urteile bereichern. Zweitens wird in diesem Beitrag versucht, das Problem stärker anhand von drei Grundgedanken zu analysieren, die in Teil I 3 vorgestellt werden.

SEP Litigation and Huawei: Negotiations in the Shadow of Competition Law

In the 2015 case Huawei/ZTE, the Court of Justice of the European Union took one of its rare opportunities to rule on the interface of antitrust and patent law. The question before the Court was whether the holder of a standard-essential patent abuses a dominant position by seeking an injunction against a potential licensee. Regarding a previous line of cases under European law, the Court took a surprisingly easy solution by forcing the companies to get back to the negotiation table. This may be attributed to a new methodological balancing approach of the Court. While acknowledging the problem of patent thickets, the Court restrains the role of antitrust authorities in this field.

The Digital Economy:: Three Chances for Competition Law

Th is must surely be a record in speed of enforcement: on 18 February 2015, the Russian antitrust authority (FAS)1 received a complaint against Google by a company named Yandex, its competitor. Ten months later, on 18 December of that same year, the FAS found that Google violated Part 1, Article 10 of the Russian Law on Protection of Competition.2 Th ree months later, the Arbitration Court of Moscow upheld the authority’s decision, so did the Appeal Court.3 On 11 August this year, FAS decided to impose a fi ne of RUB 438 million against Google.4 On 2 September, an application from Google to suspend the execution of the prohibition order was rejected, with the FAS arguing that it had already granted an extension before.5 Th e theory of harm in the case was that Google abused a dominant position for operating systems of mobile phones with its Android programme. According to the FAS, Google obliged contractors to purchase the entire Google Mobile Services package, to pre-set Google search as default, to place Google apps favourably on the screen and not to pre-install competitors’ apps. From a European perspective, the sheer speed of the Russian proceedings is breathtaking. Th e Directorate General for Competition initiated proceedings against Google in 2010 and ever since, the antitrust community is awaiting a decision in this landmark case for competition in the digital economy.6 Actually, expectations by politicians and

Regulatory Innovation and the Institutional Design of the TRIPS Agreement

This contribution seeks to provide an answer to the question how much regulatory innovation TRIPS allows. It starts from the premise that TRIPS fosters innovation—and actually legal regimes should also profit from the benefits of an innovative structure. This, however, clashes with traditional concepts of legal certainty. The benefits outweigh the costs of a less certain, more open legal regime. The debate on regulatory competition pays some attention to this. The authors thus analyse the TRIPS Agreement with specific focus on the regulatory power and pressure exerted by rules in TRIPS. For this endeavour, they apply an institutional perspective and turn to regulatory techniques used in TRIPS. Regarding the regulation of intellectual property in TRIPS, different mechanisms can be distinguished that have a different impact for the member states. To make this plain, the authors “code” the different instruments used in the Agreement with numbers attaching more extreme numbers to rules that have a high intensity of regulation. In a second step, the authors analyse the meta-structure of TRIPS to find out how open it is for adaption. Several different approaches towards TRIPS are included. In both instances, the authors point to the possibilities of change. A shift towards a more innovation-friendly, more open, more flexible regulatory regime would make TRIPS a “learning treaty”.

Corporate Social Responsibility-Standards: Rechtstheoretische Aspekte und die Frage, was den „Markenkern“ der Rechtswissenschaft ausmacht

Corporate Social Responsibility Standards etablieren sich in der Wirtschaft als eigenstandige Form der Regulierung. Rechtstheoretisch sind sie schwierig zu erfassen, da nach traditionellem Verstandnis in diesen Verhaltenskodizes keine Rechtsnormen zu sehen sind. Durch diese rechtstheoretische Abschottung gerat die Rechtswissenschaft in Gefahr, den Zugriff auf diese Form von regelbasierter Ordnung zu verlieren. Das ist angesichts der engen Verknupfung solcher Standards mit klassischem Recht nicht mehr zeitgemas. Ein Ausweg ist, entsprechende Verhaltenskodizes als autonome Setzungen mit Rechtsnormcharakter anzusehen, sie also vertragsrechtlich zu analysieren. Das wurde den Zugriff der Rechtstheorie (und auch des UWG in § 4 Nr. 11) ermoglichen. Die Rechtswissenschaft ist dann gefordert, die unternehmerischen Selbstverpflichtungen dogmatisch zu durchdringen. Ansatze dazu bietet das Konzept der Meta-Regulierung.

Rules on Competition after the Crisis

This chapter aims at framing ideas on how to improve the rules on restrictive and unfair business practices in the aftermath of the financial crisis. If something was rotten in the international legal framework for the financial industry, then it is necessary to turn to the fields of economic law. Many scholars and legislative initiatives have focused on specific laws for capital markets and the supervisory authorities. This chapter looks into another direction and goes to the very roots of economic law: the basics of business behavior are regulated by the most general laws of contract, property, liability, and competition.

Anthropological and Economic Foundations of FairEconomy as a Free Market System

The main task of every economy is to enable humans to meet their needs. An economy is to satisfy hunger, not to create it; to quench thirst, not to make thirsty. To have an economy serve this goal, social norms have to be in place and be applied.1 These norms may have legal, moral, religious, political (or other) character.2 They have to be ready to deal with human needs, which in turn represent the data to be judged by them.

A Matter of Risk and Balance – Discussing a System of Liability for Financial Products

The Greek origin of the word “crisis” points to a situation in which decisions need to be taken, to a moment where a turning point has been reached and the contingent possibility of action has been condensed to a factual necessity. So far, the new millennium has witnessed a particularly obstinate string of economic, political and social crises. Hence, it is not surprising to see a multitude of proposals being forwarded to handle ongoing, prevent future, and reflect upon past crises. Supportive measures go hand in hand with possible sanctions to restore order to a world in not only but especially economically troubled waters.