Ruud Custers

The Unconscious Will: How the Pursuit of Goals Operates Outside of Conscious Awareness

Blissful Ignorance? Although recent research has established the remarkable ways in which cognitive processing can occur without our being aware of it—for instance, casual exposure to retiree-related words, such as “elderly,” induces us to walk more slowly—behavior that is directed toward goals still seems to be the product of conscious thought. Custers and Aarts (p. 47) review a set of findings that point toward the possibility that goals may, in fact, also be vulnerable to manipulation via avenues of which we remain blissfully unaware. They place these results within a framework that reveals how thoroughly unconscious processes permeate our everyday activities. People often act in order to realize desired outcomes, or goals. Although behavioral science recognizes that people can skillfully pursue goals without consciously attending to their behavior once these goals are set, conscious will is considered to be the starting point of goal pursuit. Indeed, when we decide to work hard on a task, it feels as if that conscious decision is the first and foremost cause of our behavior. That is, we are likely to say, if asked, that the decision to act produced the actions themselves. Recent discoveries, however, challenge this causal status of conscious will. They demonstrate that under some conditions, actions are initiated even though we are unconscious of the goals to be attained or their motivating effect on our behavior. Here we analyze how goal pursuit can possibly operate unconsciously.

The nonconscious cessation of goal pursuit: when goals and negative affect are coactivated.

Extending on the recent investigation into the implicit affective processes underlying motivation and decision making, 5 studies examined the role of negative affect in moderating goal priming effects. Specifically, experimental effects on measures that typify motivational qualities of goal systems, such as keeping a goal at a heightened level of mental accessibility and exerting effort to work for a goal and experiencing desire to attain the goal, showed that the motivation and resultant operation of social goals cease when these goals are primed in temporal proximity of negatively valenced information. These goal cessation effects resulting from the mere coactivation of a goal and negative affect are discussed against the background of present research on nonconscious goal pursuit and the role of accessibility and desirability in the regulation of automatic goal-directed behavior.

Preparing and Motivating Behavior Outside of Awareness

The mere activation of the idea of a behavioral act moves the human body without the person consciously deciding to take action. In an experiment, we showed that people subliminally primed with the concept of exertion were faster to squeeze a hand grip forcefully but expended more effort when the subliminal primes were directly accompanied by consciously visible positive stimuli. These findings demonstrate the human capacity to rely on mental processes in preparing and motivating behavior outside of awareness.

Mindful Attention Prevents Mindless Impulses

Three studies illustrate that mindful attention prevents impulses toward attractive food. Participants received a brief mindfulness procedure in which they observed their reactions to external stimuli as transient mental events rather than subjectively real experiences. Participants then applied this procedure to viewing pictures of highly attractive and neutral food items. Finally, reactions to food stimuli were assessed with an implicit approach-avoidance task. Across experiments, spontaneous approach reactions elicited by attractive food were fully eliminated in the mindful attention condition compared to the control condition, in which participants viewed the same items without mindful attention. These effects were maintained over a 5-minute distraction period. Our findings suggest that mindful attention to one’s own mental experiences helps to control impulsive responses and thus suggest mindfulness as a potentially powerful method for facilitating self-regulation.

The Unconscious Eye Opener: Pupil Dilation Reveals Strategic Recruitment of Resources Upon Presentation of Subliminal Reward Cues

Recent research suggests that reward cues, in the absence of awareness, can enhance people’s investment of physical resources (Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Pessiglione et al., 2007). Pessiglione et al., for example, showed that participants spent more physical effort in a demanding force task when they could gain a high-value coin (a pound) than when they could gain a low-value coin (a penny), even when the coins were presented subliminally (i.e., below the threshold of awareness). One explanation for this intriguing finding is that subliminal reward information is processed strategically—that the costs (i.e., the required effort) and benefits (i.e., the value of the reward) of an action are weighed against each other. However, such a weighing process would require higher control functions (Cohen, Heller, & Ranganath, 2005) that are typically thought to operate only on information available to consciousness (Baars, 2002). Another explanation is that the prime directly boosts resources. From this perspective, the effects of subliminal rewards can be explained in terms of low-level, reflex-like responses to primes (Bargh, 2006). Here, we challenge the latter perspective by examining the interaction of reward value and task demands. We aim to show that resources are not directly recruited in reaction to high-reward cues, but instead are recruited strategically—only when the task requires it, and regardless of whether or not the cues enter conscious awareness. In a computerized experiment, we employed an on-line, physiological index: pupil dilation. Because the pupil dilates with sympathetic activity and constricts with parasympathetic activity (Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004), pupil size is an accurate and unobtrusive measure of the resources invested in a task. Ruling out potential alternative explanations, such as anxiety, research demonstrates that pupil dilation increases when tasks require more resources, either because of variations within or between tasks (Kahneman, 1973) or because of individual differences in, for example, cognitive ability (Ahern & Beatty, 1979). These findings demonstrate that the amount of resources individuals need to mobilize for a task can be reliably indexed by changes in their pupil size. If subliminal reward cues input into the strategic processes involved in resource recruitment, the effects of rewards on pupil dilation should occur when the task is demanding (here, recall of five digits), but not when the task is undemanding (recall of three digits), as undemanding tasks can be completed routinely and do not require many resources. It is important to note that this interactive effect of reward and demand on recruitment of resources is expected to occur regardless of whether the reward is processed consciously or nonconsciously.

Mechanisms of motivation-cognition interaction : challenges and opportunities

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.

Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort, but do not change speed–accuracy tradeoffs

While both conscious and unconscious reward cues enhance effort to work on a task, previous research also suggests that conscious rewards may additionally affect speed-accuracy tradeoffs. Based on this idea, two experiments explored whether reward cues that are presented above (supraliminal) or below (subliminal) the threshold of conscious awareness affect such tradeoffs differently. In a speed-accuracy paradigm, participants had to solve an arithmetic problem to attain a supraliminally or subliminally presented high-value or low-value coin. Subliminal high (vs. low) rewards made participants more eager (i.e., faster, but equally accurate). In contrast, supraliminal high (vs. low) rewards caused participants to become more cautious (i.e., slower, but more accurate). However, the effects of supraliminal rewards mimicked those of subliminal rewards when the tendency to make speed-accuracy tradeoffs was reduced. These findings suggest that reward cues initially boost effort regardless of whether or not people are aware of them, but affect speed-accuracy tradeoffs only when the reward information is accessible to consciousness.

Beyond priming effects: The role of positive affect and discrepancies in implicit processes of motivation and goal pursuit

Recent research demonstrates that goal pursuit can be instigated without conscious interventions when the mental accessibility of goal representations is enhanced by environmental cues. However, the mechanisms producing this non-conscious, motivational, goal-directed activity are not clearly addressed in the literature. In this chapter we present a framework within which the non-conscious activation of goal-directed behaviour can be understood. The framework departs from the idea that a goal is represented as a desired state and identifies three characteristics of this representation that render non-conscious goal pursuit more likely to occur: its mental accessibility, the discrepancy of the represented state with the actual state, and its association with positive affect. We present findings, largely established in our own labs, that demonstrate the crucial role of these three factors. We will close the chapter by showing how the framework can help to address some of the pressing issues in the research on non-conscious goal pursuit.

Priming and authorship ascription: when nonconscious goals turn into conscious experiences of self-agency.

The conscious experience of self-agency (i.e., the feeling that one causes ones own actions and their outcomes) is fundamental to human self-perception. Four experiments explored how experienced self-agency arises from a match between nonconsciously activated outcome representations and the subsequent production of the outcome and explored specifically how implicit motivation to produce the outcome may impinge on this process. Participants stopped a rapidly presented sequence of colors on a computer screen. Subsequently, they were presented with what could be the color on which they had stopped the sequence or a color that was randomly chosen by the computer. Agency ratings after each trial revealed that priming outcomes (a specific color) just before the outcome was produced enhanced experienced self-agency. Importantly, priming outcomes relatively far in advance also augmented self-agency, but only if the outcome was attached to positive affect and thus operating as a nonconscious goal maintaining the outcome representation active over time. As such, these studies show how the mechanisms underlying nonconscious goal pursuit promote experiences of self-agency, thus integrating 2 lines of research that so far have led separate lives.

Goal-Discrepant Situations Prime Goal-Directed Actions if Goals Are Temporarily or Chronically Accessible

This research tested the hypothesis that perception of goal-discrepant situations automatically (i.e., without conscious intent) facilitates access to representations of instrumental actions if goal representations are mentally accessible. Employing a probe-recognition paradigm, Experiment 1 established that sentences describing situations that are discrepant with the goal of “looking well-groomed” (e.g., having dirty shoes) automatically increased the accessibility of representations of appropriate instrumental actions (e.g., polishing) in comparison to control situations, but only when participants frequently pursued the goal. Experiments 2a and 2b suggest that this effect was due to chronic accessibility of the goal representation and demonstrate that the same effects occur if the accessibility of the goal is temporarily enhanced (by subliminal priming) for people that nonfrequently pursue the goal.