Ryan D. Griffiths

Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist Outcomes

Common wisdom and current scholarship hold that governments need to stand firm in the face of secessionist demands, since permitting the secession of one region can set a precedent for others. For this reason governments will often choose blood rather than risk dissolution. I argue that administrative organization provides states with a third option. Those regions that represent a unique administrative type stand a much better chance of seceding peacefully. Moreover, large articulated states sometimes downsize by administrative category, which helps explain why governments will release one set of units without contest while preventing another set from doing the same. Finally, secessionist movements that do not cohere with any administrative region are the least likely to be granted independence. In sum, the administrative architecture of states provides governments with a means to discriminate between secessionist demands. I test this theory in a large-N study using original data on secessionist movements and administrative units between 1816 and 2011

Introducing the International System(s) Dataset (ISD), 1816–2011

We argue that the Correlates of War dataset on sovereign state membership has two weaknesses: a requirement that states maintain diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and a size inconsistency that disqualifies many mid-sized states in the pre-1920 period. As a consequence, entire state systems are excluded from the data, and the total number of states during the nineteenth century is undercounted. After reviewing two other approaches to identifying states, we offer an alternative set of criteria that identifies 100 completely new cases, and a total of 363 states between 1816 and 2011. These modifications reveal several previously overlooked patterns. Most importantly, the global trend in the number of states over time is concave. From a high of 134 in 1816, states declined precipitously in the mid-nineteenth century through the processes of accession, conquest, and unification. This pattern of state consolidation bottomed out in 1912, and states have proliferated since 1945. However, the pattern of state death and state birth varied by region in the nineteenth century. Whereas the state systems of South Asia and Southeast Asia experienced a steady reduction in the number of states, Africa underwent a more dynamic process of state formation, consolidation, and death.

Admission to the sovereignty club: the past, present, and future of the international recognition regime

ABSTRACT Admission to the sovereignty club: the past, present, and future of the international recognition regime. Territory, Politics, Governance. The rules and practices of sovereign recognition are basic elements of the territorial design of the international system, but our understanding of these processes is under-theorized. This paper first conceptualizes sovereignty as a club good – excludable and non-rival – and specifies the threat that secession poses to existing states. It then examines the ways in which the club of sovereign states has limited membership in the past, including: (1) the pre-1816 European order in which liberal norms were absent and states colluded to deny independence to aspiring nations; (2) the age of de facto statehood from 1816 to 1918 in which self-determination came to be perceived as a negative right; and (3) the post-1945 era in which an evolving constitutive order has attempted to define which nations are eligible for independence. The paper then explores three potential futures of the international recognition regime, including an exclusive emphasis on sovereign consent, the consolidation of a remedial right to secede and the implementation of a primary right to choose independence. Throughout the discussion it is shown how each regime has balanced the competing demands of the sovereign and liberal traditions, and the strengths and weaknesses of each for international order are highlighted.

Alternative international systems? System structure and violent conflict in nineteenth-century West Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia

Were precolonial state systems different to the European model? If so, how did these state systems vary, and do variations in system structure influence the frequency of war? In this article we assess the structure off international systems in nineteenth-century West Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia using new data on precolonial states that corrects for some of the biases in the existing Correlates of War state system membership data. We develop a framework to capture variation in political order above and below the state, and explore the similarities and differences between these systems and the European system we know and study. We then assess how rates of inter- and intra-state war varied across these systems. Our results suggest: (1) It is the nature of hierarchy (not so much anarchy) that varies across these systems; and (2) inter-state wars are more frequent, but less intense, in systems composed of decentralised states. Language: en

The future of self-determination and territorial integrity in the Asian Century

Abstract The twentieth century saw the rise of two important and interrelated norms. The first is the norm of self-determination, which advances the right of stateless nations to govern themselves. The second is the norm of territorial integrity, which upholds the principle that political borders should be respected. A consequence of these norms has been an increase in secessionism, a decline in conquest, and a proliferation of states. This paper will examine the development of these norms, their interrelationship, and their prospects for the future. Attention will be given to three important questions: (1) Under what conditions does a norm endure beyond a power transition? (2) How likely is an ascendant China or India to support the norms? (3) What does a power transition and the corresponding support of these norms augur for the future of secession, conquest, and the number of sovereign states?

States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order

How would a hegemonic China shape international norms related to states, nations, and territoriality? Scholars have noted the conflict between the right of minority nations to self-determine and the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity. An unrestricted application of the former would risk considerable state fragmentation; an unconditional acceptance of the latter would condemn stateless nations to a subordinate status. Powerful actors like the United States have attempted to navigate these norms by specifying the conditions under which one norm should take precedence over the other, but such decisions are difficult to make in an international environment that lacks consensus, and the result is an ambiguous international order where conflict is common. I analyze the future of these norms in a Chinese-led international order, explaining why China would champion territorial integrity over self-determination, and why this would be better for territorial stability.

The Waltzian ordering principle and international change: A two-dimensional model

In his work on structural realism, Kenneth Waltz developed a theory of international order that is admired for its parsimony but criticized for its simplicity. Using his ordering principle as a foundation, I critique and extend his theory by constructing a model of international order with two dimensions: one of political centralization and the other of segmentary/functional differentiation. The resulting map locates different configurations of order and highlights four ideal-types: mechanical anarchy, organic hierarchy, mechanical hierarchy and organic anarchy. I then use the two-dimensional map and related ideal-types to outline two different processes of international change — a classical path and a modern path — that were invisible in the Waltzian model. This article is thus a contribution to the developing literature on conceptualizing different forms of international order and the dynamics of international change.