Tanisha M. Fazal

Dead Wrong?: Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War's Demise

Is war in decline? Recent scholarship suggests that it is. The empirical basis for this argument is a decline in battle deaths over the past several centuries, a standard metric for counting wars and armed conflicts. Dramatic improvements in medical care in conflict zones—in preventive medicine, battlefield medicine, evacuation, and protective equipment—have raised the likelihood of surviving battle wounds today compared with past eras. Thus the fact that war has become less fatal does not necessarily mean that it has become less frequent. Original data on wounded-to-killed ratios, supplemented by medical research and interviews with physicians from the military and nongovernmental communities, is used to advance this claim. The results show that the decline in war is likely not as dramatic as some scholars have argued. These findings question the foundation of existing datasets on war and armed conflict. They also highlight the growing need for policy focused on the battle wounded.

Why States No Longer Declare War

Why have states stopped issuing declarations of war? Declaring war was a norm of international politics for millennia, but now appears to have exited states’ behavioral repertoires. I argue that the proliferation of codified jus in bello, the law of war governing belligerent conduct, has created disincentives for states to issue formal declarations of war. The increasing number of codified international laws that govern belligerent conduct during warfare has made complying with the laws of war extremely costly. One way for states to limit these costs is to avoid admitting they are in a formal state of war by refraining from declaring war. I test this claim, as well as others, using an original data set. I also discuss several cases of nineteenth and twentieth century wars that illustrate the logic of this argument.

Religionist rebels & the sovereignty of the divine

Existing categorizations of rebel groups have difficulty classifying some of todays most vexing rebels–those, such as the Islamic State, that reject the Westphalian state system and depend on an almost entirely religious justification for their cause. Such rebel groups often have unlimited war aims and are unwilling to negotiate with the states whose sovereignty they challenge. In this essay, I present the new category of “religionist rebels.” I show that religionist rebels have been present throughout the history of the state system, and explore the particular challenges they pose in the civil war context. Religionist rebels are often brutal in their methods and prosecute wars that are especially difficult to end. But the nature of religionist rebellion also suggests natural limits. Thus, religionist rebels do not, ultimately, present a long-term threat to the state system.

Rebellion, War Aims & the Laws of War

Most wars today are civil wars, but we have little understanding of the conditions under which rebel groups might comply with the laws of war. i ask three questions in this essay: What do the laws of war require of rebels, or armed nonstate actors (ansas)? To what extent are rebels aware of the laws of war? Under what conditions do rebel groups comply with international humanitarian law? i argue that the war aims of rebel groups are key to understanding their relationship with the laws of war. In particular, secessionist rebel groups – those that seek a new, independent state – are especially likely to comply with the laws of war as a means to signal their capacity and willingness to be good citizens of the international community to which they seek admission.

Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict

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An Occult of Irrelevance? Multimethod Research and Engagement with the Policy World

Many security studies scholars concerned with the policy relevance of the field have argued that the use of quantitative methods impairs policy relevance. I investigate this claim by looking at the relationship between research methods on the one hand and the supply of and demand for policy-relevant research on the other. I argue that scholars using quantitative methods, either on their own or in tandem with qualitative methods, appear to be increasingly likely to conduct and disseminate policy-relevant research. I also find that curricular changes in policy schools as well as new information technologies mean that policymakers are increasingly able to consume research based on quantitative methods. These trends suggest that the current focus on methodology as the explanation for policy irrelevance may be misplaced.

Why Are Failed States’ Borders Stable against External Predation?

The term “state failure” evokes images of anarchy in Mogadishu, rebel armies in Kinshasa, and sectarian violence in Iraq. In each of these cases, neighboring states faced strong incentives to encroach upon—even claim for themselves—the territory of a nearby failed state. Hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees spilled into Ethiopia in the early 1990s, straining the Ethiopian treasury; a total of eight states occupied the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during its failure, in large part to plunder its natural resources; and Iraqi neighbors with significant populations of separatist Kurds—such as Turkey and Syria—might better preserve the cohesion of their own states by internalizing Iraq’s Kurdish population and oil. But at least to date, the international borders of these three failed states have not changed. Moreover, to the extent that they may change in the future, such cartographic alterations will likely be more a function of secession (of Somaliland) or partition (of Iraq) than of external predation. Why, given incentives to take over either part or the entirety of failed states, have neighboring powers resisted temptation in the face of relatively easy targets?