Ryan J. Owens

Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence

For decades, scholars have searched for data to show that Supreme Court justices are influenced not only by policy goals but also by legal considerations. Analyzing justices’ agenda-setting decisions, we show that while justices are largely motivated by policy concerns, jurisprudential considerations can prevail over their policy goals. When policy goals and legal considerations collide, policy gives way. If legal considerations and policy goals align toward the same end, law liberates justices to pursue policy. In short, we find that at the intersection of law and politics, law is both a constraint on and an opportunity for justices.

Adding Recess Appointments to the President’s “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers

In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess appointments to important policy-making positions, namely, major independent agencies. The authors compile a data set of every civilian nomination and recess appointment between 1987 and 2004. After controlling for other factors, the authors find strong support for their theory.

How the Supreme Court Alters Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Review

We argue that actors can attempt to shield their policy choices from unfavorable review by crafting them in a manner that will increase the costs necessary for supervisory institutions to review them. We apply this theory to the US Supreme Court and demonstrate how justices strategically obfuscate the language of majority opinions in the attempt to circumvent unfavorable review from a politically hostile Congress. The results suggest that Supreme Court justices can and do alter the language of their opinions to raise the costs of legislative review and thereby protect their decisions.

Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court

Do Solicitors General (SGs) influence how justices vote? Years of scholarship suggests that the answer is yes but has largely failed to examine what influence means and just how much influence the SG wields. The authors examine SG influence during the Court’s agenda-setting stage. They find, first, that justices follow SG recommendations even when they are completely opposed to them and, second, that law exerts a strong independent influence. Justices are significantly less likely to follow SG recommendations that contravene important legal factors.

Predicting Drift on Politically Insulated Institutions: A Study of Ideological Drift on the United States Supreme Court

We examine whether policymakers can predict whether nominees to the Supreme Court will drift ideologically. We analyze the pre-nomination speeches, articles, and separate opinions published by every justice who served at least ten years on the Court. Our data show that we can indeed predict whether a nominee will drift ideologically once on the Court.

Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments

In 2007, the U.S. Senate moved into permanent session to stop President George W. Bush from making recess appointments. This article examines this episode. We argue that Congress is only able to effectively check presidential unilateral powers when the president’s use of such powers creates high political costs for a sufficient number of members such that congressional collective action is possible. Using case studies and multivariate analysis, we show that Bush used recess appointments far more than his predecessors, creating high political costs for Senate Democrats and driving them to find an innovative way to check the power of the president.

U.S. Supreme Court Opinions and their Audiences

This book is the first study specifically to investigate the extent to which U.S. Supreme Court justices alter the clarity of their opinions based on expected reactions from their audiences. The authors examine this dynamic by creating a unique measure of opinion clarity and then testing whether the Court writes clearer opinions when it faces ideologically hostile and ideologically scattered lower federal courts; when it decides cases involving poorly performing federal agencies; when it decides cases involving states with less professionalized legislatures and governors; and when it rules against public opinion. The data shows the Court writes clearer opinions in every one of these contexts, and demonstrates that actors are more likely to comply with clearer Court opinions.

Consider the Source (and the Message): Supreme Court Justices and Strategic Audits of Lower Court Decisions

Given scarce resources, Supreme Court justices hear cases that maximize their auditing capacities. The authors argue that justices rely on the identity of lower court judges and the ideological disposition of lower court decisions to decide which cases to review. The authors find justices are most likely to audit disagreeable lower court decisions rendered by ideologically disagreeable panel judges and are least likely to review agreeable lower court decisions rendered by ideologically agreeable panel judges. Furthermore, when faced with the same ideologically disagreeable lower court decision, justices are less likely to review decisions made by ideological allies than those by ideological foes.

A Built-In Advantage The Office of the Solicitor General and the U.S. Supreme Court

The Office of the Solicitor General wins the vast majority of Supreme Court cases in which it participates. Does it enjoy a built-in advantage, or does it win because it employs experienced litigators, enjoys resource advantages, or carries the executive’s sword? To answer these questions, we employ cutting edge matching methods. After matching OSG lawyers with nearly identical non-OSG lawyers in nearly identical cases, we find that OSG attorneys still are more likely to win their cases. We discuss possible reasons for this built-in advantage along with some practical implications of our findings.

Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the United States Supreme Court

Do Solicitors General influence Supreme Court justices to behave differently than they would like? If so, are there limits on such influence? Using archival data, we find strong evidence of Solicitor General influence. In a substantial number of cases at the Supreme Courts agenda-setting stage, justices follow Solicitor General recommendations even when they are completely opposed to them. At the same time, we observe that law exerts strong influence. Justices are significantly less likely to follow Solicitor General recommendations that contravene important legal factors.