Alexander Tahk

Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court

Over the last decade the scholarship on judicial politics has increasingly emphasized the strategic aspects of decision making in the United States Supreme Court. This scholarship, however, has struggled with two significant limitations—the restriction to unidimensional policy spaces and the assumption of binary comparisons of alternatives. These two assumptions have the advantage of implying stable, predictable outcomes, but lack a sound theoretical foundation and assume away potentially important aspects of strategic behavior on the Court. In this article, we identify institutional features of the Court that, under certain conditions, allow us to relax these two assumptions without sacrificing stable, predictable policy outcomes. In particular, we formalize the “part-by-part” opinion voting used by the justices, a feature that, together with separable preferences over policy issues, implies stable policy outcomes around the issue-by-issue median of the justices.

Reconsidering the impact of behavior prediction questions on illegal drug use: The importance of using proper analytic methods

Social scientists often habitually employ ANOVA methods when analyzing data from experiments when other analytic approaches are required instead. This paper illustrates how traditional analytic approaches can lead to incorrect research conclusions by reanalyzing data from a recent study by Williams, Block, and Fitzsimons (2006a). Because the non‐negative dependent variable (illegal drug use) was super skewed and had a large majority of zero values, the use of improper statistical tests and the presence of just a few extreme, outlying observations produced the illusion that asking people to predict their likelihood of drug use increased that behavior significantly, when in fact it did not. The effect of behavior prediction questions on frequency of exercise also turns out to be non‐significant when analyzed properly. As this example illustrates, experimental researchers should choose and implement appropriate analytic approaches carefully. Jon Krosnick is University Fellow at Resources for the Future. We thank Patti Williams, Lauren Block, and Gavan Fitzsimons for providing us with their data sets for the analyses reported here.

Nominating Commissions, Judicial Retention, and Forward-Looking Behavior on State Supreme Courts An Empirical Examination of Selection and Retention Methods

High-profile advocates are pushing states to move away from judicial elections and toward a “merit” method because it purportedly produces the best quality judges. Quality, however, is difficult to measure empirically. Rather than attempt to measure quality, we examine whether certain types of state supreme courts are more forward-looking than others. States are likely to desire forward-looking behavior among judges because it can protect judicial legitimacy, help states to control policy, and could be more efficient than myopic behavior. Using a recent innovation in matching called covariate-balancing propensity scores, we find that the U.S. Supreme Court is equally likely to review and reverse decisions by judges regardless of their selection or retention methods. These results suggest that state supreme court justices, no matter their paths of getting to (and staying on) their courts, are roughly equal in terms of forward-looking behavior.