Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde

An Allais Paradox Without Mental Time Travel

The capacity to anticipate future experiences of regret has been hypothesized to explain otherwise irrational aspects of human decision‐making, including the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Econometrica 47:263–291) and the common ratio effect (Allais (1953) Econometrica 21:503–546). The anticipated regret hypothesis predicts that individuals incapable of episodically imagining their personal futures, as has been reported for people with extensive damage to medial temporal lobe structures and resulting deficits in episodic thought, should be immune to these effects. We report that K.C., who has extensive bilateral damage to his hippocampus and adjacent medial temporal lobe structures and nearly complete deficits in his ability to episodically imagine his personal future, nonetheless displays both the certainty and the common ratio effects. These results suggest that the episodic anticipation of future regret does not explain the general human tendency to display the certainty and common ratio effects.

The influence of prior reputation and reciprocity on dynamic trust-building in adults with and without autism spectrum disorder

The present study was designed to investigate the effects of reputational priors and direct reciprocity on the dynamics of trust building in adults with (N = 17) and without (N = 25) autism spectrum disorder (ASD) using a multi-round Trust Game (MTG). On each round, participants, who played as investors, were required to maximize their benefits by updating their prior expectations (the partners positive or negative reputation), based on the partners directed reciprocity, and adjusting their own investment decisions accordingly. Results showed that reputational priors strongly oriented the initial decision to trust, operationalized as the amount of investment the investor shares with the counterpart. However, while typically developed participants were mainly affected by the direct reciprocity, and rapidly adopted the optimal Tit-for-Tat strategy, participants with ASD continued to rely on reputational priors throughout the game, even when experience of the counterparts actual behavior contradicted their prior-based expectations. In participants with ASD, the effect of the reputational prior never disappeared, and affected judgments of trustworthiness and reciprocity of the partner even after completion of the game. Moreover, the weight of prior reputation positively correlated with the severity of the ASD participants social impairments while the reciprocity score negatively correlated with the severity of repetitive and stereotyped behaviors, as measured by the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R). In line with Bayesian theoretical accounts, the present findings indicate that individuals with ASD have difficulties encoding incoming social information and using it to revise and flexibly update prior social expectations, and that this deficit might severely hinder social learning and everyday life interactions.

Short-term reward experience biases inference despite dissociable neural correlates

Optimal decision-making employs short-term rewards and abstract long-term information based on which of these is deemed relevant. Employing short- vs. long-term information is associated with different learning mechanisms, yet neural evidence showing that these two are dissociable is lacking. Here we demonstrate that long-term, inference-based beliefs are biased by short-term reward experiences and that dissociable brain regions facilitate both types of learning. Long-term inferences are associated with dorsal striatal and frontopolar cortex activity, while short-term rewards engage the ventral striatum. Stronger concurrent representation of reward signals by mediodorsal striatum and frontopolar cortex correlates with less biased, more optimal individual long-term inference. Moreover, dynamic modulation of activity in a cortical cognitive control network and the medial striatum is associated with trial-by-trial control of biases in belief updating. This suggests that counteracting the processing of optimally to-be-ignored short-term rewards and cortical suppression of associated reward-signals, determines long-term learning success and failure.Making a good decision often requires the weighing of relative short-term rewards against long-term benefits, yet how the brain does this is not understood. Here, authors show that long-term beliefs are biased by reward experience and that dissociable brain regions facilitate both types of learning.

Is a cultural cortical recycling hypothesis likely in relation to economic artifacts

Neuroscience of material artifacts production and handling has recently pointed to the likeliness of a cultural cortical recycling hypothesis (Stout et al., 2008). This hypothesis had been more robustly established in the case of symbolic artifacts such as letters and numbers (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007). In both cases the idea is that specific cortical maps dedicated to basic perceptual and/or motor functions were re-used at some point of relatively recent human history (within temporal scales at which anatomical evolutions of the brain cannot take place) in view of the processing of novel cultural items. Optimal functional recycling jointly facilitates and carries over constraints on the processing of these artifacts. It also presumably plays a role in their emergence and morphogenesis. I present theoretical arguments and a preliminary set of behavioral and neurobiological data that might support the speculation that the historical emergence and the typical neural processing of coins — both a material and symbolic artifact which is central for modern economic life — are explained by a similar hypothesis.