Sander van der Linden

The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change as a Gateway Belief: Experimental Evidence

There is currently widespread public misunderstanding about the degree of scientific consensus on human-caused climate change, both in the US as well as internationally. Moreover, previous research has identified important associations between public perceptions of the scientific consensus, belief in climate change and support for climate policy. This paper extends this line of research by advancing and providing experimental evidence for a “gateway belief model” (GBM). Using national data (N = 1104) from a consensus-message experiment, we find that increasing public perceptions of the scientific consensus is significantly and causally associated with an increase in the belief that climate change is happening, human-caused and a worrisome threat. In turn, changes in these key beliefs are predictive of increased support for public action. In short, we find that perceived scientific agreement is an important gateway belief, ultimately influencing public responses to climate change.

Improving public engagement with climate change: five "best practice" insights from psychological science.

Despite being one of the most important societal challenges of the 21st century, public engagement with climate change currently remains low in the United States. Mounting evidence from across the behavioral sciences has found that most people regard climate change as a nonurgent and psychologically distant risk—spatially, temporally, and socially—which has led to deferred public decision making about mitigation and adaptation responses. In this article, we advance five simple but important “best practice” insights from psychological science that can help governments improve public policymaking about climate change. Particularly, instead of a future, distant, global, nonpersonal, and analytical risk that is often framed as an overt loss for society, we argue that policymakers should (a) emphasize climate change as a present, local, and personal risk; (b) facilitate more affective and experiential engagement; (c) leverage relevant social group norms; (d) frame policy solutions in terms of what can be gained from immediate action; and (e) appeal to intrinsically valued long-term environmental goals and outcomes. With practical examples we illustrate how these key psychological principles can be applied to support societal engagement and climate change policymaking.

Inoculating the Public against Misinformation about Climate Change

Effectively addressing climate change requires significant changes in individual and collective human behavior and decision‐making. Yet, in light of the increasing politicization of (climate) science, and the attempts of vested‐interest groups to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change through organized “disinformation campaigns,” identifying ways to effectively engage with the public about the issue across the political spectrum has proven difficult. A growing body of research suggests that one promising way to counteract the politicization of science is to convey the high level of normative agreement (“consensus”) among experts about the reality of human‐caused climate change. Yet, much prior research examining public opinion dynamics in the context of climate change has done so under conditions with limited external validity. Moreover, no research to date has examined how to protect the public from the spread of influential misinformation about climate change. The current research bridges this divide by exploring how people evaluate and process consensus cues in a polarized information environment. Furthermore, evidence is provided that it is possible to pre‐emptively protect (“inoculate”) public attitudes about climate change against real‐world misinformation.

How to communicate the scientific consensus on climate change: plain facts, pie charts or metaphors?

Previous research has identified public perceptions of the scientific consensus on climate change as an important gateway belief. Yet, little research to date has examined how to effectively communicate the scientific consensus on climate change. In this study, we conducted an online experiment using a national quota sample to compare three approaches to communicating the scientific consensus, namely: (a) descriptive text, (b) a pie chart and (c) metaphorical representations. Results indicate that while all three approaches can significantly increase public understanding of the degree of scientific consensus, the pie chart and simple text have superior recall and are most effective across political party lines. We conclude that the scientific consensus on climate change is most effectively communicated as a short, simple message that is easy to comprehend and remember. Representing the consensus visually in the form of a pie chart appears to be particularly useful.

On the relationship between personal experience, affect and risk perception:The case of climate change

Examining the conceptual relationship between personal experience, affect, and risk perception is crucial in improving our understanding of how emotional and cognitive process mechanisms shape public perceptions of climate change. This study is the first to investigate the interrelated nature of these variables by contrasting three prominent social-psychological theories. In the first model, affect is viewed as a fast and associative information processing heuristic that guides perceptions of risk. In the second model, affect is seen as flowing from cognitive appraisals (i.e., affect is thought of as a post-cognitive process). Lastly, a third, dual-process model is advanced that integrates aspects from both theoretical perspectives. Four structural equation models were tested on a national sample (N = 808) of British respondents. Results initially provide support for the “cognitive” model, where personal experience with extreme weather is best conceptualized as a predictor of climate change risk perception and, in turn, risk perception a predictor of affect. Yet, closer examination strongly indicates that at the same time, risk perception and affect reciprocally influence each other in a stable feedback system. It is therefore concluded that both theoretical claims are valid and that a dual-process perspective provides a superior fit to the data. Implications for theory and risk communication are discussed.

Exploring Beliefs About Bottled Water and Intentions to Reduce Consumption: The Dual-Effect of Social Norm Activation and Persuasive Information

Mass consumption of bottled water is contributing to a multitude of environmental problems, including; water wastage, pollution and climate change. The aim of this study is to advance a social-psychological understanding of how to effectively reduce bottled water consumption. An online survey experiment was conducted among students of a Dutch public university to examine outcome-beliefs about drinking less bottled water while subsequently testing three strategies for behavioural change. Respondents (n= 454) were randomly allocated to four different conditions (an information-only, social norm-only, a combination of both or a control group). It was hypothesized that the combination (i.e., norm-induced information provision) would be most persuasive and elicits the greatest change in intention. Results were consistent with this hypothesis. Findings also show that while beliefs about health, taste, water quality, lifestyle, the environment and perceived alternatives are all correlated with bottled water consumption, belief strength varies significantly based on rate of consumption.Mass consumption of bottled water is contributing to a multitude of environmental problems, including water wastage, pollution, and climate change. The aim of this study is to advance a social-psychological understanding of how to effectively reduce bottled water consumption. An online survey experiment was conducted among students of a Dutch public university to explore outcome beliefs about drinking less bottled water while testing three strategies for behavioral change. Respondents (N = 454) were randomly allocated to four different conditions (an information-only, social norm-only, a combination of both, or a control group). It was hypothesized that the combination (i.e., norm-induced information provision) would be most persuasive and elicit the greatest reduction in intentions to buy bottled water. Results were consistent with this hypothesis. Findings also show that while beliefs about health, taste, water quality, lifestyle, the environment, and perceived alternatives are all correlated with bottled water consumption, belief strength varies significantly based on rate of consumption.

A Conceptual Critique of the Cultural Cognition Thesis

I offer a critique of the cultural cognition thesis. I argue that cultural cognition is not a theory about culture or cognition per se; rather, it is a thesis that aims to explain why specific American groups with opposing political views disagree over a select number of contemporary science issues. I highlight that cultural cognition can be characterized as a “strange loop” as it frequently defines its core theoretical properties (e.g., group, culture, political ideology) in terms of one another. The approach also overgeneralizes specific findings from social psychology and underappreciates the many audiences that comprise the general “public”.I offer a critique of the cultural cognition thesis. I argue that cultural cognition is not a theory about culture or cognition per se; rather, it is a thesis that aims to explain why specific American groups with opposing political views disagree over a select number of contemporary science issues. I highlight that cultural cognition can be characterized as a “strange loop” as it frequently defines its core theoretical properties (e.g., group, culture, political ideology) in terms of one another. The approach also overgeneralizes specific findings from social psychology and underappreciates the many audiences that comprise the general “public”.

Scientific agreement can neutralize politicization of facts

To the Editor — In light of the continued politicization of facts on critical societal issues, developing ways to effectively communicate with the public about scientific topics is becoming increasingly important1,2. We commend recent behavioural science research for tackling a question that is of paramount interest to this debate: do individuals with more education and science literacy display more polarized beliefs on highly contested issues, such as climate change? Several recent correlational studies3,4 have suggested this, concluding that more education and science literacy may actually increase rather than decrease polarization on issues linked to political and religious identities. Although an important concern, such conclusions cannot be inferred from correlational data. Accordingly, we attempted to (1) replicate these findings and (2) investigate an underexplored yet critical question: Does communicating scientific findings lead to belief polarization, especially among higher-educated audiences? Specifically, we conducted a large nationally representative online survey experiment (N = 6,301) with Qualtrics to examine one of the most politically polarized issues in the United States: climate change5. Our analysis of the experiment’s baseline data replicated previous studies’ results3,4 indicating evidence of motivated cognition: higher education is positively associated with beliefs about the scientific consensus, whereas political conservatism is negatively correlated. Importantly, there is a significant negative interaction so that a more conservative ideology coupled with higher education results in less acceptance of climate science (Supplementary Table 2). In our experiment, however, we subsequently exposed half of the sample to a descriptive norm6: “97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused global warming is happening”. We measured judgements of the consensus at the beginning of the survey (prior) and at the end after treatment exposure (posterior), with various ‘distractors’ in between to conceal the true purpose of the experiment. This allowed us to causally evaluate the polarization prediction, particularly among higher-educated audiences. We find no evidence of polarization: both liberals and conservatives updated their beliefs in line with the scientific norm (Fig. 1), with the effect occurring more strongly among conservatives, as evidenced in a positive and significant interaction (Supplementary Table 2) between experimental condition (scientific consensus), education (higher) and ideology (conservatism). In fact, exposing people to the scientific consensus cancelled out the negative interaction between education and conservatism, and reduced belief polarization by 50% (Cohen’s d = 0.88, Fig. 1). Thus, these findings suggest that communicating facts does not necessarily cause issue polarization. Indeed, although higher educated individuals may engage in more motivated reasoning, this effect can largely be countered with accurate information about the state of scientific agreement. Furthermore, instead of trying to change deep-rooted beliefs about contested issues, it may be easier to correct people’s perception of the norm6,7, as societal norms help set standards against which people evaluate the appropriateness of their beliefs and behaviours. Importantly, as a group, scientists are viewed as non-partisan8. In other words, correcting people’s perception of the scientific norm can help depolarize ideological worldviews and neutralize motivated cognition. In short, we caution against the conclusion that communicating facts about contested issues is necessarily ‘polarizing’3,4.

The social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours: a national study

Synopsis Although human-caused climate change is one of the greatest societal challenges of the twenty-first century, insights from the social and behavioural sciences remain underrepresented in the mitigation debate. This is surprising given that the collective potential for reducing national carbon emissions through changes in individual lifestyles and behaviours has clearly been demonstrated. Accordingly, this thesis provides a more systematic understanding of the public’s perceptions, knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours. It does so specifically by examining the social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours using a longitudinal UK national survey (N = 808, wave 1 and N = 501, wave 2). In the first part of the thesis, a social-psychological model of climate change risk perceptions is advanced. The model proposes that public risk perceptions of climate change are influenced by three key psychological dimensions, namely; (i) cognitive (e.g. knowledge), (ii) experiential (e.g. affect) and (iii) socio-cultural (e.g. values, social norms) factors. Results confirm the model’s validity and show that nearly 70% of the variance in public risk perception can be explained by the model’s components. Main findings also provide empirical support for a distinction between personal and societal risk judgments and highlight important differences in their psychological antecedents. In the second part, a Domain-Context-Behaviour (DCB) model is advanced. The purpose of the model is to causally conceptualise the social-psychological determinants of pro-environmental attitudes, intentions, and behaviours. A key aspect of the DCB model is the notion that environmental values (i.e. the ‘domain’) and climate change cognitions, norms, and emotions (i.e. the ‘context’) do not influence specific mitigation intentions and behaviours (e.g. energy conservation) directly. Rather, they influence a broad and general orienting intention to help reduce climate change. This general intention in turn activates and predicts specific mitigation intentions directly as well as indirectly via behaviour-specific determinants. Important differences emerge between high-cost and low-cost behavioural changes. Overall, the DCB model explains 66% of the variance in general intentions, 57% in specific mitigation intentions, and 35% of the variance in mitigation behaviour. The thesis conclusion explores key implications of the findings forAlthough human-caused climate change is one of the greatest societal challenges of the 21st century, insights from social and environmental psychology remain underrepresented in the mitigation debate. This is surprising given that the collective potential for reducing national carbon emissions through changes in individual lifestyles and behaviours has clearly been demonstrated. Accordingly, this PhD thesis aims to provide a more systematic and detailed understanding of individual mitigation behaviour. It does so specifically by examining the social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions, intentions and behaviours using a longitudinal UK national survey (N = 808, wave 1) and (N = 501, wave 2). In total, three separate analyses were conducted using the national survey data. In the first analysis (chapter 4), a social-psychological model of climate change risk perceptions is advanced. The model proposes that public risk perceptions of climate change are influenced by three key psychological dimensions, namely; (i) cognitive, (ii) experiential and (iii) socio-cultural factors. Results confirm the model’s validity and show that nearly 70% of the variance in risk perception can be explained by the model’s components. Main findings also provide empirical support for a distinction between personal and societal risk judgements and highlight important differences in their psychological antecedents. The second analysis(chapter 5) specifically investigates the interrelation between personal experience with extreme weather, affect and risk perception and situates their conceptual relationship within the cognition-emotion debate. Results provide strong support for a dual-process model, where risk perception and affect mutually influence each other in a stable feedback system. In the third analysis (chapter 6), a domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model is advanced. The purpose of the model is to causally conceptualize and systematically organize the social-psychological determinants of climate change mitigation behaviours. A key aspect of the DCB model is the notion that environmental values (i.e. the “domain”) and climate change cognitions, norms and emotions (i.e. the “context”) do not influence specific mitigation intentions and behaviours (e.g. energy conservation) directly. Rather, they influence a broad and general orienting intention to help reduce climate change. This general intention in turn activates and predicts specific mitigation intentions directly as well as indirectly via behaviour-specific determinants. Important differences emerge between high-impact and low-impact behavioural changes. Overall, results from this thesis have important implications for public policy, risk communication and behavioural change interventions.

Policy and population behavior in the age of Big Data

Policies are large-scale interventions that typically aim to influence behaviors and decision-making across entire populations to obtain a desired outcome. With the rapid increase in Big Data and its growing influence on policy, there is an emerging opportunity to produce meaningful and efficient mechanisms for improving public policy outcomes. However, there are still considerable gaps between existing theories in the behavioral sciences and evidence generated by Big Data, including the representation of key groups within the population. We outline the need for replicating established behavioral insights through Big Data that should coincide with clear ethical standards for implementing such approaches through evidence-based policymaking.