Network


Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.

Hotspot


Dive into the research topics where Sandra Buratti is active.

Publication


Featured researches published by Sandra Buratti.


International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis | 2008

Hypnotic Experience is Related to Emotional Contagion.

Etzel Cardeña; Devin Blair Terhune; Angelica Lööf; Sandra Buratti

Abstract The authors conducted 2 studies to evaluate whether emotional contagion, the propensity to automatically imitate the emotional expressions of others and experience the corresponding emotions, is related to behavioral and experiential indices of hypnotizability and whether such a relationship is influenced by administration context. In Study 1, behavioral and subjective measures of hypnotizability were measured alongside emotional contagion in the same context. In Study 2, different measures of hypnotizability and hypnotic depth were administered, whereas emotional contagion was independently measured in a different (nonhypnotic) context. Emotional contagion correlated with behavioral and experiential indices of hypnotizability in Study 1 but only with the latter in Study 2. The authors interpret the results as reflecting a positive relationship between emotional contagion and, at least, experiential features of hypnotizability and strengthening the case for the importance of affectivity in hypnotic responsiveness.


Cognitive Processing | 2012

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

Sandra Buratti; Carl Martin Allwood

Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith’s (Psychol Rev 103:490–517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer’s correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.


Social Influence | 2014

The effects of question format and co-witness peer discussion on the confidence accuracy of children's testimonies

Sandra Buratti; Sandra Macleod; Carl Martin Allwood

Different types of social influence can affect eyewitness testimony. This study examined the effects of question format (free recall and prompts) and co-witness peer discussion on the confidence accuracy of memory reports of children aged 9–11 years. Pairs of children watched one of two perspectives of a film. Half of the pairs discussed the film; the rest discussed non-relevant topics. Children responding to prompts had a lower proportion of correct memory reports, were less confident, and showed poorer confidence accuracy compared with free recall. During free recall, the children showed near perfect confidence accuracy. No peer discussion effects were found; however, 33% of the children in the film discussion condition reported commission errors.


Social Influence | 2016

Does consulting with others affect answerability judgments of difficult questions

Carl Martin Allwood; Bodil S. A. Karlsson; Sandra Buratti

Abstract People’s judgments of the answerability of questions relating to how things are in the world can have important consequences for society and people’s lives. Thirty-one individuals and 30 pairs made answerability judgments of 20 general knowledge questions, many with less known, or unknown, answers. Four questions had high expected consensus regarding their answerability (consensus questions) and the rest had less expected consensus with respect to their answerability (non-consensus questions). The pairs showed two polarization effects: pairs gave higher answerability ratings for questions with answerability ratings over 80% and lower ratings than individuals for questions with the lower answerability ratings. Stronger consensus-seeking tendencies and a more active memory environment in the pairs may have contributed to these results.


Frontiers in Psychology | 2016

Does Anyone Know the Answer to that Question? Individual Differences in Judging Answerability

Bodil S. A. Karlsson; Carl Martin Allwood; Sandra Buratti

Occasionally people may attempt to judge whether a question can be answered today, or if not, if it can be answered in the future. For example, a person may consider whether enough is known about the dangers of living close to a nuclear plant, or to a major electricity cable, for them to be willing to do so, and state-authorities may consider whether questions about the dangers of new technologies have been answered, or in a reasonable future can be, for them to be willing to invest money in research aiming develop such technologies. A total of 476 participants, for each of 22 knowledge questions, either judged whether it was answerable today (current answerability), or judged when it could be answered (future answerability). The knowledge questions varied with respect to the expected consensus concerning their answerability: consensus questions (high expected consensus), non-consensus questions (lower expected consensus), and illusion questions (formulated to appear answerable, but with crucial information absent). The questions’ judged answerability level on the two scales was highly correlated. For both scales, consensus questions were rated more answerable than the non-consensus questions, with illusion questions falling in-between. The result for the illusion questions indicates that a feeling of answerability can be created even when it is unlikely that somebody can come up with an answer. The results also showed that individual difference variables influenced the answerability judgments. Higher levels of belief in certainty of knowledge, mankind’s knowledge, and mankind’s efficacy were related to judging the non-consensus questions as more answerable. Participants rating the illusion questions as answerable rated the other answerability questions as more, or equally, answerable compared to the other participants and showed tendencies to prefer a combination of more epistemic default processing and less intellectual processing.


Journal of General Psychology | 2017

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation, Belief in Certainty of Knowledge, Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

Sandra Buratti; Carl Martin Allwood; Bodil S. A. Karlsson

ABSTRACT In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”


Frontiers in Psychology | 2017

Psychological Health in the Retirement Transition: Rationale and First Findings in the HEalth, Ageing and Retirement Transitions in Sweden (HEARTS) Study

Magnus Lindwall; Anne Ingeborg Berg; Pär Bjälkebring; Sandra Buratti; Isabelle Hansson; Linda B. Hassing; Georg Henning; Marie Kivi; Stefanie König; Valgeir Thorvaldsson; Boo Johansson

From an aging research and life-course perspective, the transition to retirement marks a significant life-event and provides a unique opportunity to study psychological health and coping during a period of substantial change in everyday life. The aim of the present paper is to: (a) outline the rationale of the HEalth, Ageing and Retirement Transitions in Sweden (HEARTS) study, (b) describe the study sample, and (c) to present some initial results from the two first waves regarding the association between retirement status and psychological health. The HEARTS study is designed to annually study psychological health in the years before and following retirement, and to examine change and stability patterns related to the retirement event. Among a representative Swedish population-based sample of 14,990 individuals aged 60–66 years, 5,913 completed the baseline questionnaire in 2015. The majority of the participants (69%) completed a web-based survey, and the rest (31%) completed a paper version. The baseline HEARTS sample represents the general population well in terms of gender and age, but is more highly educated. Cross-sectional findings from the first wave showed that retired individuals demonstrated better psychological health compared to those who were still working. Longitudinal results from the first and second waves showed that individuals who retired between waves showed more positive changes in psychological health compared with those still working or previously retired.


Frontiers in Psychology | 2017

Experts’ and Novices’ Perception of Ignorance and Knowledge in Different Research Disciplines and Its Relation to Belief in Certainty of Knowledge

Isabelle Hansson; Sandra Buratti; Carl Martin Allwood

Assessments of the extent of knowledge in a domain can be important since non-identified lack of knowledge may lead to decisions that do not consider the effect of relevant factors. Two studies examined experts’ and novices’ perception of their own ignorance and knowledge out of everything there is to know within their own and other disciplines and their assessments of their discipline’s, and other disciplines’ knowledge of all there is to know in each discipline. In total 380 experts and 401 students from the disciplines of history, medicine, physics, and psychology participated. The results for ignorance and knowledge assessments of one’s own knowledge were similar. Novices reported more ignorance and less knowledge in their own discipline than experts, but no differences were found in the assessments of how much is known in each discipline. General belief in certainty of knowledge was associated with the knowledge assessments and level of expertise. Finally, disciplinary differences were found both for the knowledge assessments and for belief in certainty of knowledge. Historians and physicists assessed that less was known in their own discipline out of all there is to know (approximately 40%), compared to the medics (about 50%). Historians believed least in certainty of knowledge and physicists most. Our results have practical implications for higher educational teaching and interdisciplinary collaboration.


Frontiers in Pediatrics | 2016

Do Self- and Proxy Reports of Cognitive Problems Reflect Intellectual Functioning in Children and Adolescents with Congenital Heart Defects?

Sandra Buratti; Carmen Ryberg; Malin Broberg; Jan Sunnegårdh

Aim Children with congenital heart defects (CHD) who suffer from cognitive impairments and school difficulties need to be identified as early as possible in order to set appropriate interventions in place that may enhance the school situation and quality of life for these children. Identifying children and adolescents at risk for cognitive difficulties requires specific screening tools. This study assessed such a tool – Pediatric Quality of Life Inventory Cardiac Module subscale: Cognitive Problems – to investigate whether proxy reported and self-reported cognitive problems were associated with measured intellectual functioning in children and adolescents with CHD treated with surgery or by catheter interventions. Method The sample consisted of 184 children/adolescents aged 3, 5, 9, and 15 years. The severity of the CHD diagnoses was categorized into three groups (mild, moderate, or severe) for all age groups. For all the age groups, we collected proxy ratings of cognitive problems, and for the 5-, 9-, and 15-year-olds, we also collected self-reported cognitive problems. Intellectual functioning was measured with the Wechsler intelligence scales. The control variables were socioeconomic status and severity of diagnosis. Results A strong association was found between the parent’s ratings of cognitive problems and the children’s and adolescents’ results on the Wechsler scales. This association was present for all ages, including the 3-year-olds. As for the self-reports, an association was only found between the 15-year-olds self-report of cognitive problems and their results on the Wechsler scales. Conclusion To identify children with cognitive problems as early as at the age of 3 years, parent-rated Pediatrics Quality of Life subscale: Cognitive Problems can be used as a screening tool. For 15-year-olds, the self-report ratings can be used as a screening tool. We also suggest a cutoff score of 80 for both the 15-year olds as well as the proxy reports. If the score falls below 80 the child should be formally evaluated using standardized cognitive test.


Archive | 2015

Regulating Metacognitive Processes—Support for a Meta-metacognitive Ability

Sandra Buratti; Carl Martin Allwood

Second-order judgments aim to regulate metacognitive judgments or at least to assess the accuracy of metacognitive judgments (first-order judgments). For this reason, second-order judgments can be seen as a form of meta-metacognition. In this chapter, we clarify the concept of meta-metacognition and how it relates to first-order metacognitive judgments. Furthermore, we explain why the concept of second-order judgments is an important addition to the research literature on metacognition and why it is an important concept in the context of learning and memory. We also present a new generalizable method for eliciting and measuring the accuracy (realism) of second-order judgments in the context of confidence judgments of semantic and episodic memory performance and suggest how this method can be computer implemented. An asset of this method is that it allows for fine-grained analyses of the strategies that people use when they make second-order judgments without reverting to think-aloud reports.

Collaboration


Dive into the Sandra Buratti's collaboration.

Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar

Boo Johansson

University of Gothenburg

View shared research outputs
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar

Carmen Ryberg

Sahlgrenska University Hospital

View shared research outputs
Researchain Logo
Decentralizing Knowledge