Sara K. Moeller

Toward a Cognitive View of Trait Mindfulness: Distinct Cognitive Skills Predict Its Observing and Nonreactivity Facets

Dispositional variations in mindfulness and its facets have garnered considerable recent interest in the clinical and personality literatures. Theoretically, high mindful individuals have been characterized as more attuned to momentary sensations and perceptions and/or better able to execute behavior in a controlled manner, yet data of this relatively cognitive type have not been reported. In addition, perceptual attunement and executive control are distinct skills that may underlie, or at least correlate with, distinct facets of mindfulness. In 3 studies involving college students (N = 297), support for the latter idea was found. Individuals high in the observing (but not nonreactivity) facet of mindfulness demonstrated superior perceptual abilities in visual working memory (Study 1) and temporal order (Study 2) tasks. On the other hand, individuals high in the nonreactivity (but not observing) facet of mindfulness exhibited greater cognitive control flexibility (Study 3). Implications for understanding the cognitive basis of mindfulness facets are discussed.

Personality Dominance and Preferential Use of the Vertical Dimension of Space Evidence From Spatial Attention Paradigms

Previous research has shown that dominant individuals frequently think in terms of dominance hierarchies, which typically invoke vertical metaphor (e.g., “upper” vs. “lower” class). Accordingly, we predicted that in spatial attention paradigms, such individuals would systematically favor the vertical dimension of space more than individuals low in dominance. This prediction was supported by two studies (total N = 96), which provided three tests involving two different spatial attention paradigms. In all cases, analyses controlling for speed of response to horizontal spatial probes revealed that more dominant individuals were faster than less dominant individuals to respond to probes along the vertical dimension of space. Such data support the metaphor-representation perspective, according to which people think in metaphoric terms, even in on-line processing tasks. These results have implications for understanding dominance and also indicate that conceptual metaphor is relevant to understanding the cognitive-processing basis of personality.

Extraversion and reward-related processing: probing incentive motivation in affective priming tasks.

Based on an incentive motivation theory of extraversion (Depue & Collins, 1999), it was hypothesized that extraverts (relative to introverts) would exhibit stronger positive priming effects in affective priming tasks, whether involving words or pictures. This hypothesis was systematically supported in four studies involving 229 undergraduates. In each of the four studies, and in a subsequent combined analysis, extraversion was positively predictive of positive affective priming effects, but was not predictive of negative affective priming effects. The results bridge an important gap in the literature between biological and trait models of incentive motivation and do so in a way that should be informative to subsequent efforts to understand the processing basis of extraversion as well as incentive motivation.

Neuroticism and Responsiveness to Error Feedback: Adaptive Self-Regulation Versus Affective Reactivity

Responsiveness to negative feedback has been seen as functional by those who emphasize the value of reflecting on such feedback in self-regulating problematic behaviors. On the other hand, the very same responsiveness has been viewed as dysfunctional by its link to punishment sensitivity and reactivity. The present 4 studies, involving 203 undergraduate participants, sought to reconcile such discrepant views in the context of the trait of neuroticism. In cognitive tasks, individuals were given error feedback when they made mistakes. It was found that greater tendencies to slow down following error feedback were associated with higher levels of accuracy at low levels of neuroticism but lower levels of accuracy at high levels of neuroticism. Individual differences in neuroticism thus appear crucial in understanding whether behavioral alterations following negative feedback reflect proactive versus reactive mechanisms and processes. Implications for understanding the processing basis of neuroticism and adaptive self-regulation are discussed.

Integrating Trait and Social-Cognitive Views of Personality: Neuroticism, Implicit Stress Priming, and Neuroticism-Outcome Relationships

The trait perspective of personality emphasizes the broad role of traits in outcome prediction, whereas the social-cognitive perspective emphasizes the importance of if—then intrapsychic associations. Three studies (N = 188) were conducted to reconcile these alternative views of personality in the context of stress-related behaviors. Implicit priming tasks were used to quantify the extent to which stress primes activated thoughts of aggression (Studies 1 and 2) or eating (Study 3), and trait levels of neuroticism were also assessed. Neuroticism did not consistently predict stress-related implicit associations, consistent with the independence of these predictors. Of more importance, such implicit associations predicted problematic outcomes (e.g., physical aggression), but only to the extent that relevant individuals were also high in neuroticism. The results highlight an interface of trait and social-cognitive views of personality and do so in the context of understanding stress-reactivity processes, a topic of importance to multiple literatures.

The regulatory benefits of high levels of affect perception accuracy: a process analysis of reactions to stressors in daily life.

Individuals attuned to affective signals from the environment may possess an advantage in the emotion-regulation realm. In two studies (total n = 151), individual differences in affective perception accuracy were assessed in an objective, performance-based manner. Subsequently, the same individuals completed daily diary protocols in which daily stressor levels were reported as well as problematic states shown to be stress-reactive in previous studies. In both studies, individual differences in affect perception accuracy interacted with daily stressor levels to predict the problematic outcomes. Daily stressors precipitated problematic reactions--whether depressive feelings (study 1) or somatic symptoms (study 2)--at low levels of affect perception accuracy, but did not do so at high levels of affect perception accuracy. The findings support a regulatory view of such perceptual abilities. Implications for understanding emotion regulation processes, emotional intelligence, and individual differences in reactivity are discussed.

Cognitive sources of evidence for neuroticism's link to punishment-reactivity processes

Theories of neuroticism emphasise its close potential link to punishment-reactivity processes, yet cognitive sources of evidence for this proposed processing basis are surprisingly scarce. The present two studies (N = 123) sought to rectify this important gap in the literature in terms of reactivity to error feedback. Study 1 found that individuals high in neuroticism were faster to switch behavioural responses following errors, whereas an opposite pattern was found among individuals low in neuroticism. Study 2 extended this error-reactivity perspective to the realm of behavioural decision making. Individuals high in neuroticism switched their behavioural predictions following error feedback, whereas this tendency was non-significant among individuals low in neuroticism. Together, the studies present novel, but theory-informed, cognitive paradigms for assessing punishment-reactivity processes, confirm neuroticisms link to such processes, and do so in the realms of both reaction time (Study 1) and behavioural predictions (Study 2). The discussion focuses on the utility of modelling punishment-reactivity processes in cognitive terms and highlights relevant directions for future research.

Are self-deceivers enhancing positive affect or denying negative affect? Toward an understanding of implicit affective processes

Self-deception is an important construct in social, personality, and clinical literatures. Although historical and clinical views of self-deception have regarded it as defensive in nature and operation, modern views of this individual difference variable instead highlight its apparent benefits to subjective mental health. The present four studies reinforce the latter view by showing that self-deception predicts positive priming effects, but not negative priming effects, in reaction time tasks sensitive to individual differences in affective priming. In all studies, individuals higher in self-deception displayed stronger positive priming effects, defined in terms of facilitation with two positive stimuli in a consecutive sequence, but self-deception did not predict negative priming effects in the same tasks. Importantly, these effects occurred both in tasks that called for the retrieval of self-knowledge (Study 1) and those that did not (Studies 2–4). This broad pattern supports substantive views of self-deception rather than views narrowly focused on self-presentation processes. Implications for understanding self-deception are discussed.

You never think about my feelings: interpersonal dominance as a predictor of emotion decoding accuracy.

Dominance and submission constitute fundamentally different social interaction strategies that may be enacted most effectively to the extent that the emotions of others are relatively ignored (dominance) versus noticed (submission). On the basis of such considerations, we hypothesized a systematic relationship between chronic tendencies toward high versus low levels of interpersonal dominance and emotion decoding accuracy in objective tasks. In two studies (total N = 232), interpersonally dominant individuals exhibited poorer levels of emotion recognition in response to audio and video clips (Study 1) and facial expressions of emotion (Study 2). The results provide a novel perspective on interpersonal dominance, suggest its strategic nature (Study 2), and are discussed in relation to Fiskes (1993) social-cognitive theory of power.

The Big Chill: Interpersonal Coldness and Emotion‐Labeling Skills

Interpersonally cold (relative to warm) individuals may be less skilled in inferring the emotional states of others, a factor that should contribute to their poorer social relationships. Systematic support for this hypothesis was obtained in 4 studies (total N = 434 undergraduates) involving diverse emotion- and affect-decoding tasks. Specifically, relatively cold individuals exhibited lower accuracy in decoding emotional facial expressions (Study 1), in labeling the emotions of others from audio and video clips (Study 2), in predicting the emotions of others from social scenario descriptions (Study 3), and in the normative accuracy of their word evaluations (Study 4). Altogether, the results demonstrate that cold individuals appear broadly deficient in linking emotion and affect to relevant environmental stimuli. Implications of the findings for understanding the nature and correlates of interpersonal coldness are discussed.