Scott Ode

Error-Monitoring Ability Predicts Daily Stress Regulation

This study examined whether individual differences in error-related self-regulation predict emotion regulation in daily life, as suggested by a common-systems view of cognitive and emotional self-regulation. Participants (N = 47) completed a Stroop task, from which error-related brain potentials and behavioral measures of error correction were computed. Participants subsequently reported on daily stressors and anxiety over a 2-week period. As predicted by the common-systems view, a physiological marker of error monitoring and a behavioral measure of error correction predicted emotion regulation in daily life. Specifically, participants higher in cognitive control, as assessed neurally and behaviorally, were less reactive to stress in daily life. The results support the notion that cognitive control and emotion regulation depend on common or interacting systems.

Toward a Cognitive View of Trait Mindfulness: Distinct Cognitive Skills Predict Its Observing and Nonreactivity Facets

Dispositional variations in mindfulness and its facets have garnered considerable recent interest in the clinical and personality literatures. Theoretically, high mindful individuals have been characterized as more attuned to momentary sensations and perceptions and/or better able to execute behavior in a controlled manner, yet data of this relatively cognitive type have not been reported. In addition, perceptual attunement and executive control are distinct skills that may underlie, or at least correlate with, distinct facets of mindfulness. In 3 studies involving college students (N = 297), support for the latter idea was found. Individuals high in the observing (but not nonreactivity) facet of mindfulness demonstrated superior perceptual abilities in visual working memory (Study 1) and temporal order (Study 2) tasks. On the other hand, individuals high in the nonreactivity (but not observing) facet of mindfulness exhibited greater cognitive control flexibility (Study 3). Implications for understanding the cognitive basis of mindfulness facets are discussed.

Cognitive-emotional dysfunction among noisy minds: predictions from individual differences in reaction time variability.

Mental noise can be defined as less reliable information processing. Individuals with high levels of mental noise are thought to be disadvantaged in cognitive, emotional, and behavioural realms. The present five studies (total N=298) investigated such potential disadvantages among normally functioning college undergraduates. Mental noise was operationalised in terms of the reaction time coefficient of variation (RTCV), a measure of RT variability that corrects for average levels of mental speed. Individuals with higher RTCV exhibited less effective cognitive control (Studies 1 and 5), less controlled behaviour (Study 2), and were more prone to negative emotional experiences (Study 3) and depressive symptoms (Study 4). Study 5 extended these results and found that individuals higher (versus lower) in RTCV were more adversely affected by their attentional lapses in daily life. Results converge on the idea that mental noise is an important individual difference dimension with multiple adverse correlates and consequences.

Neuroticism's Importance in Understanding the Daily Life Correlates of Heart Rate Variability

Individual differences in high-frequency heart rate variability (HRV) have been conceptualized in terms of a greater capacity to self-regulate problematic outcomes, but have also been conceptualized in terms of greater moment-to-moment flexibility. From a self-regulation perspective, higher HRV should be inversely correlated with trait neuroticism and problematic daily outcomes. From a flexibility perspective, high HRV should result in more state-like functioning--that is, functioning that is more contextual and less trait-like in nature. In the latter case, HRV and trait neuroticism may interact to predict problematic outcomes such that neuroticism should be a less consequential predictor at higher levels of HRV. The flexibility perspective was systematically supported in a daily experience-sampling protocol. Implications focus on theories of neuroticism and HRV.

Extraversion and reward-related processing: probing incentive motivation in affective priming tasks.

Based on an incentive motivation theory of extraversion (Depue & Collins, 1999), it was hypothesized that extraverts (relative to introverts) would exhibit stronger positive priming effects in affective priming tasks, whether involving words or pictures. This hypothesis was systematically supported in four studies involving 229 undergraduates. In each of the four studies, and in a subsequent combined analysis, extraversion was positively predictive of positive affective priming effects, but was not predictive of negative affective priming effects. The results bridge an important gap in the literature between biological and trait models of incentive motivation and do so in a way that should be informative to subsequent efforts to understand the processing basis of extraversion as well as incentive motivation.

Neurotic contentment: A self-regulation view of neuroticism-linked distress.

The present hypotheses were guided by four premises, which were systematically examined in six studies involving 409 undergraduate participants. The first premise, established by prior work, is that trait neuroticism is closely associated with avoidance-related goals. The second premise, however, is that neuroticism may be uncorrelated with cognitive tendencies to recognize threats as they occur, and subsequently to down-regulate them. In support of this point, all six studies found that neuroticism was unrelated to post-error behavioral adjustments in choice reaction time. The third premise is that post-error reactivity would nonetheless predict individual differences in threat-recognition (Studies 1 and 2) and its apparent mitigation (Study 3), independently of trait neuroticism. These predictions were supported. The fourth premise is that individual differences in neuroticism and error-reactivity would interact with each other in predicting everyday experiences of distress. In support of such predictions, Studies 4-6 found that higher levels of error-reactivity were associated with less negative affect at high levels of neuroticism, but more negative affect at low levels of neuroticism. The findings are interpreted in terms of trait-cognition self-regulation principles.

Behavioral facilitation: a cognitive model of individual differences in approach motivation.

Approach motivation consists of the active, engaged pursuit of ones goals. The purpose of the present three studies (N = 258) was to examine whether approach motivation could be cognitively modeled, thereby providing process-based insights into personality functioning. Behavioral facilitation was assessed in terms of faster (or facilitated) reaction time with practice. As hypothesized, such tendencies predicted higher levels of approach motivation, higher levels of positive affect, and lower levels of depressive symptoms and did so across cognitive, behavioral, self-reported, and peer-reported outcomes. Tendencies toward behavioral facilitation, on the other hand, did not correlate with self-reported traits (Study 1) and did not predict avoidance motivation or negative affect (all studies). The results indicate a systematic relationship between behavioral facilitation in cognitive tasks and approach motivation in daily life. Results are discussed in terms of the benefits of modeling the cognitive processes hypothesized to underlie individual differences motivation, affect, and depression.

Approach Motivation as Incentive Salience: Perceptual Sources of Evidence in Relation to Positive Word Primes

Four experiments (total N = 391) examined predictions derived from a biologically based incentive salience theory of approach motivation. In all experiments, judgments indicative of enhanced perceptual salience were exaggerated in the context of positive, relative to neutral or negative, stimuli. In Experiments 1 and 2, positive words were judged to be of a larger size (Experiment 1) and led individuals to judge subsequently presented neutral objects as larger in size (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, similar effects were observed in a mock subliminal presentation paradigm. In Experiment 4, positive word primes were perceived to have been presented for a longer duration of time, again relative to both neutral and negative word primes. Results are discussed in relation to theories of approach motivation, affective priming, and the motivation-perception interface.

Blood pressure reactivity predicts somatic reactivity to stress in daily life

The purpose of the present study was to examine whether stress-somatic symptom associations may be more pronounced among individuals whose bodies exhibit higher levels of cardiovascular reactivity to a laboratory social stress task. During an initial laboratory session, participants delivered a 5-min speech and individual differences in cardiovascular reactivity were quantified. The same participants subsequently completed a 15-day experience sampling protocol, in which daily levels of stress and somatic symptoms were assessed. Multi-level modeling was used to assess associations among laboratory cardiovascular reactivity, daily stress and somatic symptoms. Daily symptom reports included a set of commonly experienced physical symptoms reflective of general bodily dysfunction. Individuals displaying high levels of laboratory systolic blood pressure reactivity experienced more somatic symptoms on high-stress days, but this was not the case for individuals low in systolic blood pressure reactivity. The results bridge two hitherto distinct health psychology literatures showing that cardiovascular and somatic reactivity to stress are associated. Stress reactivity individual differences in one system may indicate more general differences in bodily reactivity across systems.

Interpersonal Arrogance and the Incentive Salience of Power versus Affiliation Cues

The arrogance dimension of the circumplex contrasts people who seemingly value power over affiliation (high arrogance) versus those who do not (low arrogance). Following this line of thinking, and building on an incentive salience model of approach motivation, three studies (total N = 284) examined the differential processing of power versus affiliation stimuli in categorization, perception and approach–avoidance paradigms. All studies found interactions of the same type. In study 2, for example, people high in arrogance perceived power stimuli to be larger than affiliation stimuli, but this differential pattern was not evident at low arrogance levels. People high, but not low, in arrogance also approached power stimuli faster than affiliation stimuli in a motor movement task (study 3). The results contribute to a process–based understanding of how interpersonal arrogance functions while linking such differences to the manner in which power versus affiliation cues are perceived and reacted to. Copyright