Sara Slinn

Certification Delay under Elections and Card- Check Procedures: Empirical Evidence from Canada

This paper examines the determinants and consequences of delay in the union certification process using data from certification applications and unfair labor practice complaints (ULPs) from British Columbia (1986–98) and Ontario (1993–98). During the period studied, there were several changes in delay-related laws, including laws regulating the presence and stringency of election time limits and the availability of expedited ULP hearings. Key findings are that ULPs against the employer reduced the likelihood of compliance with time limit laws except where expedited ULP hearings also existed; employer-filed objections to the application reduced the likelihood of compliance; and election delay reduced the likelihood of certification success both in policy regimes without time limits and in those where stipulated time limits were frequently breached. Overall, the results suggest that enforced time limits on elections coupled with expedited ULP hearings may substantially mitigate the adverse effects of election delay on certification success.This paper examines the determinants and consequences of delay in the union certification process using data from certification applications and unfair labor practice complaints (ULPs) from British Columbia (1986–98) and Ontario (1993–98). During the period studied, there were several changes in delay-related laws, including laws regulating the presence and stringency of election time limits and the availability of expedited ULP hearings. Key findings are that ULPs against the employer reduced the likelihood of compliance with time limit laws except where expedited ULP hearings also existed; employer-filed objections to the application reduced the likelihood of compliance; and election delay reduced the likelihood of certification success both in policy regimes without time limits and in those where stipulated time limits were frequently breached. Overall, the results suggest that enforced time limits on elections coupled with expedited ULP hearings may substantially mitigate the adverse effects of election delay on certification success.

First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act: Multi-Jurisdictional Evidence from Canada

First contract arbitration (FCA) provisions are posed as a solution to the difficulties of negotiating a first contract for newly certified bargaining units. FCA is a longstanding, and no longer controversial, element of Canadian labor legislation. FCA provisions now exist in six Canadian jurisdictions and four distinct FCA models have developed (the exceptional remedy or fault model, the automatic access model, the no-fault model, and the mediation intensive model). In the United States the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) included a highly contested proposal to amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to include an FCA provision similar to the Canadian automatic access model. This chapter offers a balanced assessment of FCA evidence from Canada addressing the main objections to FCA in the EFCA debates. Individual case level data from jurisdictions representing each of the four FCA models is examined. The evidence demonstrates that although FCA is widely available in Canada, it is an option that is rarely sought and, when sought, rarely granted; that parties involved in FCA are able to establish stable bargaining relationships; and, that this process does not, as critics charge, simply prolong the life of nonviable bargaining units. This chapter concludes by suggesting that the practice under Quebecs “no-fault” model and British Columbias “mediation intensive” model merit consideration for adoption elsewhere. These models position the FCA process as a mechanism fostering collective bargaining and voluntary agreements, rather than treating it as a remedy for dysfunctional negotiations and as part of the unfair labor practice framework.

Some Think of the Future: Internet, Electronic, and Telephonic Labor Representation Elections

Amid the scholarly dialogue regarding amending labor certification procedures, there have been calls for the adoption of internet, electronic and/or telephonic representation voting (IETV) procedures in representation elections. To date, most labor relations agencies in the United States and Canada have not implemented IETV. Three notable exceptions are the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) in the United States, and the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB). This article explores the strengths and weaknesses of IETV and the potential for wider adoption of this technology in the representation election context. The article examines NMB’s rationale in adopting IETV, and its experience with this new election format. Insights and experiences from interview participants provide a fuller examination of the prospects and pitfalls of IETV than previous research. The primary rationale for adopting IETV has been premised on pragmatic administrative decision-making, rather than minimizing employer and union interference in voting. Findings also show that IETV has been adopted as a substitute for mail-ballot elections, and not as a replacement for manual elections. These findings have implications for extending the adoption of IETV to other labor relations agencies. This article posits that while IETV is an important innovation in the representation electoral process, it is too early for there to be universal adoption of the format without additional research and experimentation. In experimenting with IETV, the focus should be on determining whether IETV fulfills the fundamental purpose of a representation election: to accurately reflect whether or not employees in a unit wish to be represented by the applicant union. Moreover, in introducing IETV, an agency must explore new means of communicating with unit employees aimed at maximizing participation under the new election format.