Sarah Oates

The neo-Soviet model of the media

Abstract This article traces the genesis of a neo-Soviet model of the mass media. Through an examination of the Russian media in the post-Soviet era as well as a review of media performance during elections in the region, the article concludes that the Russian media now operate in a ‘neo-Soviet’ fashion. Factors in this media model include a rejection of balance or objectivity; flaws in media law; self-censorship; government interference and harassment of media outlets; the lack of journalistic professionalism; and an atmosphere of violence against journalists. Furthermore, there are continuities in audience reception from the Soviet to the neo-Soviet model.

Revolution stalled : the political limits of the internet in the post-Soviet sphere

Acknowledgments Introduction The National Borders of the Internet: How the Russian State Shapes the Global Potential of ICTs The Internet Audience in Russia Internet Control in Russia Russian Parties On Line Parents and Patients: Online health and fairness campaigns in Russia The Winter of Discontent: Elections, Protests, and the Internet in Russia, 2011-12 Conclusions Appendix References Index

Media Effects and Russian Elections, 1999–2000

The Russian parliamentary and presidential elections of December 1999 and March 2000 appeared to have been won in large part through the partisan use of (particularly state) television. According to the evidence of a spring 2001 national survey, television was the main source of political information for the supporters of all parties and candidates. However, state television (which had been most supportive of the Kremlin) was much more likely to be favoured by the supporters of the pro-regime Unity party; while commercial television (which had provided a more even-handed coverage of the elections) was more popular and respected among the supporters of anti-Kremlin parties and candidates and less popular among supporters of Vladimir Putin. Regression analysis that takes account of reciprocal causation between media source and vote choice indicates that these were not spurious associations. The findings suggest that the state itself may exercise a disproportionate influence upon the electoral process in newly established systems in which social structures and political allegiances remain fluid.

Rhetoric in the Language of Real Estate Marketing

‘Des. Res.’, ‘rarely available’, ‘viewing essential’—these are all part of the peculiar parlance of housing advertisements which contain a heady mix of euphemism, hyperbole and superlative. Of interest is whether the selling agents penchant for rhetoric is spatially uniform or whether there are variations across the urban system. This paper is also interested in how the use of superlatives varies over the market cycle and over the selling season. For example, are estate agents more inclined to use hyperbole when the market is buoyant or when it is flat, and does it matter whether a house is marketed in the summer or winter? This paper attempts to answer these questions by applying textual analysis to a unique dataset of 49 926 records of real estate transactions in the Strathclyde conurbation over the period 1999 to 2006. The analysis opens up a new avenue of research into the use of real estate rhetoric and its interaction with agency behaviour and market dynamics.

Mind the Gaps: Media Use and Mass Action in Russia

In the winter of 2011–2012 in Russia, tens of thousands of citizens attended protest demonstrations in Moscow and other Russian cities after anger erupted over electoral manipulation in the Decembe...

Politics and the Media in Postcommunist Russia

The evidence of a nationally representative survey conducted in April 2001 suggests that television is the medium of choice for most Russians. At least 92 per cent watch at least several times a week, with state channels more popular than those in commercial ownership. The media enjoy a high level of trust, and there is widespread agreement that they should adopt a stabilising role in society rather than simply report developments. Television is the main source of information when Russians make their electoral choices; there are accordingly considerable implications in the extent to which pro-Kremlin candidates and parties enjoy the support of the state media, which in turn are the favourite viewing of the voters that support them.

Russian Elections and TV News Comparison of Campaign News on State-Controlled and Commercial Television Channels

Recent parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in the Russian Federation offer a chance to study the political role of television in a post-Soviet state. Television has many roles to play during an election in a developing democracy: It should inform voters about choices, report on the events of the campaign, and educate voters about the electoral process itself. This article examines how the news coverage of parliamentary and presidential elections on Russias primary state television channel and on its largest private television station fulfilled these goals. The results of coding television news during the campaign periods for the 1995 Duma campaign and the 1996 presidential race show that these channels generally failed to contribute fully to the legitimization of the electoral process. During the parliamentary campaign, state-controlled Russian Public Television (ORT) focused on pro-government parties and neglected coverage of the competition. Although the elections coverage on the private NTV station was more balanced, the elections were relatively ignored in favor of aggressive coverage of the war in Chechnya. By the 1996 presidential election, the two stations both abandoned the pretense of neutrality to promote the incumbent presidential candidate, Boris Yeltsin. What emerges from this study is evidence of a missed opportunity to consolidate the growth of an independent media in Russia—and the failure of voters to obtain disinterested information from primary television outlets in a fragile democracy.

Religion and Political Action in Postcommunist Europe

Patterns of political identification in postcommunist Europe are still weakly formed. The churches, however, command high levels of confidence, in sharp contrast to political parties. Representative surveys in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine in late 1997 and early 1998 indicate high levels of confidence in the churches in three of these nations, but not in the Czech Republic for reasons that appear connected to its forced conversion to Catholicism. The religious, as in other countries, are disproportionately female, but attenders in postcommunist Europe are not more likely to be elderly or resident in the countryside. There was little difference between church attenders and national populations in attitudes to the market, NATO membership, or the current government; there were rather larger differences between the countries, with Bulgarians the most favourable to the market, NATO and pro-market parties, and Ukrainians the least favourable. A multiple regression analysis found that church attendance of itself had little effect on attitudes or party preferences in either the Czech Republic or Slovakia; it did, however, increase support for the market, for joining NATO and for pro-market parties in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The relatively modest effects of overt religiosity are likely to be helpful to the formation of a democratic political culture, although account must also be taken of a strong association between the Muslim minorities in these countries and the political parties that seek to represent their interests.

Crisees: real-time monitoring of social media streams to support crisis management

The Crisees demonstrator is a service that aggregates and collects social media streams to support Crisis Managment.

Comparing the Politics of Fear: The Role of Terrorism News in Election Campaigns in Russia, the United States and Britain

How has the threat of terrorism been portrayed in recent election campaigns? Looking at detailed evidence from nightly news programmes in the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States shows various similarities, but also important divergences in the political salience of ‘terrorism’ in the context of the contemporary ‘war on terror’ in which the governments of all three countries are involved. The evidence suggests that messages about terrorism play an emotive and important role in American and Russian elections. The British media and audience, however, appear to remain more rational and less emotional in discussions about terrorism during a national election. The ‘fear factor’ seems to be a tempting card to play, offering political leaders means of entrenching their positions.