Matthew Wyman

Parties and Politics in Post-communist Russia

A survey carried out in 12 urban areas in December, 1992, suggests that parties are widely believed to be playing a role of little significance in Russian politics, and that there is little interest in their activities. Of those that did express a view, communist supporters were likely to be older, poorer, less well educated, and more working class than the supporters of other parties; Yeltsin supporters, by contrast, were richer, better educated, and younger, with supporters of the remaining parties less clearly differentiated. Communists, equally, were more hostile to the market and to political democracy, and more likely than others to deplore the loss of Russias great power status, with Yeltsin supporters again least likely to do so. The outcome is a “party system without parties,” with an electorate divided socially and attitudinally but those differences not reflected in a stable pattern of attachments to the political parties that have so far been established.

Russian political culture: Evidence from public opinion surveys

Established views of Russian political culture locate the Soviet experience in the culture of Imperial Russia. Yet the rapid modernization effected by the Soviet regime might be expected to have brought about changes in the direction of secularism, pluralism and democracy. The work of other scholars has suggested precisely that. However, the circumstances of their work needs to be taken into account. More careful studies over a longer period suggest at best that the cultural basis for genuine democracy is mixed, so the prospects for democratic politics are so far not secure.

Developments in Russian voting behaviour: 1993 and 1995 compared

Election surveys from the parliamentary elections of December 1993 and December 1995 reveal a high level of electoral volatility, which is explained in terms of general problems of party consolidation in post‐communist conditions and further conditions specific to Russia. Continuities and changes in the social basis of the party vote between the two parliamentary elections have been explained, together with voting patterns, in terms of the influence of party programmes, campaign effects and the influence of charisma or clientelism. Information on turnout suggests that Russia remains a country where the poorer and more excluded sections of society are drawn into electoral participation in relatively great proportions. The general volatility in voting behaviour weakens the prospects for democratic consolidation and strengthens the drift to semi‐authoritarian government.

Public Opinion and Post-Soviet Politics

What were the main features of Russian public opinion in the recent period? To what extent does one observe continuity, and are there major discontinuities in mass attitudes? What has been the impact of public opinion on post-Soviet politics? And do the findings raise any general theoretical points about the role of public opinion in the transition from communism in Russia?

Attitudes to the Market Economy

The institution of the planned economy was a central feature of the Soviet regime. Virtual elimination of the private sector enabled the regime to claim that it had abolished the exploitation of man by man and created a qualitatively new way of organising production and distribution. History would prove the planned economy superior to capitalism. Such claims were vital components of the whole system of legitimisation.

Public Opinion and Soviet Political Institutions

The extent of legitimacy of the communist system in the Soviet Union has been much debated by experts, a debate which is likely to continue, since there is no way of going back and measuring it. The following is perhaps widely accepted. Whatever we are now told by violent anti-communists, there were many sincere believers in the system, who genuinely thought that society was on the road to communism. After the campaign of de-Stalinisation and the revelations about atrocities that took place after Stalin’s death, levels of idealism were hardly to return to the levels of the 1920s, but it never completely died out. Such a belief was based on some undoubted achievements. While the extent and nature of the industrialisation achieved in the Soviet period is now under question, certainly the victories in the Second World War and in the space race through the launching of the first Sputnik, and the achievement of superpower status were considerable sources of Soviet pride.

Public Opinion and Postcommunist Political Institutions

The collapse of communist power in the Soviet Union in August 1991 did not leave a power vacuum. Republican institutions, which had managed to assert considerable power, as discussed in the previous chapter, were able to take over in most cases virtually unchallenged. But this did not solve the problem of where institutional power should lie. Should there be an executive form of government, with the President appointing a government answerable only to him, and elected parliaments playing a role merely as a ‘sounding board’? Or should governments be formed from within Parliament, with the Head of State having more symbolic than real power? At a still deeper level, could the new institutions regain some of the popular trust and authority that political institutions in general had lost during the perestroika period? In Russia at least, postcommunist politics has focused just as much on these constitutional issues of who governs as on debates about policy.

Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture

How does the experience of centuries of authoritarian rule affect Russian political culture? How important is it that decisions have for most of her history been taken from above, by an extremely narrow circle of decision makers, without popular involvement or discussion of alternatives? That there has never been much law in Russia, only a system of non-laws, or rather laws which are only arbitrarily applied? That regimes have only rarely respected the most basic rights of the citizen?

Russians and Non-Russians on the Collapse of the USSR

For Russians, having an empire was natural. For centuries, well before the rise of nationalism as a political ideology, many peoples were subject to Russian rule. Some had been assimilated relatively peacefully, others with a great deal of suffering and loss of life. Russification of nations whose cultures differed — that is, the imposition of the Russian language and cultural norms and the Orthodox religion, was frequent.

The Mood of the Nation

Before 1985, the lives of most ordinary Russians were at least predictable. Living standards were not high, the economy had stagnated and queues for basic goods were the rule, not the exception. However, prices of essentials were low and stable and there was a high degree of job security. The country faced important social problems — poverty, homelessness, alcoholism and the like — but the all-pervasive culture of secrecy meant that many Russians were simply unaware of the seriousness of the situation they faced.