Sarah Teige-Mocigemba

Implicit measures: A normative analysis and review.

Implicit measures can be defined as outcomes of measurement procedures that are caused in an automatic manner by psychological attributes. To establish that a measurement outcome is an implicit measure, one should examine (a) whether the outcome is causally produced by the psychological attribute it was designed to measure, (b) the nature of the processes by which the attribute causes the outcome, and (c) whether these processes operate automatically. This normative analysis provides a heuristic framework for organizing past and future research on implicit measures. The authors illustrate the heuristic function of their framework by using it to review past research on the 2 implicit measures that are currently most popular: effects in implicit association tests and affective priming tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Process components of the Implicit Association Test: a diffusion-model analysis.

The authors present a diffusion-model analysis of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In Study 1, the IAT effect was decomposed into 3 dissociable components: Relative to the compatible phase, (a) ease and speed of information accumulation are lowered in the incompatible phase, (b) more cautious speed-accuracy settings are adopted, and (c) nondecision components of processing require more time. Studies 2 and 3 assessed the nature of interindividual differences in these components. Construct-specific variance in the IAT relating to the construct to be measured (such as implicit attitudes) was concentrated in the compatibility effect on information accumulation (Studies 2 and 3), whereas systematic method variance in the IAT was mapped on differential speed-accuracy settings (Study 3). Implications of these dissociations for process theories of the IAT and for applications are discussed.

Understanding the role of executive control in the Implicit Association Test: Why flexible people have small IAT effects:

The goal of the present research was to investigate the role of three central-executive functions—switching of mental sets, inhibition of prepotent responses, and simultaneous storage and processing (i.e., working-memory capacity)—in accounting for method variance in the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In two studies, several IATs with unrelated contents were administered along with a battery of central-executive tasks, with multiple tasks tapping each of the above executive functions. Method variance was found to be related to the switching factor, but not to the inhibition factor. There was also evidence for a small independent contribution of the working-memory capacity factor. The findings constrain process accounts of the IAT, lending support to an account in terms of task-set switching, and they have consequences for applications.

Minimizing the influence of recoding in the Implicit Association Test: The Recoding-Free Implicit Association Test (IAT-RF)

Recoding processes can influence the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) in a way that impedes an unequivocal interpretation of the resulting compatibility effects. We present a modified version of the IAT that aims to eliminate recoding, the IAT-RF (short for “IAT–recoding free”). In the IAT-RF, compatible and incompatible assignments of categories to responses switch randomly between trials within a single experimental block. Abandoning an extended sequence of consistent category–response mappings undermines recoding processes in the IAT-RF. Two experiments reveal that the IAT-RF is capable of assessing compatibility effects between the nominally defined categories of the task and effectively prevents recoding. By enforcing a processing of the stimuli in terms of their task-relevant category membership, the IAT-RF eliminates the confounding of compatibility effects with task switch costs and becomes immune against biased selections of stimuli.

On the controllability of evaluative-priming effects: Some limits that are none

Two experiments examined recent claims of uncontrollability of the evaluative-priming effect. According to these claims, imposing an adaptive 600 ms response deadline prevents successful faking (Degner, 2009). Furthermore, strategic control attempts have been argued not to reduce the priming measures sensitivity to spontaneous evaluations so that correlations of evaluative-priming effects with external criteria are not affected by attempts to fake (Bar-Anan, 2010). Here, we show that faking is possible even with an adaptive 600 ms response deadline when faking instructions do not conflict with speed pressures imposed thereby (Experiments 1 and 2). In addition, suitable faking instructions substantially affect the predictive validity of priming effects in terms of their correlations with (non-faked) self-report measures and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). The previous claims about the uncontrollability of the evaluative-priming effect may thus have been premature.

When scoring algorithms matter: Effects of working memory load on different IAT scores

In most process accounts of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), it is assumed that compatible and incompatible IAT blocks require different amounts of working memory capacity (WMC) and recruit executive functions such as task switching and inhibition to different extents. In the present study (N= 120), cognitive load during the completion of an IAT was experimentally manipulated by means of an oral random-number generation secondary task. Cognitive load led to slower latencies and more errors, especially in the incompatible block. However, different IAT scores, including conventional scores and D-scores, were affected differentially by the load manipulation: scores based on raw data of task performance such as latencies and errors were increased whereas scores that use transformations such as log-latency scores and D-scores were decreased. A number of analyses shed light on the reasons for the unexpected dissociation between scoring algorithms. Remarkably, external correlations of the IAT scores were not affected by the experimental manipulation.

Controlling the “uncontrollable”: Faking effects on the affect misattribution procedure

ABSTRACT In two experiments, the impact of faking on the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) was examined. Results revealed that faking influences both the overall means and the convergent validity of AMP effects in terms of correlations with self-report measures. Faking effects were very selective in that they affected fake-prime trials only, for which AMP effects were significant, but reversed in direction, while AMP effects for non-fake trials remained intact. Importantly, neither strategic advice nor prior task experience was a necessary prerequisite for successful faking. The discussion focuses on possible processes underlying successful faking in the AMP.

The Affect Misattribution Procedure

The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) has been forwarded as one of the most promising alternatives to the Implicit Association Test and the evaluative-priming task for measuring attitudes such as prejudice indirectly. We investigated whether the AMP is indeed able to detect an evaluative out-group bias. In contrast to recent conclusions about the robustness of AMP effects, six out of seven pilot studies indicated that participants did not show any prejudice effects in the AMP. Yet, these pilot studies were not fully conclusive with regard to our research question because they investigated different domains of prejudice, used small sample sizes, and employed a modified AMP version. In a preregistered, high-powered AMP study, we therefore examined whether the standard AMP does reveal prejudice against Turks, the biggest minority in Germany, and found a significant, albeit very small prejudice effect. We discuss possible reasons for the AMP’s weak sensitivity to evaluations in socially sensitive domains.