Saul Kelly

‘Crazy in the Extreme’? The Silk Letters Conspiracy

The Silk Letters Conspiracy, or Case, was a plot by a small clique of Indian Pan-Islamists located in Afghanistan, India and the Hijaz to overthrow British rule in India during the First World War. Although British officials at the time were prepared to admit that the conspiracy had been ‘organised with some skill’, there was a general feeling that it was a rather ‘pathetic’ and ‘ineffectual’ affair, and ‘crazy in the extreme’. This verdict has been echoed by those who have subsequently considered the plot, if only in passing. But there is more to the Silk Letters Conspiracy than meets the eye, as this article will detail. In retrospect, the Case has a greater significance than previously thought in terms of Britains encounter with Pan-Islam.

A Succession of Crises: SOE in the Middle East, 1940-45

A detailed account of SOE in the Middle East is a prominent omission from the collection of studies on SOE during the Second World War. This is surprising given the importance of the region to Britain and the fact that some records were released, with a helpful guide, in 1994. Using these records, and the SOE War Diary (released in 1999), this article intends to show that SOE operations in the Middle East were characterized by a succession of crises. These fall into three periods: the early activities in 1940–41; the post-occupational planning phase of 1941–43, and the post-October 1943 period which saw reorganization, the recession of the German threat, the disbandment of the post-occupational schemes and the desire to re-tool SOE in the Middle East for peacetime/post-war problems.

Desert Conquests: Early British Planning on the Future of the Italian Colonies, June 1940–September 1943

Based on British archival sources, this article re-examines early British government planning on the future of the Italian colonies during the period of Mussolinis War from June 1940 to September 1943.

The British in Egypt. Community, Crime and Crises, 1882–1922

activities that are not sufficiently examined in Jeffery’s book, especially covert political action, or ‘dirty tricks’ as they were defined. It can be established that SIS and SOE, before its integration with the former in January 1946, were closely involved in covert political activities in the Middle East, including co-opting prominent Arab politicians and manipulating local political systems to ensure the election or nomination of pro-British leaders. Details of the joint operation by the SIS and CIA in 1953 that toppled Musaddiq’s nationalist government in Iran are well known, but SIS and other British intelligence agencies were more involved in covert political action and black propaganda in the Middle East than previously assumed. An example hitherto unknown was the highly successful covert political operation in which SIS and SOE were involved during the Syrian crisis in the summer of 1945, which forced France out of the Levant and placed Syria under tacit British hegemony. This raises the issue of Great Britain’s use of its intelligence services during the decolonization process to defend its strategic and economic interests in its former colonies or spheres of influence. Another topic revealed in the ‘French documents’, which Jeffery’s work does not adequately address, is the Foreign Office’s use of SIS in its foreign policy, not merely to provide political intelligence, but as an active tool. For example, in the Middle East traditional diplomacy and special political operations were used simultaneously, as when SIS agents were employed in manoeuvring Arab leaders against the Soviet Union or the United States. In the latter case they tried to exploit President Truman’s endorsement of Jewish immigration to Palestine to undermine the American position in Saudi Arabia. SIS was understandably reluctant to expose such controversial activities, and we can only speculate that Jeffery was either barred from seeing documents on such issues for ‘national security’ reasons, or that they were among the large number of documents disposed of. We should therefore pay attention to the warning of Richard Aldrich, a leading historian of British intelligence, about the services’ attempts to ‘manipulate’ or ‘police’ their records. This criticism does not detract from the importance of Jeffery’s work, or from his achievements. His book is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of British intelligence and for anyone seeking to learn more on the behind-the-scenes role of an intelligence organization in a democratic country.

The Modern Middle East. A Political History since the First World War (2nd edition)

Jewish matters. Most of the six articles included in this section discuss various aspects of the Jewish community and life of Jerusalem in the sixteenth century. In an anecdotal article published in 2002, Cohen discusses the case of two Jewish women suing the Jewish waqf over permission to reconstruct a building in 1865. Though the case was fully within the Jewish context, the contenders brought the case in front of the local Muslim court; to Cohen this case highlights two dynamics emerging in the city: the growing Jewish demographic presence and the emergence of a more visible rift between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews. The following and last article of this section, first published in 1978, is an attempt to portray the Jews under Islam in Palestine, and provides an interesting perspective on the state of academia on this subject in the late 1970s. The last part of the book includes four articles exploring Christians and Christianity in Palestine, mainly in the context of sixteenth century Jerusalem. In these papers, Cohen presents a variety of sources in order to discuss Muslim policies towards Christians, showing how often governmental policies were distanced from local attitudes and behaviours. The last article in this collection, first published in 1992, investigates the decrease of the Christian presence in the countryside of Palestine through the study of an order issued by the provincial governor of Damascus in 1807. Cohen argues that in this period Muslims and Christians were virtually undistinguishable, as Christians often hid their religious identity. Cohen claims that the Christian presence in the rural areas of Palestine was diminishing because of the poor level of protection and safety, as the Covenant of Umar worked only superficially. As mentioned at the beginning, a general assessment of Studies on Ottoman Palestine certainly does not include a judgement on the achievements of Amnon Cohen. The book, in fact, could have benefited from better editorial work and it would have been interesting to read Cohen’s thoughts on some of his early writings: perhaps a reassessment or reinforcement of his earlier claims and suggestions for new lines of research. Studies on Ottoman Palestine constitutes an interesting collection of articles that will be welcomed by scholars of Ottoman Palestine and Jerusalem, but I am sorry to say that it does not really add anything new to the field.

Churchill and the Dardanelles, by Christopher Bell: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, 439 pp., £25.00/

outlet for religious entrepreneurship, while the same dynamic never existed in Senegal (216). This theory linking the relationship between the state and religious elite is a significant contribution to existing literature on Islamist mobilisation. Interestingly, though Mecham writes about the important social role of religious institutions, ideology itself is not considered a viable motivation for Islamist mobilisation. He cites Islamic institutions as pushing mobilisation by shaping individual preferences on the role Islam plays in politics, creating a set of shared symbolic references, and generating channels for interpersonal communication – in other words, fostering a specific ideology (56). He claims that such symbolic language, however, only becomes political ‘when it is juxtaposed against an external political context’ (62). Mecham asserts, then, that religious identity is purely instrumental (217), stating that many who vote for Islamist parties do so because it is the primary vehicle of political opposition (218). While this dynamic certainly takes place under some conditions, in others ideology very much matters, especially when it comes to Salafi parties that form to challenge existing Brotherhood blocs. In his closing discussion about mobilisation since 2010, Mecham makes the important point that state weakness does not necessarily lead to higher levels of Islamist mobilisation (235). Rather, state crises in places like Libya, Syria and Yemen have provided the focal points around which Islamist activity has emerged; this activity has turned violent as government avenues have closed (235). In places wherein Islamists have come to power since 2011, Mecham has found that they ‘lose much of the protest support that they initially received because of popular dissatisfaction with the current system’ (236). Ultimately, Mecham describes two shifts in the potential for Islamist mobilisation following the so-called Arab Spring: the potential for ‘expression without repression’ and the possibility for ‘public coordination around a particular political narrative and objective’ (237). Although Islamists seemed most able to translate these dynamics into electoral gains, these shifts could also benefit other parties in the future, and Mecham’s model explaining how Islamist mobilisation arises in certain institutional environments is critical to understanding the contexts in which Islamist, rather than other types of mobilisation, are likely to take place.

34.95(hardback), ISBN 978-0-19-870254-2

On putting down Michael Cohens anthology of articles on Palestine and the Middle East from the Balfour Declaration to the Suez Crisis, one is left with an overwhelming sense of despair at the shee...

Britain's hegemony in Palestine and the Middle East, 1917–56: changing strategic imperatives, by Michael J. Cohen: London and Portland, OR, Valentine Mitchell, 2017, 330 pp., £50.00/

Abstract During the First World War, Persia was the scene of early British cryptanalytical successes against German diplomatic codes and ciphers under the auspices of Room 47 (one of the suite of rooms which for convenience have been listed under “Room 40 OB” or the Old Building of the British Admiralty in London). It is the contention of this article, based on newly discovered archival material, that there is a strong, and previously undetected link with the Zimmermann Telegram, which David Kahn has called “the greatest intelligence coup of all time.”

86.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1910383216

decades. Contributing to this dynamism are favourable demographics, high rates of urbanization and infrastructure investment, relatively low physical capital stock, diversified resource base and good geographical position. The weaknesses include a fragile institutional structure and significant political risks. But Egypt is ‘ahead’ of, say, Vietnam in dealing with its political transition and succession risks. Although the global conditions are less favourable today, research on the experience of Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, or even the Philippines after the political protests that ousted the Marcos regime, is likely to be useful in further illuminating the outlook for Egypt in the aftermath of the Mubarak regime.

Room 47: The Persian Prelude to the Zimmermann Telegram

demands of engineers, technicians, and military strategists, who sought to provide the most credible of nuclear deterrents (pp. 131–38). From the international perspective, Moore’s research provides some extremely interesting, and important, information regarding the condition of Britain’s nuclear weapons. As Moore illustrates, technically there existed occasions when Britain’s nuclear weapons, especially in their delivery systems and the decoys utilised in them, were superior to that of the United States. This is best illustrated with the case of the Blue Streak Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (1955–9) which, on a purely technical basis, if not on an economic and political one, was far superior to anything the United States possessed at this juncture. However, as Moore shows, while Britain’s technical capabilities in nuclear weaponry grew, the perception internationally was that Britain’s power was in terminal decline (pp. 108–40). Nuclear Illusions, as with every work of history, is not without a few flaws. Most obvious is Moore’s lack of engagement with US source material. Moore has not drawn on the extensive materials available from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson libraries. Nor has he utilised the documentation in the US National Archive in College Park, Maryland. Further, the Treasury files of the British government, which would have perhaps illustrated the economic pressures upon the British government more keenly, were also only sparingly used. While this reviewer accepts that Nuclear Illusions is predominantly focused on the technical aspects of Britain’s evolving nuclear capabilities, engagement with US source material would have provided a more contextualised account of the geo-political structure in which British actors operated. Regardless of these minor points, Nuclear Illusions is a first-rate work of scholarship that should appeal to those interested in nuclear politics, AngloAmerican relations, and the Cold War more generally. Indeed, Moore has provided a lucid and engaging account of Britain’s evolving nuclear capabilities during the governments of Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home.