Scott Jacobs

Structure of conversational argument: Pragmatic bases for the enthymeme

Conversational argument is characterized as sequential expansion of adjacency pairs aimed at regulating disagreement. The preconditions and embedded propositons of the speech act performed in the arguable turn define the sorts of expansions recognizable as arguments. General properties of adjacency pairs explain the prevalence of enthymemes in conversation.

Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics

Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation.

Strategy and structure in conversational influence attempts

Discourse analytic research has treated the communicative and sequential properties of conversational influence attempts (CIAs) independently. This study assembles evidence that the communicative properties of a variety of act‐types in CIA episodes can be placed on a continuum according to the degree to which the act‐type is dissociated from the illocutionary force of a request. Conversationalists’ assignment of any utterance to a place on this continuum is inherently problematic, being a matter of fallible assessment of mutual contextual knowledge. This continuum and its problematic application in conversation provides an integrated account of a variety of previously fragmented sequential patterns of CIAs.

Maintaining neutrality in dispute mediation: managing disagreement while managing not to disagree

Dispute mediators are active but neutral facilitators of discussion. Their job is inevitably marked by the need to manage multiple competing demands. These competing demands are a paradigm case of the kind of situation that the pragmatics literature has identified as giving rise to the production of various complex, nonstraightforward ways of talking. This paper shows three tactics mediators use to manage their multiple competing demands: indirect advocacy, framing of advocacy, and equivocal advocacy. These tactics serve as functional substitutes for more simple and straightforward moves of direction, correction, disagreement, argument, and the like. In this way, mediators manage disputes while maintaining an appearance of neutrality.

Argument as a Natural Category: The Routine Grounds for Arguing in Conversation.

A theoretical analysis of the natural category “argument”; can be built inductively from examination of discursive objects recognizable as members of the category. The natural category of argument appears to be defined functionally by its disagreement‐relevance and structurally by its expansion of basic sequences of speech acts. Expansion of speech act sequences into prototypical arguments—those in which reasons are exchanged—is governed by felicity conditions associated with the particular speech acts involved, so that making an argument is always done with reference to socially shared structures amounting to the proof requirements of individual speech acts.

Speech acts and arguments

Speech act theory seems to provide a promising avenue for the analysis of the functional organization of argument. The theory, however, might be taken to suggest that arguments are a homogenous class of speech act with a specifiable illocutionary force and a single set of felicity conditions. This suggestion confuses the analysis of the meaning of speech act verbs with the analysis of the pragmatic structure of actual language use. Suggesting that arguments are conveyed through a homogeneous class of linguistic action overlooks the way in which the context of activity and the form of expression organize the argumentative functions performed in using language. An alternative speech act analysis would treat folk terminology as a heuristic entry point into the development of a technical analysis of the myriad argumentative functions and structures to be found in natural language use. This would lead to a thorough-going pragmatic analysis of the rational and functional design of speech acts in argumentation.

Messages as replications: toward a message-centered design strategy

Three significant points of controversy separate Hunter, Hamilton, and Allens defense of single‐message designs from our suggestion that messages be replicated within experiments. We respond to each of these controversies. First, we examine their claim that “controlled”; single‐message designs completely eliminate all confounding of manipulated variables with other possible influences on the dependent variable and show it to rest on manifestly implausible assumptions. Second, we show why researchers should plan for the possibility of nonuniform treatment effects across messages, and so use multiple‐message designs; contrary to Hunter et al. ‘s suggestion, the available empirical evidence shows that treatment effects can and do vary across messages. Third, we discuss the advantages of having message replications both within and between studies, as opposed to Hunter et al.’s suggestion that such replication occur only between studies; multiple‐message designs provide greater reliability in estimation of tr...

Information Manipulation Theory: A Replication and Assessment.

>Information manipulation theory (IMT) applies Grices (1975; 1989) conversational maxims to the design of deceptive messages, but ignores the role of implicatures in deception. As a result, IMT proposes a dubious editing model of deception and an implausible conception of what it is that makes a deceptive message misleading. An alternative model, based on Grices theory of implicature, proposes that deception involves the manipulation of information so as to generate false implicatures. McCornacks (1992; McCornack et al., 1992) studies are replicated with the inclusion of explicit checks to determine the covertness of the purported deceptive messages and to check manipulation of information‐type (Quantity, Quality, Relevance, and Manner violations). None of the results are consistent with IMT predictions. Instead, the results uniformly support a model of deceptive message design based on conversational implicature.

Relevance and digressions in argumentative discussion: A pragmatic approach

Digressions in argumentative discussion are a kind of failure of relevance. Examination of what actual cases look like reveals several properties of argumentative relevance: (1) The informational relevance of propositions to the truth value of a conclusion should be distinguished from the pragmatic relevance of argumentative acts to the task of resolving a disagreement. (2) Pragmatic irrelevance is a collaborative phenomenon. It does not just short-circuit reasoning; it encourages a failure to take up the demands of an argumentative task. (3) Pragmatic irrelevance can occur not simply by the absence of a connection between what is said and some standpoint in dispute, but also by the presence of a connection between what is said and a competing use of the information. (4) Pragmatic relevance must be accomplished through communicative action.

Derailments of argumentation: It takes two to tango

The research of the Amsterdam School has spread outward across the discipline of argumentation studies like a new day, awakening us to new vistas, casting light on new opportunities, and offering a fresh look at our familiar surroundings. When it first appeared, the pragma-dialectical approach challenged so many existing assumptions that is seemed almost radical, and entirely disrupted the established view. Yet over the years this approach has proved so remarkably effective that many of its central tenets have begun to be widely recognized and accepted. These tenets are even becoming a part of science, as they are increasingly adopted into the standard model of argument used in computing. Along with Rob Grootendorst, Frans van Eemeren was the founding father of the Amsterdam School, and of the pragma-dialectical approach to the study of argumentation. This new approach found its inspiration in the critical rationalism of Popper (1972, 1974), Barth and Krabbe’s (1982) theory of formal dialectic, and the speech act theory of Austin (1962), Searle (1969), and Grice (1975) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 51). Argumentation, as a growing interdisciplinary field of research, was conducted mainly in logic, philosophy, and communication studies in the beginning. It has now branched and become truly interdisciplinary as it has affected more and more fields, like cognitive science, where models of rational thinking are an essential part of the research program. At some point, argumentation methods and findings began to be imported into computing, especially in the area called artificial intelligence, or AI. Since that time, other researchers in argumentation began to use tools developed in AI. In this chapter, we explore the development and importance of this connection between argumentation and artificial intelligence. Specifically, we show that the influence of argumentation on AI has occurred within a framework that is consistent with the basic approach of Pragma-Dialectics. While the pragma-dialectical approach is typically conceived