F.H. van Eemeren

Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation

In Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse, Frans H. van Eemeren brings together the dialectical and the rhetorical dimensions of argumentation by introducing the concept of strategic maneuvering. Strategic maneuvering refers to the arguer’s continual efforts to reconcile aiming for effectiveness with being reasonable. It takes place in all stages of argumentative discourse and manifests itself simultaneously in the choices that are made from the topical potential available at a particular stage, in adaptation to audience demand, and in the use of specific presentational devices. Strategic maneuvering derails when in the specific context in which the discourse takes place a rule for critical discussion has been violated, so that a fallacy has been committed. Van Eemeren makes clear that extending the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation by taking account of strategic maneuvering leads to a richer and more precise method for analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse.

Argumentative indicators in discourse: a pragma-dialectical study

Preface. 1. The identification of argumentative indicators. 1.1 Argumentative moves and argumentative indicators. 1.2 The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse. 1.3 Organisation of this study. 2. The ideal model of a critical discussion as a theoretical framework. 2.1 Dialectical stages in a critical discussion. 2.2 Pragmatic characterisation of argumentative moves as speech acts. 2.3 Dialectical profiles for pragmatic patterns of moves. 3. Indicators of confrontation. 3.1 Dialectical confrontation profiles. 3.2 Indicators of standpoints. 3.2.1 Tools for the identification of standpoints. 3.2.2 Propositional attitude indicating and force modifying expressions. 3.3 Indicators of disputes. 3.3.1 Doubt as an indicator of a single non-mixed dispute. 3.3.2 Indicators of a mixed dispute. 3.3.3 Indicators of a qualitative multiple dispute. 4. Indicators of the distribution of the burden of proof. 4.1 The distribution of the burden of proof. 4.2 Dialectical profiles for establishing the burden of proof. 4.3 Analysing the distribution of the burden of proof. 4.3.1 Indicators of a challenge to defend a standpoint. 4.3.2 Indicators of the acceptance of a one-sided burden of proof. 4.3.3 Indicators of refusing a one-sided burden of proof. 4.3.4 Indicators of sequence issues in a two-sided burden of proof. 5. Indicators of starting points for the discussion. 5.1 The identification of starting points. 5.2 Dialectical profile for establishing a starting point. 5.3The analysis of establishing starting points. 5.3.1 Indicators of a proposal to accept a proposition as a starting point. 5.3.2 Indicators of responses to a proposal to accept a proposition as a starting point. 6. Indicators of argument schemes. 6.1 The use of argument schemes in a critical discussion. 6.2 Clues for analogy argumentation. 6.2.1 Dialectical profile for the analogy relationship. 6.2.2 Clues in the presentation of argumentation by comparison. 6.2.3 Indications in criticism of argumentation by comparison. 6.2.4 Indications in the follow-up of argumentation by comparison. 6.3 Indications for symptomatic argumentation. 6.3.1 Dialectical profile for the symptomatic relationship. 6.3.2 Indications in the presentation of symptomatic argumentation. 6.3.3 Clues in criticism of symptomatic argumentation. 6.3.4 Clues in the follow-up of symptomatic argumentation. 6.4 Indications for causal argumentation. 6.4.1 Dialectical profile for the causal relationship. 6.4.2 Clues in the presentation of causal argumentation. 6.4.3 Clues in criticism of causal argumentation. 6.4.4 Clues in the follow-up of causal argumentation. 6.5 Some complications. 7. Indicators of the argumentation structure. 7.1 Dialectical profiles for different types of complex argumentation. 7.2 Indications in the verbal presentation of arguments. 7.2.1 Univocal indications for a subordinative relationship. 7.2.2 Non-univocal indications for subordinative argumentation. 7.2.3 Univocal indications for multiplicity. 7.2.4 Non-univocal i

Argumentation. Analysis, evaluation, presentation

Contents: Preface. Introduction. Part I: Analysis. Differences of Opinion. Argumentation and Discussion. Standpoints and Argumentation. Unexpressed Standpoints and Unexpressed Premises. The Structure of Argumentation. Part II: Evaluation. The Soundness of Argumentation. Fallacies (1). Fallacies (2). Part III: Presentation. Written Argumentation. Oral Argumentation.

The speech acts of arguing and convincing in externalized discussions.

In discussions directed towards solving a conflict of opinion the participants try to convince one another of the acceptability or unacceptability of the opinion that is under discussion. If the participants are co-operative, this means that they are prepared to externalize their position with regard to the opinion and to advance argumentation for or against it. In this article, which is a condensed translation of an article originally published in Dutch (van Eemeren and Grootendorst in Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing 2:271–310, 1980), the authors try to indicate, by reference to the speech act theory, what this entails. In the way in which it was originally conceived, the speech act theory is inadequate to characterize argumentation. In the authors’ view this objection can be met by regarding argumentation as an illocutionary act complex at a textual level. They formulate the conditions obtaining for a happy performance of this act complex and explain that for the speaker the performance is linked by convention to the perlocutionary act of convincing. In the case of an externalized discussion this means that with his argumentation the speaker tries to make the listener, in turn, perform an illocutionary act in which he expresses his acceptance of non-acceptance of the opinion.

For reason's sake: maximal argumentative analysis of discourse.

Everybody knows the kind of argumentation of the ‘Look out! Do you want to get run over?’-type. In these argumentations a standpoint, which is not always presented as one, is defended by an argumentation, which may pose as a question, often called ‘rhetorical’, or which otherwise does not show itself directly as an argumentation.

Identifying Argumentation Schemes

Argumentation is always a defense of a point of view: (a) Mother: “I don’t think five pounds pocket money is at all necessary; your sister always got two pounds a week.” Daughter: “That was years ago, and Betty, Monica, and all my other girlfriends get five or six pounds.” (b) History teacher: “Funny that you don’t want members of the National front working for the police, you were, after all, against the German Berufsverbote at the time?” English teacher: “Yes, but at the time it wasn’t about people who are fundamentally undemocratic which is certainly the case with the National Front.” (c) Policeman: “Will you put these tables and chairs back where they belong immediately?” Publican: “Why can’t I put tables and chairs outside? Across the street they put everything outside and you don’t pick on them.” Policeman: “Well, Sir, they pay council rates for doing so, and you don’t!”

Democracy and argumentation

Speaking in Fulton Missouri at the same place and from the same oaken lectern used by Winston Churchill to make his historic “Iron Curtain” speech 46 years earlier, on May the 6th 1992 the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a warning that mankind faced “the most difficult transition in its history.” According to the British newspaper The Independent of May the 7th 1992, Gorbachev urged “a new system of global government anchored to the United Nations.” The Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant reported on the same day that Gorbachev announced “a new era of worldwide democracy.”

The study of argumentation as normative pragmatics

In the past decade, the study of argumentation has developed into a field of study in its own right, with its own scholarly infrastructure of journals, book series and conferences. This evolution is achieved by a joint venture of philosphers, formal and informal logicians, discourse and conversation analysts, communication scholars and representatives of still other disciplines. In my opinion, the time is ripe for integrating the complementary contributions of the various disciplines into a coherent paradigmatic framework in which all relevant aspects of the study of argumentation are systematically taken into account. Of course, depending on the perspective of argumentative discourse which is taken as a starting-point, different paradigms can be articulated. Basically, Perelman and Olbrecht-Tytecas new rhetoric, Meyers problematology, Willards social epistemics, Blair and Johnsons informal logic, Woods and Waltons post-standard approach to fallacies, Grizes natural logic, Barth and Krabbes formal dialectics, van Eemeren and Grootendorsts pragmadialectics and several other contributions to the study of argumentation already constitute more or less worked-out parts of such a paradigm. With a view to getting a clearer picture of the rationale of their planning, it would be useful if the protagonists of the various paradigms would specify the research programs they are going to carry out in the nineties. As I see it, in order to be able to deal with the problems involved in creating an all-encompassing paradigmatic framework, a comprehensive research program is required. In this paper, I shall specify five types of research which, in my opinion, are necessary components of any adequate research progam.

The history of the argumentum ad hominem since the seventeenth century.

In this paper, we present an historical and systematic overview of the study of the argumentum ad hominem since the seventeenth century. We discuss the main pre-Hamblin approaches (Locke, Whately, Schopenhauer, Perelman, Johnstone), the Standard Treatment (Hamblin, Copi, Rescher, Kahane), and recent post-Hamblin developments (formal dialectics, pragma-dialectics, Woods and Walton).

Kinship: The Relationship Between Johnstone's Ideas about Philosophical Argument and the Pragma-Dialectical Theory Of Argumentation

As he himself declared in Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument (1978, 1), the late philosopher Henry W. Johnstone Jr. devoted a long period of his professional life to clarifying the nature of philosophical argument. His well-known view was that philosophical arguments are sui generis, i.e., not to be judged by the standards of argumentation in science or everyday discourse. Philosophical arguments are not ad rem, but are based on premises that are ex pressed or implied commitments of a party in dialogue. This is why philosophical argumentation is, according to Johnstone, always ad hominem. In philosophical argumentation, every ad rem argument begs the question. Usually, ad hominem argumentation is dismissed as invalid. Johnstone, however, maintains that making use of argumentum ad hominem is the only way to establish a philosophical conclusion. In an argumentum ad hominem, inferences are drawn from propositions stated or implied by the other party and critical questions are raised about the conclusions that were drawn, so that it can be used to refute a philosophical position by showing that this position is inconsistent. As Walton (2001) rightly observes, this type of ad hominem argumentation boils down to arguing from commitments of the other party, i.e., ex concessis. The use of ad hominem argumentation as the criticism of a position in terms of its own presuppositions is, in Johnstones view, the only valid argument in philosophy, if any philosophical argument is indeed valid. All philosophical polemic is in this perspective in fact addressed ad hominem. This applies not only to philosophical argumentation that concerns self-referential refutation but also to other ad hominem types of philosophical argumentation, including the tu quoque argument (1978, 11-12). According to Johnstone, there is no objective criterion for determining the validity of ad hominem argumentation. Validity must, says Johnstone in the