Sean Joseph Hughes

The relational responding task: toward a new implicit measure of beliefs

We introduce the Relational Responding Task (RRT) as a tool for capturing beliefs at the implicit level. Flemish participants were asked to respond as if they believed that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants (e.g., respond “true” to the statement “Flemish people are wiser than immigrants”) or to respond as if they believed that immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people (e.g., respond “true” to the statement “Flemish people are dumber than immigrants”). The difference in performance between these two tasks correlated with ratings of the extent to which participants explicitly endorsed the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants and with questionnaire measures of subtle and blatant racism. The current study provides a first step toward validating RRT effects as a viable measure of implicit beliefs.

To Be or Want to Be: Disentangling the Role of Actual versus Ideal Self in Implicit Self-Esteem

A growing body of work suggests that both depressed and non-depressed individuals display implicit positivity towards the self. In the current study, we examined whether this positivity can be underpinned by two qualitatively distinct propositions related to actual (‘I am good’) or ideal (‘I want to be good’) self-esteem. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants completed a self-esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT) as well an Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) targeting their actual self-esteem and an IRAP targeting ideal self-esteem. Both groups demonstrated similar and positive IAT effects. A more complex picture emerged with regard to the IRAP effects. Whereas non-dysphorics did not differ in their actual and ideal self-esteem, their dysphoric counterparts demonstrated lower actual than ideal self-esteem. Our results suggest that closer attention to the role of propositional processes in implicit measures may unlock novel insight into the relationship between implicit self-esteem and depression.

Expanding the boundaries of evaluative learning research: How intersecting regularities shape our likes and dislikes.

Over the last 30 years, researchers have identified several types of procedures through which novel preferences may be formed and existing ones altered. For instance, regularities in the presence of a single stimulus (as in the case of mere exposure) or 2 or more stimuli (as in the case of evaluative conditioning) have been shown to influence liking. We propose that intersections between regularities represent a previously unrecognized class of procedures for changing liking. Across 4 related studies, we found strong support for the hypothesis that when environmental regularities intersect with one another (i.e., share elements or have elements that share relations with other elements), the evaluative properties of the elements of those regularities can change. These changes in liking were observed across a range of stimuli and procedures and were evident when self-report measures, implicit measures, and behavioral choice measures of liking were employed. Functional and mental explanations of this phenomenon are offered followed by a discussion of how this new type of evaluative learning effect can accelerate theoretical, methodological, and empirical development in attitude research. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Functional-Cognitive Framework for Psychological Research: Controversies and Resolutions

The scientific goals, values and assumptions of functional and cognitive researchers have propelled them down two very different scientific pathways. Many have, and continue to argue, that these differences undermine any potential communication and collaboration between the two traditions. We explore a different view on this debate. Specifically, we focus on the Functional-Cognitive (FC) framework, and in particular, the idea that cognitive and functional researchers can and should interact to the benefit of both. Our article begins with a short introduction to the FC framework. We sweep aside misconceptions about the framework, present the original version as it was outlined by De Houwer (2011) and then offer our most recent thoughts on how it should be implemented. Thereafter, we reflect on its strengths and weaknesses, clarify the functional (effect-centric vs. analytic-abstractive) level and consider its many implications for cognitive research and theorising. In the final section, we briefly review the articles contained in this Special Issue. These contributions provide clear examples of the conceptual, empirical and methodological developments that can emerge when cognitive, clinical, personality and neuroscientists fully engage with the functional-cognitive perspective.

A functional perspective on personality

Personality psychology has made enormous progresses over the years by accumulating empirical evidence on how patterns of stable individual differences in behaviours can be clustered systematically at different levels of abstraction (i.e. traits and facets) and how they can predict important consequential outcomes. At the same time, functionally orientated researchers have accumulated a vast body of knowledge on environment-behaviour relations and the underlying behavioural principles, that is, abstract descriptions of the way in which behaviour is a function of elements in the past and present environment. We explore a functional perspective on personality that attempts to bridge the two domains and to exploit the best of both worlds. From this functional perspective, personality refers to the impact of the individual on different types of environment-behaviour relations as well as on the way other factors moderate those relations. We discuss the potential of this functional perspective on personality to organise existing scientific knowledge and inspire future research.

Unreliable Yet Still Replicable: A Comment on LeBel and Paunonen (2011)

Lebel and Paunonen (2011) highlight that despite their importance and popularity in both theoretical and applied research, many implicit measures continue to be plagued by a persistent and troublesome issue—low reliability. In their paper, they offer a conceptual analysis of the relationship between reliability, power and replicability, and then provide a series of recommendations for researchers interested in using implicit measures in an experimental setting. At the core of their account is the idea that reliability can be equated with statistical power, such that “lower levels of reliability are associated with decreasing probabilities of detecting a statistically significant effect, given one exists in the population” (p. 573). They also take the additional step of equating reliability and replicability. In our commentary, we draw attention to the fact that there is no direct, fixed or one-to-one relation between reliability and power or replicability. More specifically, we argue that when adopting an experimental (rather than a correlational) approach, researchers strive to minimize inter-individual variation, which has a direct impact on sample based reliability estimates. We evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the LeBel and Paunonens recommendations and refine them where appropriate.

Mechanisms underlying effects of approach-avoidance training on stimulus evaluation

Over the past decade an increasing number of studies across a range of domains have shown that the repeated performance of approach and avoidance (AA) actions in response to a stimulus leads to changes in the evaluation of that stimulus. The dominant (motivational-systems) account in this area claims that these effects are caused by a rewiring of mental associations between stimulus representations and AA systems that evolved to regulate distances to positive and negative stimuli. In contrast, two recently forwarded alternative accounts postulate that AA effects are caused by inferences about the valence of actions and stimuli (inferential account) or a transfer of valenced action codes to stimulus representations (common-coding account). Across four experiments we set out to test these three competing accounts against each other. Experiments 1–3 illustrate that changes in stimulus evaluations can occur when people perform valenced actions that bear no relation to a distance regulation, such as moving a manikin upward or downward. The observed evaluative effects were dependent on the evaluative implication of the instructed movement goal rather than whether the action implied a movement toward or away from the stimuli. These results could not be explained with a rewiring of associations to motivational systems. Experiment 4 showed that changes in stimulus evaluations occurred after participants passively observed approach-avoidance movements, supporting an explanation in terms of cognitive inferences.

A Systematic Review of Pliance, Tracking, and Augmenting:

Within relational frame theory, a distinction has been made between three types of rule-governed behavior known as pliance, tracking, and augmenting. This review examined whether there is support for the concepts of pliance, tracking, and augmenting in the experimental analysis of behavior; whether these concepts refer to distinct functional classes of behavior; and how these concepts have been operationalized in experimental (behavioral-analytic) research. Given that the concepts of pliance, tracking, and augmenting were first defined by Zettle and Hayes, we confined our review to studies published in or after 1982. Our results indicate that (a) experimental research investigating pliance, tracking, and/or augmenting is extremely limited; (b) it is difficult to determine the extent to which the concepts of pliance, tracking, and augmenting allow for relatively precise experimental analyses of distinct functional classes of behavior; and (c) pliance and tracking have been operationalized by using a limited set of procedures.

Obesity, food restriction, and implicit attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods: Lessons learned from the implicit relational assessment procedure.

It has been argued that obese individuals evaluate high caloric, palatable foods more positively than their normal weight peers, and that this positivity bias causes them to consume such foods, even when healthy alternatives are available. Yet when self-reported and automatic food preferences are assessed no such evaluative biases tend to emerge. We argue that situational (food deprivation) and methodological factors may explain why implicit measures often fail to discriminate between the food-evaluations of these two groups. Across three studies we manipulated the food deprivation state of clinically obese and normal-weight participants and then exposed them to an indirect procedure (IRAP) and self-report questionnaires. We found that automatic food-related cognition was moderated by a persons weight status and food deprivation state. Our findings suggest that the diagnostic and predictive value of implicit measures may be increased when (a) situational moderators are taken into consideration and (b) we pay greater attention to the different ways in which people automatically relate rather than simply categorize food stimuli.

Highly Prevalent but Not Always Persistent Undergraduate and Graduate Student’s Misconceptions About Psychology

Although past research has documented the prevalence of misconceptions in introductory psychology classes, few studies have assessed how readily upper-level undergraduate and graduate students endorse erroneous beliefs about the discipline. In Study 1, we administered a 30-item misconception test to an international sample of 670 undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral students. Analyses indicated that participants identified and rejected the majority of misconceptions, with doctoral students performing better than their master’s or undergraduate peers. In Study 2, we administered a revised version of our questionnaire to a novel sample of 557 students while controlling for number of years spent at university, psychology courses completed, and need for cognition. Once again, we found that graduate students rejected more, affirmed less, and reported lower levels of uncertainty than their undergraduate counterparts. Educational implications and future research directions are discussed.