Pieter Van Dessel

Instruction-Based Approach-Avoidance Effects: Changing Stimulus Evaluation via the Mere Instruction to Approach or Avoid Stimuli.

Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a certain stimulus changes the liking of this stimulus. We investigated whether these effects of approach and avoidance training occur also when participants do not perform these actions but are merely instructed about the stimulus-action contingencies. Stimulus evaluations were registered using both implicit (Implicit Association Test and evaluative priming) and explicit measures (valence ratings). Instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were observed for relatively neutral fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites), but not for clearly valenced well-known social groups (i.e., Blacks and Whites). We conclude that instructions to approach or avoid stimuli can provide sufficient bases for establishing both implicit and explicit evaluations of novel stimuli and discuss several possible reasons for why similar instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were not found for valenced well-known stimuli.

The influence of high-level beliefs on self-regulatory engagement: evidence from thermal pain stimulation

Determinist beliefs have been shown to impact basic motor preparation, prosocial behavior, performance monitoring, and voluntary inhibition, presumably by diminishing the recruitment of cognitive resources for self-regulation. We sought to support and extend previous findings by applying a belief manipulation to a novel inhibition paradigm that requires participants to either execute or suppress a prepotent withdrawal reaction from a strong aversive stimulus (thermal pain). Action and inhibition responses could be determined by either external signals or voluntary choices. Our results suggest that the reduction of free will beliefs corresponds with a reduction in effort investment that influences voluntary action selection and inhibition, most directly indicated by increased time required to initiate a withdrawal response internally (but not externally). It is likely that disbelief in free will encourages participants to be more passive, to exhibit a reduction in intentional engagement, and to be disinclined to adapt their behavior to contextual needs.

Approach–Avoidance Training Effects Are Moderated by Awareness of Stimulus–Action Contingencies

Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a stimulus changes the liking of that stimulus. In two experiments, we investigated the relationship between, on one hand, effects of approach–avoidance (AA) training on implicit and explicit evaluations of novel faces and, on the other hand, contingency awareness as indexed by participants’ memory for the relation between stimulus and action. We observed stronger effects for faces that were classified as contingency aware and found no evidence that AA training caused changes in stimulus evaluations in the absence of contingency awareness. These findings challenge the standard view that AA training effects are (exclusively) the product of implicit learning processes, such as the automatic formation of associations in memory.

When does hearing laughter draw attention to happy faces? Task relevance determines the influence of a crossmodal affective context on emotional attention

Prior evidence has shown that a persons affective context influences attention to emotional stimuli. The present study investigated whether a crossmodal affective context that is induced by remembering an emotional sound modulates attention to visual emotional stimuli. One group of participants had to remember a positive, negative, or neutral sound during each trial of a dot probe paradigm. A second group of participants also had to encode the valence of the sound. The results revealed that attention was preferentially deployed to stimuli that were emotionally congruent to the affective context. However, this effect was only evident when participants had to encode the valence of the affective context. These findings suggest that a crossmodal affective context modulates the deployment of attention to emotional stimuli provided that the affective connotation of the context is task-relevant.

Failures to change stimulus evaluations by means of subliminal approach and avoidance training.

Previous research suggests that the repeated performance of approach and avoidance (AA) actions in response to a stimulus causes changes in stimulus evaluations. Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and Dovidio (2007) and Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, and Fazio (2013) provided evidence that these AA training effects occur even when stimuli are presented only subliminally. We also examined whether reliable AA training effects can be observed with subliminal stimulus presentations but added more sensitive checks of perceptual stimulus discriminability. Three experiments, including a direct replication of the study by Kawakami et al. (2007), failed to provide any evidence for effects of subliminal AA training on implicit or explicit evaluations. Bayesian analyses indicated that our data provide robust evidence that subliminal AA training does not cause changes in evaluations. In contrast, we observed changes in evaluations when participants were provided with (either correct or incorrect) information about the stimulus-action contingencies in the subliminal AA training task and when participants performed a supraliminal AA training task that allowed participants to detect these contingencies. These findings support the idea that contingency awareness is necessary for the occurrence of AA training effects.

Voluntary inhibition of pain avoidance behavior: an fMRI study.

AbstractBehavioral inhibition has classically been considered to rely upon a neural network centered at the right inferior frontal cortex [rIFC; Aron et al. (8:170–177, 2004; 18:177–185, 2014)]. However, the vast majority of inhibition studies have entailed exogenous stop signals instructing participants to withhold responding. More recent work has begun to examine the neural underpinnings of endogenous inhibition, revealing a distinct cortical basis in the dorsal fronto-median cortex [dFMC; Brass and Haggard (27:9141–9145, 2007); Kühn et al. (30:2834–3843, 2009)]. Yet, contrary to everyday experiences of voluntary behavioral suppression, the paradigms employed to investigate action inhibition have thus far been somewhat artificial, and involve little persuasive motivation to act. Accordingly, the present fMRI study seeks to compare and contrast intentional with instructed inhibition in a novel pain paradigm that recruits ‘hot’ incentive response systems. Participants received increasing thermal stimulation to their inner wrists, and were required to occasionally withhold their natural impulse to withdraw from the compelling pain sensation at peak temperature, in both instructed and free-choice conditions. Consistent with previous research, we observed inhibition-related activity in the dFMC and the rIFC. However, these regions displayed equivalent activation levels for both inhibition types. These data extend previous research by demonstrating that under ecologically valid conditions with a strong motivation to act, both stopping networks operate in concert to enable suppression of unwanted behavior.

Mechanisms underlying effects of approach-avoidance training on stimulus evaluation

Over the past decade an increasing number of studies across a range of domains have shown that the repeated performance of approach and avoidance (AA) actions in response to a stimulus leads to changes in the evaluation of that stimulus. The dominant (motivational-systems) account in this area claims that these effects are caused by a rewiring of mental associations between stimulus representations and AA systems that evolved to regulate distances to positive and negative stimuli. In contrast, two recently forwarded alternative accounts postulate that AA effects are caused by inferences about the valence of actions and stimuli (inferential account) or a transfer of valenced action codes to stimulus representations (common-coding account). Across four experiments we set out to test these three competing accounts against each other. Experiments 1–3 illustrate that changes in stimulus evaluations can occur when people perform valenced actions that bear no relation to a distance regulation, such as moving a manikin upward or downward. The observed evaluative effects were dependent on the evaluative implication of the instructed movement goal rather than whether the action implied a movement toward or away from the stimuli. These results could not be explained with a rewiring of associations to motivational systems. Experiment 4 showed that changes in stimulus evaluations occurred after participants passively observed approach-avoidance movements, supporting an explanation in terms of cognitive inferences.

When people co-occur with good or bad events : graded effects of relational qualifiers on evaluative conditioning

Studies on evaluative conditioning show that a change in liking can occur whenever stimuli are paired. Such instances of attitude change are known to depend on the type of relation established between stimuli (e.g., “Bob is a friend of Mike” vs. “Bob is an enemy of Mike”). Research has so far only compared assimilative and contrastive relational qualifiers (e.g., friend vs. enemy). For the first time, we compared the effect of nonoppositional qualifiers on attitude change in an evaluative conditioning procedure (e.g., “Bob causes Positive Outcomes” vs. “Bob predicts Positive Outcomes”). Differential effects of nonoppositional relational qualifiers were observed on explicit and implicit evaluations. We discuss the implications of our findings for attitude research, theories of attitude change, and optimizing evaluative conditioning for changing attitudes in applied settings.

The mere exposure instruction effect : mere exposure instructions influence liking

The mere exposure effect refers to the well-established finding that people evaluate a stimulus more positively after repeated exposure to that stimulus. We investigated whether a change in stimulus evaluation can occur also when participants are not repeatedly exposed to a stimulus, but are merely instructed that one stimulus will occur frequently and another stimulus will occur infrequently. We report seven experiments showing that (1) mere exposure instructions influence implicit stimulus evaluations as measured with an Implicit Association Test (IAT), personalized Implicit Association Test (pIAT), or Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), but not with an Evaluative Priming Task (EPT), (2) mere exposure instructions influence explicit evaluations, and (3) the instruction effect depends on participants’ memory of which stimulus will be presented more frequently. We discuss how these findings inform us about the boundary conditions of mere exposure instruction effects, as well as the mental processes that underlie mere exposure and mere exposure instruction effects.

Relational information moderates approach-avoidance instruction effects on implicit evaluation

Previous research demonstrated that instructions to approach one stimulus and avoid another stimulus can result in a spontaneous or implicit preference for the former stimulus. In the current study, we tested whether the effect of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit evaluation depends on the relational information embedded in these instructions. Participants received instructions that they would move towards a certain non-existing word and move away from another non-existing word (self-agent instructions) or that one non-existing word would move towards them and the other non-existing word would move away from them (stimulus-agent instructions). Results showed that self-agent instructions produced stronger effects than stimulus-agent instructions on implicit evaluations of the non-existing words. These findings support the idea that propositional processes play an important role in effects of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit evaluation and in implicit evaluation in general.