Seetharam Narasimhan

Hardware Trojan: Threats and emerging solutions

Malicious modification of hardware during design or fabrication has emerged as a major security concern. Such tampering (also referred to as Hardware Trojan) causes an integrated circuit (IC) to have altered functional behavior, potentially with disastrous consequences in safety-critical applications. Conventional design-time verification and post-manufacturing testing cannot be readily extended to detect hardware Trojans due to their stealthy nature, inordinately large number of possible instances and large variety in structure and operating mode. In this paper, we analyze the threat posed by hardware Trojans and the methods of deterring them. We present a Trojan taxonomy, models of Trojan operations and a review of the state-of-the-art Trojan prevention and detection techniques. Next, we discuss the major challenges associated with this security concern and future research needs to address them.

Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures

Security of a computer system has been traditionally related to the security of the software or the information being processed. The underlying hardware used for information processing has been considered trusted. The emergence of hardware Trojan attacks violates this root of trust. These attacks, in the form of malicious modifications of electronic hardware at different stages of its life cycle, pose major security concerns in the electronics industry. An adversary can mount such an attack with an objective to cause operational failure or to leak secret information from inside a chip-e.g., the key in a cryptographic chip, during field operation. Global economic trend that encourages increased reliance on untrusted entities in the hardware design and fabrication process is rapidly enhancing the vulnerability to such attacks. In this paper, we analyze the threat of hardware Trojan attacks; present attack models, types, and scenarios; discuss different forms of protection approaches, both proactive and reactive; and describe emerging attack modes, defenses, and future research pathways.

Multiple-parameter side-channel analysis: A non-invasive hardware Trojan detection approach

Malicious alterations of integrated circuits during fabrication in untrusted foundries pose major concern in terms of their reliable and trusted field operation. It is extremely difficult to discover such alterations, also referred to as “hardware Trojans” using conventional structural or functional testing strategies. In this paper, we propose a novel non-invasive, multiple-parameter side-channel analysis based Trojan detection approach that is capable of detecting malicious hardware modifications in the presence of large process variation induced noise. We exploit the intrinsic relationship between dynamic current (IDDT ) and maximum operating frequency (Fmax) of a circuit to distinguish the effect of a Trojan from process induced fluctuations in IDDT . We propose a vector generation approach for IDDT measurement that can improve the Trojan detection sensitivity for arbitrary Trojan instances. Simulation results with two large circuits, a 32-bit integer execution unit (IEU) and a 128-bit Advanced Encryption System (AES) cipher, show a detection resolution of 0.04% can be achieved in presence of ±20% parameter (Vth) variations. The approach is also validated with experimental results using 120nm FPGA (Xilinx Virtex-II) chips.

Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis

Hardware Trojan attack in the form of malicious modification of a design has emerged as a major security threat. Sidechannel analysis has been investigated as an alternative to conventional logic testing to detect the presence of hardware Trojans. However, these techniques suffer from decreased sensitivity toward small Trojans, especially because of the large process variations present in modern nanometer technologies. In this paper, we propose a novel noninvasive, multiple-parameter side-channel analysisbased Trojan detection approach. We use the intrinsic relationship between dynamic current and maximum operating frequency of a circuit to isolate the effect of a Trojan circuit from process noise. We propose a vector generation approach and several design/test techniques to improve the detection sensitivity. Simulation results with two large circuits, a 32-bit integer execution unit (IEU) and a 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES) cipher, show a detection resolution of 1.12 percent amidst ±20 percent parameter variations. The approach is also validated with experimental results. Finally, the use of a combined side-channel analysis and logic testing approach is shown to provide high overall detection coverage for hardware Trojan circuits of varying types and sizes.

TeSR: A robust Temporal Self-Referencing approach for Hardware Trojan detection

Malicious modification of integrated circuits, referred to as Hardware Trojans, in untrusted fabrication facility has emerged as a major security threat. Logic testing approaches are not very effective for detecting large sequential Trojans which require multiple state transitions often triggered by rare circuit events in order to activate and cause malfunction. On the other hand, side-channel analysis has emerged as an effective approach for detection of such large sequential Trojans. However, existing side-channel approaches suffer from large reduction in detection sensitivity with increasing process variations or decreasing Trojan size. In this paper, we propose TeSR, a Temporal Self-Referencing approach that compares the current signature of a chip at two different time windows to completely eliminate the effect of process noise, thus providing high detection sensitivity for Trojans of varying size. Furthermore, unlike existing approaches, it does not require golden chip instances as a reference. Simulation results for three complex designs and three representative sequential Trojan circuits demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach under large inter- and intra-die process variations.

MECCA: a robust low-overhead PUF using embedded memory array

The generation of unique keys by Integrated Circuits (IC) has important applications in areas such as Intellectual Property (IP) counter-plagiarism and embedded security integration. To this end, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) have been proposed to build tamperresistant hardware by exploiting random process variations. Existing PUFs suffer from increased overhead to the original design due to their specific functions for generating unique keys and/or routing constraints. In this paper, we propose a novel memory-cell based PUF (MECCA PUF), which performs authentication by exploiting the intrinsic process variations in read/write reliability of cells in static memories. The reliability of cells is characterized after manufacturing by inducing temporal failures, such as write and access failures in the cells using a programmable word line duty cycle controller. Since most modern designs already have considerable amount of embedded memory, the proposed approach incurs very little overhead (<1%) compared to existing PUF designs. Simulation results for 1000 chips with 10% inter-die variations show that the PUF provides large choice of challenge-response pairs with high uniqueness (49.9% average inter-die Hamming distance) and excellent reproducibility (0.85% average intra-die Hamming distance).

Improving IC Security Against Trojan Attacks Through Integration of Security Monitors

This paper describes using on-chip monitors to significantly improve the sensitivity of side-channel signal analysis techniques to malicious inclusions in integrated circuits known as hardware Trojans.

Ultra-Low-Power and Robust Digital-Signal-Processing Hardware for Implantable Neural Interface Microsystems

Implantable microsystems for monitoring or manipulating brain activity typically require on-chip real-time processing of multichannel neural data using ultra low-power, miniaturized electronics. In this paper, we propose an integrated-circuit/architecture-level hardware design framework for neural signal processing that exploits the nature of the signal-processing algorithm. First, we consider different power reduction techniques and compare the energy efficiency between the ultra-low frequency subthreshold and conventional superthreshold design. We show that the superthreshold design operating at a much higher frequency can achieve comparable energy dissipation by taking advantage of extensive power gating. It also provides significantly higher robustness of operation and yield under large process variations. Next, we propose an architecture level preferential design approach for further energy reduction by isolating the critical computation blocks (with respect to the quality of the output signal) and assigning them higher delay margins compared to the noncritical ones. Possible delay failures under parameter variations are confined to the noncritical components, allowing graceful degradation in quality under voltage scaling. Simulation results using prerecorded neural data from the sea-slug (Aplysia californica) show that the application of the proposed design approach can lead to significant improvement in total energy, without compromising the output signal quality under process variations, compared to conventional design approaches.

Hybridization of CMOS With CNT-Based Nano-Electromechanical Switch for Low Leakage and Robust Circuit Design

Exponential increase in leakage power has emerged as a major barrier to technology scaling. Existing circuit techniques for leakage reduction either suffer from reduced effectiveness at nanometer technologies or affect performance and gate-oxide reliability. In this paper, we propose application of a specific carbon nanotube (CNT)-based nano-electromechanical switch as a leakage-control structure in logic and memory circuits. In case of memory circuits, we demonstrate that the proposed hybridization can be employed to reduce both cell leakage and bitline leakage, thereby improving the read noise margin as well. Due to the unique electromechanical properties of CNTs, these switches have high current-carrying capacity, extremely low leakage current, and low operating voltages. Moreover, they can act as nonvolatile memory elements, which can be exploited for data retention of important registers and latches during power down. Simulation results for a set of benchmark circuits show that we can obtain several orders of magnitude improvement in leakage saving in logic circuits at iso-performance compared to existing multi-threshold CMOS technique. In memory circuits, simulations show reduction in standby leakage and reduction in bitline leakage compared with the best existing techniques.

Sequential hardware Trojan: Side-channel aware design and placement

Various design-for-security (DFS) approaches have been proposed earlier for detection of hardware Trojans, which are malicious insertions in Integrated Circuits (ICs). In this paper, we highlight our major findings in terms of innovative Trojan design that can easily evade existing Trojan detection approaches based on functional testing or side-channel analysis. In particular, we illustrate design and placement of sequential hardware Trojans, which are rarely activated/observed and incur ultralow delay/power overhead. We provide models, examples, theoretical analysis of effectiveness, and simulation as well as measurement results of impact of these Trojans in a hardened design. It is shown that efficient design and placement of sequential Trojan would incur extremely low side-channel (power, delay) signature and hence, can easily evade both post-silicon validation and DFS (e.g. ring oscillator based) approaches.