Swarup Bhunia

HARPOON: An Obfuscation-Based SoC Design Methodology for Hardware Protection

Hardware intellectual-property (IP) cores have emerged as an integral part of modern system-on-chip (SoC) designs. However, IP vendors are facing major challenges to protect hardware IPs from IP piracy. This paper proposes a novel design methodology for hardware IP protection using netlist-level obfuscation. The proposed methodology can be integrated in the SoC design and manufacturing flow to simultaneously obfuscate and authenticate the design. Simulation results for a set of ISCAS-89 benchmark circuits and the advanced-encryption-standard IP core show that high levels of security can be achieved at less than 5% area and power overhead under delay constraint.

MERO: A Statistical Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection

In order to ensure trusted in---field operation of integrated circuits, it is important to develop efficient low---cost techniques to detect malicious tampering (also referred to as Hardware Trojan ) that causes undesired change in functional behavior. Conventional post--- manufacturing testing, test generation algorithms and test coverage metrics cannot be readily extended to hardware Trojan detection. In this paper, we propose a test pattern generation technique based on multiple excitation of rare logic conditions at internal nodes. Such a statistical approach maximizes the probability of inserted Trojans getting triggered and detected by logic testing, while drastically reducing the number of vectors compared to a weighted random pattern based test generation. Moreover, the proposed test generation approach can be effective towards increasing the sensitivity of Trojan detection in existing side---channel approaches that monitor the impact of a Trojan circuit on power or current signature. Simulation results for a set of ISCAS benchmarks show that the proposed test generation approach can achieve comparable or better Trojan detection coverage with about 85% reduction in test length on average over random patterns.

Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme

There have been serious concerns recently about the security of microchips from hardware trojan horse insertion during manufacturing. This issue has been raised recently due to outsourcing of the chip manufacturing processes to reduce cost. This is an important consideration especially in critical applications such as avionics, communications, military, industrial and so on. A trojan is inserted into a main circuit at manufacturing and is mostly inactive unless it is triggered by a rare value or time event; then it produces a payload error in the circuit, potentially catastrophic. Because of its nature, a trojan may not be easily detected by functional or ATPG testing. The problem of trojan detection has been addressed only recently in very few works. Our work analyzes and formulates the trojan detection problem based on a frequency analysis under rare trigger values and provides procedures to generate input trigger vectors and trojan test vectors to detect trojan effects. We also provide experimental results.

Hardware Trojan: Threats and emerging solutions

Malicious modification of hardware during design or fabrication has emerged as a major security concern. Such tampering (also referred to as Hardware Trojan) causes an integrated circuit (IC) to have altered functional behavior, potentially with disastrous consequences in safety-critical applications. Conventional design-time verification and post-manufacturing testing cannot be readily extended to detect hardware Trojans due to their stealthy nature, inordinately large number of possible instances and large variety in structure and operating mode. In this paper, we analyze the threat posed by hardware Trojans and the methods of deterring them. We present a Trojan taxonomy, models of Trojan operations and a review of the state-of-the-art Trojan prevention and detection techniques. Next, we discuss the major challenges associated with this security concern and future research needs to address them.

Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures

Security of a computer system has been traditionally related to the security of the software or the information being processed. The underlying hardware used for information processing has been considered trusted. The emergence of hardware Trojan attacks violates this root of trust. These attacks, in the form of malicious modifications of electronic hardware at different stages of its life cycle, pose major security concerns in the electronics industry. An adversary can mount such an attack with an objective to cause operational failure or to leak secret information from inside a chip-e.g., the key in a cryptographic chip, during field operation. Global economic trend that encourages increased reliance on untrusted entities in the hardware design and fabrication process is rapidly enhancing the vulnerability to such attacks. In this paper, we analyze the threat of hardware Trojan attacks; present attack models, types, and scenarios; discuss different forms of protection approaches, both proactive and reactive; and describe emerging attack modes, defenses, and future research pathways.

Electromechanical Computing at 500°C with Silicon Carbide

High-Temperature Electronic Switching In electronic circuitry, the band gap of a semi-conductor helps to provide the barrier that keeps charge carriers from flowing until a voltage is applied that switches the device. As temperatures rise, the carriers acquire enough thermal energy to overcome the band gap, causing the device to leak current even when they are turned off. The higher band gap of silicon carbide (SiC) makes it an attractive candidate for higher-temperature operations compared to conventional silicon, but several performance issues occur with SiC junction field-effect transistors. T.-H. Lee et al. (p. 1316) describe the fabrication of SiC nano-electromechanical switches that formed inverter circuits with extremely low leakage currents and switched billions of times at 500°C. Nanoscale mechanical switches made with silicon carbide operate at high temperatures with low leakage currents. Logic circuits capable of operating at high temperatures can alleviate expensive heat-sinking and thermal-management requirements of modern electronics and are enabling for advanced propulsion systems. Replacing existing complementary metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors with silicon carbide (SiC) nanoelectromechanical system (NEMS) switches is a promising approach for low-power, high-performance logic operation at temperatures higher than 300°C, beyond the capability of conventional silicon technology. These switches are capable of achieving virtually zero off-state current, microwave operating frequencies, radiation hardness, and nanoscale dimensions. Here, we report a microfabricated electromechanical inverter with SiC complementary NEMS switches capable of operating at 500°C with ultralow leakage current.

Security against hardware Trojan through a novel application of design obfuscation

Malicious hardware Trojan circuitry inserted in safety-critical applications is a major threat to national security. In this work, we propose a novel application of a key-based obfuscation technique to achieve security against hardware Trojans. The obfuscation scheme is based on modifying the state transition function of a given circuit by expanding its reachable state space and enabling it to operate in two distinct modes - the normal mode and the obfuscated mode. Such a modification obfuscates the rareness of the internal circuit nodes, thus making it difficult for an adversary to insert hard-to-detect Trojans. It also makes some inserted Trojans benign by making them activate only in the obfuscated mode. The combined effect leads to higher Trojan detectability and higher level of protection against such attack. Simulation results for a set of benchmark circuits show that the scheme is capable of achieving high levels of security at modest design overhead.

Low-power scan design using first-level supply gating

Reduction in test power is important to improve battery lifetime in portable electronic devices employing periodic self-test, to increase reliability of testing, and to reduce test cost. In scan-based testing, a significant fraction of total test power is dissipated in the combinational block. In this paper, we present a novel circuit technique to virtually eliminate test power dissipation in combinational logic by masking signal transitions at the logic inputs during scan shifting. We implement the masking effect by inserting an extra supply gating transistor in the supply to ground path for the first-level gates at the outputs of the scan flip-flops. The supply gating transistor is turned off in the scan-in mode, essentially gating the supply. Adding an extra transistor in only one logic level renders significant advantages with respect to area, delay, and power overhead compared to existing methods, which use gating logic at the output of scan flip-flops. Moreover, the proposed gating technique allows a reduction in leakage power by input vector control during scan shifting. Simulation results on ISCAS89 benchmarks show an average improvement of 62% in area overhead, 101% in power overhead (in normal mode), and 94% in delay overhead, compared to the lowest cost existing method.

Multiple-parameter side-channel analysis: A non-invasive hardware Trojan detection approach

Malicious alterations of integrated circuits during fabrication in untrusted foundries pose major concern in terms of their reliable and trusted field operation. It is extremely difficult to discover such alterations, also referred to as “hardware Trojans” using conventional structural or functional testing strategies. In this paper, we propose a novel non-invasive, multiple-parameter side-channel analysis based Trojan detection approach that is capable of detecting malicious hardware modifications in the presence of large process variation induced noise. We exploit the intrinsic relationship between dynamic current (IDDT ) and maximum operating frequency (Fmax) of a circuit to distinguish the effect of a Trojan from process induced fluctuations in IDDT . We propose a vector generation approach for IDDT measurement that can improve the Trojan detection sensitivity for arbitrary Trojan instances. Simulation results with two large circuits, a 32-bit integer execution unit (IEU) and a 128-bit Advanced Encryption System (AES) cipher, show a detection resolution of 0.04% can be achieved in presence of ±20% parameter (Vth) variations. The approach is also validated with experimental results using 120nm FPGA (Xilinx Virtex-II) chips.

Deterministic clock gating for microprocessor power reduction

With the scaling of technology and the need for higher performance and more functionality, power dissipation is becoming a major bottleneck for microprocessor designs. Pipeline balancing (PLB), a previous technique, is essentially a methodology to clock-gate unused components whenever a programs instruction-level parallelism is predicted to be low. However, no nonpredictive methodologies are available in the literature for efficient clock gating. This paper introduces deterministic clock gating (DCG) based on the key observation that for many of the stages in a modern pipeline, a circuit blocks usage in a specific cycle in the near future is deterministically known a few cycles ahead of time. Our experiments show an average of 19.9% reduction in processor power with virtually no performance loss for an 8-issue, out-of-order superscalar processor by applying DCG to execution units, pipeline latches, D-Cache wordline decoders, and result bus drivers. In contrast, PLB achieves 9.9% average power savings at 2.9% performance loss.