Seung Ho Yoo

Pricing and return policy under various supply contracts in a closed-loop supply chain

This study investigates pricing and return policies under various supply contracts in a closed-loop supply chain in which a supplier has more bargaining power than a retailer. We develop integrated supply contract models based on the principal–agent paradigm. Specifically, the supplier with more bargaining power devises a supply contract, acting as a Stackelberg leader. Then, given the contract offer, the retailer decides on pricing and return policies which affect consumers’ demand and return behaviours. We look into three commonly used supply contracts, i.e. wholesale price, buy-back and quantity discount contracts. The main purpose of this study is to explore how each supply contract affects the retailer’s decision on pricing and return policies, which in turn influence the profits of the entire supply chain and of its members. In doing so, we focus on investigating which contract coordinates the supply chain involving the retailer’s moral hazard. Through analytic comparison of contracts and extensive numerical analyses, we present numerous propositions to enrich the body of knowledge in the closed-loop supply chain and to provide meaningful decision guidelines to the practice.

Inventory models for imperfect production and inspection processes with various inspection options under one-time and continuous improvement investment

This study investigates both internal and external effects of defective production and delivery from imperfect production and inspection processes in a stable production and inventory system, and subsequent defective returns and dispositions. We first develop profit-maximizing imperfect-quality inventory models for various inspection options (sampling inspection, entire lot screening, and no inspection) under one-time improvement investment in production and inspection reliability. We then present the models under continuous improvement (CI) investments over multiple periods, which have not been explored before. In a CI environment, we further propose an inspection alternative of changing an inspection option from entire lot screening to no inspection and vice versa. We develop an algorithm for finding the optimal inspection policy yielding a superior profit, among inspection option change between entire lot screening and no inspection and those without option change. Based on the analytical models along with numerical and simulation analyses, we provide important managerial implications to practicing managers and future research directions.

Effect of supply chain structure and power dynamics on R&D and market performances

This study is the first investigating the effect of supply chain structure and players’ power dynamics on a supply chain’s RD an integrated supply chain can expect improved performance. The selling price is a function of power dynamics, and is higher when RD due to its location in the middle of the supply chain, the manufacturer can directly control the overall chain. On the other hand, a R&D firm could innately be associated with marginalization issues. Therefore, it is important for the R&D firm to have a systematic understanding of the entire system. This study contributes to the literature and practice by not only bridging the gap in the previous studies but also offering important managerial implications.

Effect of Power Dynamics in a Supply Chain on R&D and Market Performances

This study investigates the effect of power dynamics on R&D and market performances. Various types of relationships in a supply chain are considered. An R&D company offering new technology for product quality and a manufacturer responsible for both production and sales are utilized as subjects. The company with bargaining power differs with respect to the supply chain situation in practice, and no fixed single relationship and supply chain structure exist. However, only a few studies have considered the various relationships among players in a supply chain and their effects on performance. Therefore, we propose three models with different supply chain structures and power dynamics among players. This study contributes to the academia and supply chain practice by revealing the different characteristics of supply chain models.