Simon Shen

Re-branding without re-developing: Constraints of Hong Kong's 'Asia's World City' brand (1997-2007)

Abstract Interest among academics towards Hong Kongs global status has gradually waned since 1997. However, identifying Hong Kongs position on the international platform is essential if the Special Administrative Regions competitiveness is to be distinguished from that of regional rivals. The positioning challenge not only results from the sovereignty retrocession, but also from the rapid pace of globalization and the intensified competition from major cities in the Greater China Region. Instead of focusing on the much-researched topic of the direct competition between Hong Kong and Shanghai or Singapore, an exploration of Hong Kongs hitherto little-researched re-branding experience not only throws light on Hong Kong Special Administrative Regions policy orientation, but is also valuable in understanding how other cities in the region conducted similar exercises. This article reviews the overall evolution of the ‘Asias World City’ (AWC) discourse as promoted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from 1997 to 2007. It starts by reviewing the international identity of post-colonial Hong Kong as background to the discourse, in order to reconstruct various theoretical assumptions that led to the re-branding exercise. The second section examines the purpose and evolution of the AWC campaign, and identifies the problems within the discourse. The concluding section focuses on the unrealized theoretical assumptions and other administrative and ideological constraints that the HKSARG faced in the exercise as a means to explaining the overall limited achievements of the campaign and proposes possible ways to remedy the shortcomings.

A constructed (un)reality on China's re-entry into Africa: the Chinese online community perception of Africa (2006–2008)

Chinas 21st-century re-entry into Africa has been made with considerable new fanfare and in a manner that contrasts sharply with the Maoist ideologist policy of the 1960s. However, how the Chinese perceive Africa, as expressed by the online community, has been little studied. In a country where full democracy and complete freedom of expression are still lacking, online communication arguably plays a particularly significant role. When it comes to topics in China which are not frequently addressed in the public domain, the flow of information among the online community is paramount in shaping public perceptions. The result of systematic qualitative research on the online community in China, this paper aims to bridge the gap between formal studies of Sino-African relations and online perceptions. Reconstructing the online image of Africa is essential in understanding not only contemporary Sino-African relations from the popular perspective but also the distorted nature of information that circulates in Chinese cyberspace.

Reshaping nationalism: Chinese intellectual response towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the international arena has witnessed two concurrent worldwide trends. One is the gradual prevalence of universalism under the banner of human civilization; the other is the gradual revival of nationalism globally under exactly the same heading. Both trends are evident in China, a country which in the twenty-first century is perceived universally as a rising nation. However, does Chinese nationalism necessarily pose a threat to the world? By examining two debates on the Chinese intellectual response towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in the early twenty-first century, this paper investigates the status of Chinese nationalism. It questions whether it is a fixed set of ideas embraced by a solid entity, or whether it possesses multiple layers with dual elements contributing to both security and insecurity internationally. The paper argues that three separate nationalist processes are occurring concurrently but independently of each other: the construction of civic nationalist values; the development of an international relations strategy assigning responsible power to China; and the detection of alleged anti-Chinese conspiracies. The effect of the first two would be to encourage regional peace, and they could offset fervent nationalist expression. A somewhat counter-intuitive result of Chinese nationalism might be that it also becomes a stabilizing force within and outside Chinas borders.

Online Chinese Perceptions of Latin America: How They Differ from the Official View

Using online Chinese communities as primary sources, this article studies public perceptions in China of Latin America in terms of how the region is seen as part of the Third World while also offering China a convenient backyard by which to access the First World United States. Codified online public opinion on four different Latin American topics is then analysed and compared with official opinion: how “Latin Americanization” becomes Chinas nightmare, how the Latin Americans should learn from the “China model,” how the Latin Americans were being discriminated in the H1N1 epidemic, and how the “Latin American card” to balance the United States is emphasized. The conclusion suggests that only when the stereotypes discussed in this article are dismissed will the true value of Latin America gradually obtain any standing in the eyes of ordinary Chinese and will the Latin American mission of the Chinese government be fully understood by its subjects.

The Hidden Face of Comradeship: popular Chinese consensus on the DPRK and its implications for Beijing's policy

As Chinas economic and foreign policies increasingly move away from the countrys past socialist ideals, Beijings attitude towards the DPRK has, in recent years, begun to subtly change. However, the close historic ties that exist between the two ruling communist parties prevent such changes from being overtly publicized in official discourses; criticizing the DPRK in China readily results in serious protests from Pyongyang. The popular perception in China of the DPRK, which is far more critical than the official version, is, on the other hand, hard to hide. In an authoritarian nation where exhibiting sentiments contrary to the party-states policy is still not a safe and established practice, the Chinese people have increasingly relied on the platform of the Internet to express their views on various aspects of policy, including that towards the DPRK. This makes the Internet a rich resource for academics to gauge down-to-earth public opinion and how it contrasts with the official policy. Drawing on systematic, qualitative research on the online community, this article wishes to explore the possible differences between the written policy of Beijing and popular Chinese perceptions, or consensus if any, towards Pyongyang. The article is written in three parts. The first reviews the relevant literature on Beijings contemporary policy towards the DPRK, the role of Internet opinions in Chinese foreign policy making, and introduces our methodology. The main part of the article typologizes and analyses the images as perceived by Chinese Internet users of the DPRK, its leaders and polices, as well as Beijings DPRK policy, in order to highlight the differences between official policies and online opinions. Explanations for the discrepancies with the official line and the possible implications of our findings for Chinas future policy on the DPRK are discussed in the concluding section. As witnessed from the research, surprisingly, there was relative consensus of opinion among the different available viewpoints towards the DPRK regime, as both the Chinese nationalists and the liberals are likely to pressure Beijing to walk further away from Kim Jong-il in the future.

From Zero-sum Game to Positive-sum Game: why Beijing tolerates Pacific Island states' recognition of Taipei

The Pacific Islands region might be regarded as one of the most remote and politically least significant areas in the geopolitical and economic considerations of world giants. However, as the regional order of the Asia–Pacific changes rapidly, China has shown more eagerness to engage the island states. Interestingly, Beijings former arch-rival Taipei still maintains, arguably, considerable influence over the region. This raises a question that is thought-provoking: why is this status quo tolerated by Beijing? Drawing on empirical sources in relation to communication between Beijing, Taipei and these island states, by focusing on how Beijing handles the South Pacific region in general and the six non-recognizing states in particular, this article attempts to tackle the question by distinguishing the difference in Beijings mentality today from that of 30 or 40 years ago. It argues that the zero-sum mentality of fighting against Taipei in the region has now been replaced by a positive-sum assumption to engage Taipei, as well as the pan-Chinese community in the world, via the PIS, regardless of whether they establish formal ties with Beijing or not.

Failure of the Saffron Revolution and Aftermath: Revisiting the Transitologist Assumption

Myanmar often baffles political scientists throughout the world for the resilience of its military regime and its resistance to attempts at democratization. Although Eastern Europe provides a plethora of examples reaffirming the rosy picture that Western democracy will gradually prevail as the universal political system, Myanmar seems to offer an exception. Paradoxically, most of the factors conducive to the introduction of democratization — such as increasing costs for military maintenance, a long-term economic fiasco, widespread local mobilization, sweeping electoral defeats for the military-backed government, international boycotts and condemnation — exist in Myanmar. In August 2007, a new spate of uprisings, later to become known as the “Saffron Revolution” or the “Saffron Uprising,” was suppressed by the Myanmar junta, leaving the junta to continue in power to mishandle the disastrous cyclone of May 2008. Why does the transitologist assumption for democratization record consistent failure in this country? By consulting primary and secondary sources available in the East and the West, this paper sets out to describe the limitations of the transitologist approach when applied to Myanmar by examining the socio-economic and geo-political situation, and its implications.

A comparative study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall plan

Since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, both the mainstream media and professional analysts began to name the Initiative “China’s Marshall Plan”. While the rhetoric may simply be an eye-catching term constructed in journalist and consultancy circles, this paper examines the background and purposes behind these two grand projects in order to shed light on the similarities and the differences of their effects on the world order. By comparing the projects under five different aspects—boosting exports, exporting currency, countering a rival, fostering strategic divisions, and siphoning away diplomatic support—this paper argues that while the two projects may have similarities and aim to respond to the malfunctioning world order through macro political-economic investments and developmental aid, their outcomes (given the relative differences of the global position of rivalries—USSR in Marshall Plan; US in BRI) and the changing economic structures, could be very different. As a result, this paper concludes that it may be too early to suggest that the BRI could bring similar outcomes as the Marshall Plan, especially in competing for the global leadership in the 21st century.

Have Nuclear Weapons Made the DPRK a Rogue State? Studying the Korean Peninsula Crisis from the Waltzian Theory

The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) is considered by the West as a troublemaker, the one most responsible for creating instability in the region and the most worrisome security risk. Its possession of nuclear weapons is perceived as an unimaginable threat to world peace in the twenty-first century. As Northeast Asia is a complex of great powers, including China, Japan, Russia, and the US as well as the two Koreas, how to deal with a nuclear-armed “rogue state” would impact on world politics. This article will re-visit the neo-realist theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz, especially on the inter-relationship between nuclear proliferation and global insecurity and its application to the Korean Peninsula crisis. The article will be in four sections: (a) a literature review illustrating Waltzs theory; (b) an assessment of the DPRKs nuclear crisis by applying this theory; (c) in response to the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island bombardment, a discussion on how various powers calculate their interests in the region from the perspective of brinkmanship demonstrating the overall picture; (d) an investigation on the limitations of Waltzs theory to acknowledge the potential of other competing theoretical frameworks to supplement the Waltzian hypothesis.

Alternative Online Chinese Nationalism: Response to the Anti-Japanese Campaign in China on Hong Kong’s Internet

In April 2005, a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in China. Scholars such as Liu Shih-diing proposed that these events were a milestone in the development of China’s “online nationalism.” Based on Liu’s analytical framework, this paper studies the concurrent and subsequent response of Hong Kong’s “cybermen” to the anti-Japanese discourse prevalent within the mainland Internet community from April 2005 to March 2007, analyzes the reasons behind the differences, and previews a likely pattern of online Chinese nationalism should political circumstances in Beijing one day more approximate those of present-day Hong Kong.