Shiri Einav

Eye-movement patterns are associated with communicative competence in autistic spectrum disorders

BACKGROUND Investigations using eye-tracking have reported reduced fixations to salient social cues such as eyes when participants with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) view social scenes. However, these studies have not distinguished different cognitive phenotypes. METHODS The eye-movements of 28 teenagers with ASD and 18 typically developing peers were recorded as they watched videos of peers interacting in familiar situations. Within ASD, we contrasted the viewing patterns of those with and without language impairments. The proportion of time spent viewing eyes, mouths and other scene details was calculated, as was latency of first fixation to eyes. Finally, the association between viewing patterns and social-communicative competence was measured. RESULTS Individuals with ASD and age-appropriate language abilities spent significantly less time viewing eyes and were slower to fixate the eyes than typically developing peers. In contrast, there were no differences in viewing patterns between those with language impairments and typically developing peers. Eye-movement patterns were not associated with social outcomes for either language phenotype. However, increased fixations to the mouth were associated with greater communicative competence across the autistic spectrum. CONCLUSIONS Attention to both eyes and mouths is important for language development and communicative competence. Differences in fixation time to eyes may not be sufficient to disrupt social competence in daily interactions. A multiple cognitive deficit model of ASD, incorporating different language phenotypes, is advocated.

Do individuals with autism process words in context? Evidence from language-mediated eye-movements

It is widely argued that people with autism have difficulty processing ambiguous linguistic information in context. To investigate this claim, we recorded the eye-movements of 24 adolescents with autism spectrum disorder and 24 language-matched peers as they monitored spoken sentences for words corresponding to objects on a computer display. Following a target word, participants looked more at a competitor object sharing the same onset than at phonologically unrelated objects. This effect was, however, mediated by the sentence context such that participants looked less at the phonological competitor if it was semantically incongruous with the preceding verb. Contrary to predictions, the two groups evidenced similar effects of context on eye-movements. Instead, across both groups, the effect of sentence context was reduced in individuals with relatively poor language skills. Implications for the weak central coherence account of autism are discussed.

When Being Right Is Not Enough Four-Year-Olds Distinguish Knowledgeable Informants From Merely Accurate Informants

Recent evidence demonstrates that children are selective in their social learning, preferring to learn from a previously accurate speaker than from a previously inaccurate one. We examined whether children assessing speakers’ reliability take into account how speakers achieved their prior accuracy. In Study 1, when faced with two accurate informants, 4- and 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) were more likely to seek novel information from an informant who had previously given the answers unaided than from an informant who had always relied on help from a third party. Similarly, in Study 2, 4-year-olds were more likely to trust the testimony of an unaided informant over the testimony provided by an assisted informant. Our results indicate that when children reach around 4 years of age, their selective trust extends beyond simple generalizations based on informants’ past accuracy to a more sophisticated selectivity that distinguishes between truly knowledgeable informants and merely accurate informants who may not be reliable in the long term.

Does the Majority Always Know Best? Young Children's Flexible Trust in Majority Opinion

Copying the majority is generally an adaptive social learning strategy but the majority does not always know best. Previous work has demonstrated young childrens selective uptake of information from a consensus over a lone dissenter. The current study examined childrens flexibility in following the majority: do they overextend their reliance on this heuristic to situations where the dissenting individual has privileged knowledge and should be trusted instead? Four- to six- year-olds (N = 103) heard conflicting claims about the identity of hidden drawings from a majority and a dissenter in two between-subject conditions: in one, the dissenter had privileged knowledge over the majority (he drew the pictures); in the other he did not (they were drawn by an absent third party). Overall, children were less likely to trust the majority in the Privileged Dissenter condition. Moreover, 5- and 6- year-olds made majority-based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged knowledge but systematically endorsed the dissenter when he drew the pictures. The current findings suggest that by 5 years, children are able to make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to follow the majority rather than automatically following the most common view.

Take it as read: origins of trust in knowledge gained from print.

The ability to read opens up the possibility of learning about the world indirectly via print sources, providing a powerful new opportunity for children who have for years learned effectively from what people tell them. We compared childrens trust in printed versus oral information. We also examined whether children who showed preferential trust in an informant with print assumed that the informant was still reliable about new information offered without print support. Children (N=89 aged 3-6 years) received conflicting suggestions from two dolls about which picture showed an unfamiliar target. Only one dolls suggestion referred to a printed label read aloud. Prereaders, despite their exposure to print and presumed experience of others treating print sources as authoritative, showed no clear evidence of preferential trust in the suggestions with print support. Early readers, in contrast, consistently preferred the suggestions with print support. Importantly, despite having treated the doll with print as having a history of accuracy, early readers no longer showed trust in that doll when it subsequently had no print support. Children at the very earliest stages of reading treated the doll with print appropriately as having gained only specific information from the print sources.

The power of print: children's trust in unexpected printed suggestions.

How do children evaluate the veracity of printed text? We examined childrens handling of unexpected suggestions conveyed via print versus orally. In Experiment 1 (N=131), 3- to 6-year-olds witnessed a speaker either read aloud an unexpected but not completely implausible printed label (e.g., fish for a bird-like animal with some fish features) or speak the label without accompanying text. Pre-readers accepted labels in both conditions. Early readers often rejected spoken labels yet accepted them in the print condition, and in Experiment 2 (N=55) 3- to 6-year-olds continued to apply them even after the print was obscured. Early readers accept printed testimony that they reject if only spoken, and the influence of text endures even when it is no longer visible.

Best Friends: Children Use Mutual Gaze to Identify Friendships in Others.

This study examined childrens ability to use mutual eye gaze as a cue to friendships in others. In Experiment 1, following a discussion about friendship, 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were shown animations in which three cartoon children looked at one another, and were told that one target character had a best friend. Although all age groups accurately detected the mutual gaze between the target and another character, only 5- and 6-year-olds used this cue to infer friendship. Experiment 2 replicated the effect with 5- and 6-year-olds when the target character was not explicitly identified. Finally, in Experiment 3, where the attribution of friendship could only be based on synchronized mutual gaze, 6-year-olds made this attribution, while 4- and 5-year-olds did not. Children occasionally referred to mutual eye gaze when asked to justify their responses in Experiments 2 and 3, but it was only by the age of 6 that reference to these cues correlated with the use of mutual gaze in judgements of affiliation. Although younger children detected mutual gaze, it was not until 6 years of age that children reliably detected and justified mutual gaze as a cue to friendship.