Silvy Peeters

Quantifying the influence of the tobacco industry on EU governance: automated content analysis of the EU Tobacco Products Directive

Objective The tobacco industry spends large sums lobbying the European Union (EU) institutions, yet whether such lobbying significantly affects tobacco policy is not well understood. We used novel quantitative text mining techniques to evaluate the impact of industry pressure on the contested EU Tobacco Products Directive revision. Design Policy positions of 18 stakeholders including the tobacco industry, health NGOs and tobacco retailers were evaluated using their text submissions to EU consultations and impact assessments. Using Wordscores to calculate word frequencies, we developed a scale ranging from 0–tobacco industry to 1–public health organisations, which was then used to track changes in the policy position of the European Commissions 2010 consultation document, its 2012 final proposal and the European Parliament and Councils approved legislation in March 2014. Results Several stakeholders’ positions were closer to the tobacco industry than that of health NGOs, including retailers (ω=0.35), trade unions (ω=0.34) and publishers (ω=0.33 and ω=0.40). Over time the European Commissions position shifted towards the tobacco industry from ω=0.52 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.54) to ω=0.40 (95% CI 0.39 to 0.42). This transition reflected an increasing use of words pertaining to business and the economy in the Commissions document. Our findings were robust to alternative methods of scoring policy positions in EU documents. Conclusions Using quantitative text mining techniques, we observed that tobacco industry lobbying activity at the EU was associated with significant policy shifts in the EU Tobacco Products Directive legislation towards the tobacco industrys submissions. In the light of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, additional governance strategies are needed to prevent undue influence of the tobacco industry on EU policy making.

Understanding the emergence of the tobacco industry's use of the term tobacco harm reduction in order to inform public health policy

Objectives To explore the history of transnational tobacco companies’ use of the term, approach to and perceived benefits of ‘harm reduction’. Methods Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, contemporary tobacco industry literature and 6 semistructured interviews. Results The 2001 Institute of Medicine report on tobacco harm reduction appears to have been pivotal in shaping industry discourse. Documents suggest British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International adopted the term ‘harm reduction’ from Institute of Medicine, then proceeded to heavily emphasise the term in their corporate messaging. Documents and interviews suggest harm reduction offered the tobacco industry two main benefits: an opportunity to (re-) establish dialogue with and access to policy makers, scientists and public health groups and to secure reputational benefits via an emerging corporate social responsibility agenda. Conclusions Transnational tobacco companies’ harm reduction discourse should be seen as opportunistic tactical adaptation to policy change rather than a genuine commitment to harm reduction. Care should be taken that this does not undermine gains hitherto secured in efforts to reduce the ability of the tobacco industry to inappropriately influence policy.

Illicit trade, tobacco industry-funded studies and policy influence in the EU and UK

In the course of the last decade, the tobacco industry has attempted to increase the political salience of the illicit trade in tobacco products (illicit trade) (box 1).1 ,2 Tobacco companies have claimed that sharp rises in tobacco taxation and innovative regulation, such as standardised packaging and product display bans, are drivers of the illicit trade, and have advocated programmes of engagement with policymakers and other social actors in an effort to ensure that the issue is given greater consideration in health policymaking.2–5 Box 1 ### Major activities comprising the illicit trade in tobacco products.6–8 Transcrime adopts the definition of illicit trade outlined in the World Health Organisation, Framework Convention of Tobacco Control, namely, ‘any practice or conduct prohibited by law and which relates to production, shipment, receipt, possession, distribution, sale or purchase including any practice or conduct intended to facilitate such activity’.6 ,9 This covers:

Worldwide news and comment:Europe: BAT and European Union policy influence- another third party?

MAURITIUS: FIGHT AGAINST TOBACCO MANUFACTURING PLANT After ratifying the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2004, Mauritius put in place effective tobacco control measures, supported by strong political will. Legislation was adopted to ban tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship and smoking in most public places, and the first pictorial health warnings on cigarette packs in Africa were introduced in 2008. More than 70% of the retail price of the most popular tobacco products is tax, although they are still easily affordable to the average-income smoker. In 2007, British American Tobacco closed its manufacturing plant on the island. In 2012 it stopped the purchase of tobacco leaves from tobacco growers in Mauritius, bringing an abrupt end to domestic cultivation. Data compiled from the customs office indicate that the import of cigarettes is going down. However, the shadow of big tobacco is looming again in the Mauritian landscape. An undisclosed international tobacco company based in Dubai is seeking authorisation from the government to set up a tobacco manufacturing plant for products to be exported to other African countries. Although officially the company will be manufacturing cigarettes, information indicates that the company will also be producing chewing tobacco. According to the existing law in Mauritius, the company will be allowed to sell up to 50% of its production on the local market. The proposal has been strongly opposed by VISA, a Mauritian tobacco control NGO, on the basis that it violates the WHO FCTC as well as the United Nations Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of NonCommunicable Diseases. The proposed manufacturing plant will support the tobacco industry to increase consumption in Africa, leading to further tobacco-related suffering and deaths in a continent already faced with the double burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases. VISA and other organisations argue that Mauritius has a moral responsibility not to allow the tobacco industry to use its territory to manufacture a deadly product which will harm the populations of other African countries. According to the World Customs Organization, the free zones in the United Arab Emirates, including Dubai, are known sources of considerable counterfeit cigarette production which targets predominantly West African markets. There is concern that the Dubai-based tobacco manufacturing plant may use the free port of Mauritius to engage in illicit trade of tobacco products. Action led by VISA to dissuade the government of Mauritius from authorising the tobacco plant, including official protests to the prime minister and other key government ministers, and advocacy by international organisations such as the Framework Convention Alliance and African Tobacco Control Alliance appears to have fallen on deaf ears. The official response received from the Ministry of Agro-Industry is that the “cigarette is a legal product worldwide and smokers will purchase the product whether manufactured in Mauritius or in any other country”. This stance ignores the health, social, economic and environmental consequences of tobacco use and the normalising effect of welcoming a manufacturing plant, thereby signalling societal approval of its products. Mauritius is regarded as a model and leader in tobacco control by the WHO and other international bodies. Establishing a tobacco manufacturing plant risks tarnishing this image, as it indicates a lack of regional and global responsibility in the face of the harms caused by the tobacco epidemic. The issue is a reminder that the tobacco industry is always looking for opportunities to expand its commercial activities, even (and perhaps especially) in countries that have put in place strong tobacco control measures. The national and international response by non-government organisations and other agencies shows that civil society remains a major force to counteract the power and influence of the tobacco industry.