Simon Franzmann

Locating Political Parties in Policy Space A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data

Starting from a number of deficiencies in the Comparative Manifestos Project approach to studying left–right policy scales in election programs, an additive model based on the distinction between position and valence issues is proposed. This allows analysis of the policy space in established democracies under the assumption that left and right have different meanings from country to country and over time. The model is illustrated with regard to four Western European countries with different types of party system: Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Empirical findings affirm that the procedures are workable and that the data generated are capable of yielding detailed information beyond that which previous approaches are able to deliver. In addition, preliminary tests on external validity produce reassuring results.

Who Owns Education? Cleavage Structures in the Partisan Competition over Educational Expansion

The literature on the partisan foundations of education policies leads to ambiguous expectations with regard to the predominant cleavage structures in party competition on this topic. There is disagreement as to whether leftist or rightist parties are responsible for increasing spending on education, while others claim that educational expansion has become a consensual topic. This paper analyses the cleavage structure of party competition over the topic of educational expansion, relying on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. It identifies political parties as ‘issue-owners’ and ‘issue-ignorers’, respectively, and finds considerable variation with regard to cleavage structures of party competition between countries and across time. One tentative conclusion from the analysis is that policy legacies play an important role in shaping cleavage structures.

Towards a real comparison of left-right indices A comment on Jahn

In a recent article in Party Politics, Detlef Jahn proposed an alternative way of generating left–right scores using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). Despite presenting innovative ideas, the article requires comment and correction. First, Jahn’s claim of a deductive approach is not convincing. He proceeds at least partly inductively. Furthermore, he ignores the theoretical ground of the competing approaches. Second, and more importantly, the central criterion by which to evaluate different approaches should be construct validity; however, Jahn does not conduct a full test of the construct validity. In this comment, I first explain the theoretical base of different approaches in generating left–right position scores using CMP. Second, I conduct a test of construct validity using not only expert data but also survey data. The results clearly suggest that approaches using a context-specific scheme for determining left–right issues are superior to the existing alternatives. This comment should be of interest to all scholars concerned with the question of how to create valid party position indicators.

Calling the Ghost of Populism: The AfD's Strategic and Tactical Agendas until the EP Election 2014

Since the formation of the German AfD in spring 2013, political scientists have discussed whether the AfD can be classified as a populist party. Despite the split of the party in summer 2015 leading to this characterisation becoming uncontested, the question remains whether the AfD was populist from its inception. This article demonstrates that distinguishing between the tactical and strategic agendas of the party solves this conundrum. While the AfD seldom applied populist discourse in its official manifestos, its tactical agenda was undoubtedly framed by populism. Ironically, it has been the ideologically moderate economist wing that has applied populist discourse in combination with its critique of the euro.

Von der EURO-Opposition zur Kosmopolitismus-Opposition

“Once we cannot organize opposition in the EU, we are then almost forced to organize opposition to the EU.” (Mair 2007, S. 7; kursive Hervorhebung im Originaltext). Zu diesem skeptischen Urteil kommt Peter Mair bezuglich des EU-Institutionengefuges und seiner Unfahigkeit, widerstreitende Interessen zu integrieren. Er argumentiert, dass systemstutzende, themenbasierte Opposition – anders als auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene – zwangslaufig zu einer Anti-Systemhaltung fuhren musse, da eine themenbasierte Opposition innerhalb der EU nicht moglich sei. Doch stimmt das? Am kritischen Fall der Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) zeigt sich, dass die „Eurokrise“ zwar Anlass, aber nicht Ursache ihrer Grundung war. Entscheidender ist die Entstehung einer neuen kulturellen Konfliktlinie (Bornschier 2012). Mairs Argument unterschatzt gesellschaftliche Veranderung als mogliche Radikalisierungsursache. Im Fall der AfD war die Politisierung des EU- und Eurothemas ein vorrubergehendes Phanomen. Die Europaische Integration ist Teil des auf der Ebene des Nationalstaates entstehenden Konfliktes uber kosmopolitische Wertehaltungen.

Opposition und Staat. Zur Grundlegung der Parteiendemokratie

Welche Funktionen hat eine Parteiendemokratie? Wovon hangt die Qualitat ihrer Funktionsweise ab? Diesen grundlegenden widmet sich das vorliegende Kapitel. Hierzu werden zunachst die Konzepte Parteienwettbewerb und Parteiendemokratie definiert. Anschliesend werden die zentralen Mechanismen zur Herstellung einer funktionierenden Parteidemokratie erortert. Entscheidend ist zum einen die Verfugbarkeit institutioneller Kanale zur Ausubung von Opposition. Zum anderen hangt die Qualitat an der tatsachlichen Partizipation der Burger eines politischen Systems. Der Beitrag schliest mit einer Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen theoretischen Befunde und dem Hinweis auf die normative Funktion der Parteiendemokratie: Parteiendemokratien sind autoritaren Systemen durch Innovationsleistung und Integrationsleistung uberlegen und stabilisieren somit ein Staatswesen. Voraussetzung dafur ist jedoch ein hinreichen des Ausmas an Partizipation. Die zeitgenossische Kritik an der Parteiendemokratie erscheint weniger als Phanomen der Kritik am grundlegenden Konzept, sondern dass die Realitat nicht mit ihren Ideal ubereinstimmt.

Contextualizing Cognitive Consonance by a Social Mechanisms Explanation: Moderators of Selective Exposure in Media Usage

Abstract While many studies from analytical sociology apply agent-based modeling to analyze the transformational mechanisms linking the micro to the macro level, we hold the view that both situational and action formation mechanisms can rather be unveiled by means of more advanced quantitative methods. By focusing on selective exposure to quality newspapers, our study has both an analytical and a substantive aim. First., our analytical aim is to amend the psychological mechanism of avoiding cognitive dissonance by social mechanisms allowing postulates on how the selective exposure effect might vary by particular social groups. Second, our substantive aim is to set the ground for a longitudinal analysis of selective exposure to quality papers by placing these social mechanisms in the context of social and cultural change. By referring to hypothetical data, we illustrate which kind of (multilevel) moderator effects would have to hold if our hypotheses were true.

How the Mechanism of Dynamic Representation Affects Policy Change and Stability

Abstract In politics, we often observe stasis when, at first sight, no reason exists for such policy blockades. In contrast., we sometimes see policy change when one would expect blockades resulting from veto points or countervailing majorities. How can we explain these contradictory results concerning policy stability? In order to solve this theoretical puzzle, we develop an agent-based model (ABM). We combine established models of veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002: Ganghof-Bräuninger 2006) with the findings of political sociology and party competition. By aggregating previous party-level findings, we show that dynamic representation (Stimson et. al. 1995) provides an additional mechanism that can explain these macro-level outcomes. Parties behaving responsively to their electorate do not automatically guarantee perfect responsivity on the party system level. Further, if opposition parties also fear punishment by the electorate for government inaction, the opposition behaves more accommodatingly than previous approaches have predicted.

Die Schwäche der Opposition, die Außerparlamentarische Opposition und die Emergenz neuer Regierungsperspektiven

Die Bundestagswahl 2013 hatte fur die folgende 18. Legislaturperiode eine ungewohnliche Situation geschaffen: Mit FDP und AfD gab es zwei starke auserparlamentarische Oppositionsparteien, wahrend die parlamentarische Opposition aus Grunen und Linken mit 20 Prozent der Abgeordnetenstimmen vergleichsweise schwach war. Inwieweit hat die auserparlamentarische Opposition die Schwache der parlamentarischen Opposition kompensieren konnen? Der Beitrag beginnt mit der Klarung des Oppositionsbegriffs und der besonderen Funktion der auserparlamentarischen Opposition im deutschen politischen System. Auf Basis vorwiegend inhaltsanalytischer Daten zeigt der Beitrag, wie AfD und FDP von dem sich verandernden deutschen Wahlerraum profitierten. Seit dem Hohepunkt der Fluchtlingskrise ist die „neue kulturelle Kluft“ („new cultural divide“ – Bornschier 2010) in Deutschland virulent geworden. Dies eroffnete beiden Parteien ein Gelegenheitsfenster zur Neupositionierung innerhalb des deutschen Parteienwettbewerbs. Die FDP verfolgte dabei die Strategie eines Re-Branding im Sinne der Kreierung eines neuen Marktauftritts. Die AfD hingegen besetzte strategisch national-konservative und rechtspopulistische Themen.

Extra-Parliamentary Opposition within a Transforming Political Space: The AfD and FDP under Merkel III between 2013 and 2017

The federal elections of 2013 generated an unusual situation for the German party system: a very strong extra-parliamentary opposition. The liberal FDP and the newly emerging AfD, with 4.8 per cent and 4.7 per cent, respectively, of the votes, ended up as the extra-parliamentary opposition, although both parties were ultimately successful in entering the German parliament in 2017. What strategies did these parties apply? How did they manage to get into parliament in 2017? The German case presents a unique situation, with the FDP, an experienced mainstream government party, and the AfD, a challenger party, belonging to the extra-parliamentary opposition. Clarifying first the concept and function of an extra-parliamentary opposition, the article describes, using manifesto data, the transformation of the German political space and the growing salience of the new cultural divide. The AfD contributed to establishing this divide by applying populist rhetoric. By contrast, the FDP succeeded by using a party-elite-led re-branding and re-framing of economic issues in the times of digitalisation.