Slobodan Djajić

Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation

This paper studies the effects of illegal immigration and the associated expansion of the underground economy on the allocation of resources, commodity prices, and wages of workers, both in the short run (when occupational mobility is restricted) and in the long run (when the skill-composition of the labor force is endogenous). The paper goes on to consider some of the fiscal implications of illegal immigration and the related expansion of underground activity. Effects of sanctions against employers hiring illegal aliens and measures to legalize the status of clandestine foreign workers are also examined. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Skills and the pattern of migration: the role of qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international labor mobility.

This paper develops a two-country model of international migration in an attempt to study the role of both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international labor mobility. Individuals are distinguished in terms of their ability and age, enabling the model to examine factors that influence the age and skill profile of those who migrate, as well as the equilibrium flow of migrants and the pattern of factor rewards in the two economies. Effects of changes in certain parameters of the model are related to the nature of the immigration policy enforced by the host country. The role of emigration restrictions is also considered. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Investment Opportunities in the Source Country and Temporary Migration

This paper examines how attractive investment opportunities available to temporary migrants in their country of origin a¤ect their saving behavior and the optimal duration of stay abroad. The model predicts an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration duration and the expected rate of return on repatriated savings. A higher rate provides an incentive to go back earlier and consume less abroad, while it can also trigger emigration aimed at generating the savings required for investment after return. At a more general level, the paper illustrates how the behavior of temporary migrants re?ects the interaction between their preferences and the opportunities available in the labor and capital markets of both countries.

SOME ESSENTIALS OF A WORKABLE GUEST‐WORKER PROGRAM

A guest�?worker program provides an appealing way of addressing labor shortages in an advanced country. It requires, however, that foreign workers are willing to return home when their work permit expires. I examine how immigration policies, enforcement measures, and opportunities available in various markets at home and abroad affect the behavior of program participants. Welfare of a migrant who obeys the rules of the program is compared with that of workers who choose other options in order to define the conditions under which temporary migration is attractive to potential migrants and at the same time consistent with voluntary return.

TEMPORARY EMIGRATION AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF LOW‐SKILLED LABOR

This article studies the implications of temporary emigration for the welfare of a source country. The framework is one of general equilibrium, where the economys stocks of both capital and labor are endogenously determined by the saving and migration decisions of optimizing agents. Simulations of the model suggest that for realistic values of the parameters, welfare of nonmigrants of the source country is maximized when the migrants are employed abroad for a period in the range of roughly 8–12 years. The ideal duration is found to be an increasing function of the international wage differential, migration costs, and the degree to which the rights of migrants are protected in the host country.

Guest Worker Programs: A Theoretical Analysis of Welfare of the Host and Source Countries

This article examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them, to the extent possible, with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.

A MODEL OF TRADE IN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES

This paper develops a two-period, two-country model of trade in exhaustible resources. It investigates the role of intertemporal consumption substitution in determining whether international asymmet ries in terms of relative resource endowments or rates of time prefer ence have a greater influence on the pattern of trade. Other factors which may affect the direction of trade are also considered. Finally, the paper studies the effects of temporary and permanent changes in government spending and of a resource discovery on the world rate of interest and the relative price of the resource in terms of consumpti on goods. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country

We consider the implications of cooperation with respect to immigration control between a final-destination country (D) and its poorer neighbor (T). Assuming that the latter serves as a transit country for undocumented immigrants, a key question is how much aid should D provide to T for the purpose of strengthening its immigration controls. The problem for T is to determine what proportion of aid to use strictly for immigration control rather than trying to meet other border-security objectives. We examine the Nash equilibrium values of the policy instruments of both countries and compare them with those which are optimal when international cooperation on immigration control extends to maximization of joint welfare. We also consider a two-stage game in which D first decides on how much aid to transfer to T, with the latter subsequently choosing how to use it.

Temporary Migration and the Flow of Savings to the Source Country

The saving behavior of temporary migrants when the duration of their stay abroad is set by the immigration policy of the host country is studied in this paper. The focus is on the implied flow of savings back to the source country and how it depends on migration costs, duration of the work permit, and international wage, interest and price-level differentials. The amount of time that migrants are allowed to work in the host country is shown to be a key policy variable that affects the flow of savings repatriated to the source country.

Immigration Policies and the Choice between Documented and Undocumented Migration

What determines whether a temporary migrant chooses to go abroad as a documented worker or as an illegal alien? We address the question from a theoretical perspective by focusing on how immigration policies, aimed at both documented and undocumented foreign workers, influence the choice between the two modes of migration. Calibrating our model to the specific case of temporary emigration from Thailand, we provide estimates of the relative policy effectiveness. The deportation rate facing undocumented aliens is shown to be the most potent instrument, while some of the measures directed at documented contract workers are found to be more effective in influencing the choice of emigration mode than border controls and employer sanctions aimed at illegal immigrants.