Somogy Varga

The politics of Nation Branding Collective identity and public sphere in the neoliberal state

Nation Branding is broadly conceived of as an apolitical marketing strategy that targets external markets to establish and communicate a specific image of national identity. However, in this article it is argued that Nation Branding displays characteristics that make it constructive to analyse in terms of an implicit cultural policy. The main point is that Nation Branding is essentially an inner-oriented, cultural-political measure that targets the citizens of the national state, characterized by conservative, transformative and transferring political agendas. On the background of an analysis of these characteristics, it will be argued that Nation Branding may work in a self-defeating manner and endanger democratic processes.

Social cognition and psychopathology: a critical overview

The philosophical and interdisciplinary debate about the nature of social cognition, and the processes involved, has important implications for psychiatry. On one account, mindreading depends on making theoretical inferences about another persons mental states based on knowledge of folk psychology, the so‐called “theory theory” (TT). On a different account, “simulation theory” (ST), mindreading depends on simulating the others mental states within ones own mental or motor system. A third approach, “interaction theory” (IT), looks to embodied processes (involving movement, gesture, facial expression, vocal intonation, etc.) and the dynamics of intersubjective interactions (joint attention, joint action, and processes not confined to an individual system) in highly contextualized situations to explain social cognition, and disruptions of these processes in some psychopathological conditions. In this paper, we present a brief summary of these three theoretical frameworks (TT, ST, IT). We then focus on impaired social abilities in autism and schizophrenia from the perspective of the three approaches. We discuss the limitations of such approaches in the scientific studies of these and other pathologies, and we close with a short reflection on the future of the field. In this regard we argue that, to the extent that TT, ST and IT offer explanations that capture different (limited) aspects of social cognition, a pluralist approach might be best.

Critical social philosophy, Honneth and the role of primary intersubjectivity

Gesellschaftskritik, or social philosophy that aims to provide firm criticism of pathological social practices, requires normatively grounded evaluative principles. In this article, we assess different possibilities for such principles with focus on a model that takes specific patterns of intersubjective interaction as its point of reference. We argue that in order to understand the full significance of this ‘intersubjective turn’ for social philosophy, and to strengthen the normative foundation of social philosophy, we need to distinguish several levels of intersubjectivity and, in particular, focus on the somewhat neglected level of primary intersubjectivity. The article will discuss the account of primary intersubjectivity in Honneth’s work. We show that Honneth’s account runs into difficulties, and drawing on recent findings in developmental psychology, we suggest a rethinking of elementary recognition in terms of ‘affective proximity’. This both renders the account less susceptible to criticism and provides a normative perspective that can effortlessly enter into interdisciplinary collaboration.

Conceptual issues in autism spectrum disorders.

Purpose of review To provide an update on recent studies concerning social cognition in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), to compare different theoretical approaches used to interpret empirical data, and to highlight a number of conceptual issues. Recent findings In regard to social cognition in ASDs, there is an emerging emphasis on early-onset and prolonged sensory–motor problems. Such sensory–motor problems may fit with the theories of social cognition that emphasize the importance of embodied interaction rather than deficits in mindreading, or they may reflect more general aspects of developmental disorders. Summary Different theoretical frameworks offer alternative perspectives on the central characteristics in ASDs and motivate different ways of conceptualizing diagnosis and intervention. Theory-of-mind approaches continue to appeal to false-belief paradigms, and debate continues about the performance of individuals with autism. Likewise, there is continuing debate and renewed skepticism about the role of simulation and deficits in the mirror system in ASDs. Growing evidence concerning sensory–motor problems, specifically disrupted patterns in re-entrant (afferent and proprioceptive) sensory feedback across the autistic spectrum, may not only provide support for more embodied interactive approaches, but also suggests that a single approach is unlikely able to explain all social cognition problems in autism. A pluralist approach understands ASDs as involving a variant range of cascading disrupted processes.

Evolutionary psychiatry and depression: testing two hypotheses

In the last few decades, there has been a genuine ‘adaptive turn’ in psychiatry, resulting in evolutionary accounts for an increasing number of psychopathologies. In this paper, I explore the advantages and problems with the two main evolutionary approaches to depression, namely the mismatch and persistence accounts. I will argue that while both evolutionary theories of depression might provide some helpful perspectives, the accounts also harbor significant flaws that might question their authority and usefulness as explanations.

From Melancholia to Depression: Ideas on a Possible Continuity

In this paper, the history of melancholia and depression is addressed, with special emphasis on the issue of their continuity. Not surprisingly, opinions are divided on this matter. Proponents of what could be called the ‘unproblematic continuity view’ argue that what is now termed depressive disorder is more or less similar to melancholia. Proponents of the ‘discontinuity view’ firmly deny this. It is argued that, on a more fine-grained view, a modest continuity view is justified. In the first part of the paper, (1) an alternative interpretation of the unity of melancholia is provided that serves as a starting point for (2) a reconsideration of the relation between melancholia and depression. In the last part of the paper, (3) an attempt is made to shed light on differing etiological explanations of melancholia and to show how some of them have come to shape recent approaches to depression.

Pretence, Social Cognition and Self-Knowledge in Autism

This article suggests that an account of pretence based on the idea of shared intentionality can be of help in understanding autism. In autism, there seems to be a strong link between being able to engage in pretend play, understanding the minds of others and having adequate access to own mental states. Since one of the first behavioral manifestations of autism is the lack of pretend play, it therefore seems natural to investigate pretence in order to identify the nature of the central impairment in question. In mainstream theories, this has been identified as an impaired ‘theory of mind module’ or ‘mentalizing’ capacities. This paper points to some difficulties encountered by such accounts and – by drawing on research by Tomasello and Rakoczy – seeks to develop an alternative account of pretence and social cognition.

Critical Theory and the Two-Level Account of Recognition - Towards a New Foundation?

Abstract Axel Honneth makes initial and promising steps towards what could be called a two-level account of recognition, according to which the normatively substantial forms of recognition represent various manners in which the primordial acquaintedness with others is expressed. It will be argued that Honneths promising approach must be revised in regard to the issue of intentionality, which may be achieved by reference to earlier critical theorists such as Adorno and Arendt. With such a foundation, critical theory can enter into new fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue.

Interaction and extended cognition

In contemporary philosophy of the cognitive sciences, proponents of the ‘Hypothesis of Extended Cognition’ (HEC) have focused on demonstrating how cognitive processes at times extend beyond the boundaries of the human body to include external physical devices. In recent years the HEC framework has been put to use in cases of “socially” extended cognition. The guiding intuition in this paper is that exploring the cognitive incorporations of genuinely social elements may advance HEC debates. The paper provides an analysis of emotion regulation in ‘dyadic synchronic interaction’ between infant and caretaker and argues that some ‘socially extended’ cases of cognition cannot be captured with the HEC. Instead, the ‘Hypothesis of Emergent Extended Cognition’ (HEEC) is introduced that complements the HEC and helps in understanding how cognitive properties are sometimes irreducibly emergent, non-programmed properties of coupled social systems. It will be concluded that operating with the HEEC leads to both a more precise grip on the explanandum and to a more robust explanans.

Editorial introduction: Socializing the extended mind

1 Traditionally the disciplines that comprise cognitive science have been considered to be those which make up the “cognitive hexagon” (See H.Gardner 1985 The Mind’s New Science). That is, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Research at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science has been a dynamically evolving and rapidly growing field that has witnessed increased attention over the last decade. A particular debate that has contributed to this growth concerns the role of non-neural, “external” structures in cognition and the idea that the neural, or even organismic, boundary is a merely arbitrary stopping point for the systematic investigation of cognition. This debate is particularly stimulating for researchers across the traditional disciplinary boundaries as it indicates a gradual change in opinion about how the cognitive apparatus is to be studied. Supporters of this approach have, in various ways, opposed the view that cognition is constituted only by computational, representation-manipulating activity that finds place in the head and have argued instead that the study of cognition must acknowledge the non-trivial role of the body and external structures in cognitive processes. This special issue expands upon the aforementioned discussion by addressing what the editors and contributors see as lacuna among the extended mind debates. The focus in this issue is on the extent to which “extended” frameworks are useful for understanding the role of social structures in cognition. This is an area of research that has until recently received little attention in the philosophy of cognitive science. The title of this special issue, and of the target paper, refers back to one of the most heavily discussed articles in this field, The Extended Mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) in which the authors introduce the ‘Hypothesis of Extended Cognition’. In this paper Clark and Chalmers argue that cognitive activity not only often involves the exploitation of the surrounding environment but that sometimes extra-cranial items actually figure as constituents of cognitive processes. That is to say, proper parts of cognition sometimes extend into the environment. Although this hypothesis has provoked a deluge of opponents and defenders, the debate has tended to focus on the two particular kinds of external items which Clark emphasizes in his works: tools in the environment, and actions of the morphological body. Where social cognition has been considered in the debate, it has typically been in terms of the possibility of using another person as some sort of external memory resource, perhaps betraying the prominent influence of the disciplines of artificial intelligence,