Sonia Paty

The Effects of Politics on Local Tax Setting: Evidence from France

This paper investigates the hypothesis that local politics has an impact on local taxation in the French public sector by using a cross-sectional dataset on departments in 1999. Political variables are included in a tax-setting equation to provide empirical evidence whether local governments in France adopt business taxation behaviour closer to the Leviathan government hypothesis, with higher tax rates when political competition decreases, or to the partisan government hypothesis, with differences in tax rates according to partisan variables. It is shown that the wider the seats margin, the lower the tax rates, and that this cut is weaker in the case of a left-wing local majority than a right-wing majority. It is therefore concluded that the partisan government hypothesis is more supported by the French data than the Leviathan one, even after controlling for tax interdependencies between departments.

The Impact of Inter-Municipal Cooperation on Local Public Spending?

The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of inter-municipal fiscal cooperation on municipal public spending, based on the French experience. We estimate a model of municipal spending choice using panel data and spatial econometrics for municipalities over the period 1994-2003. We provide two main results. First, inter-municipal cooperation has no significant impact on the level of municipal public spending, which suggests that cooperation does not achieve its goal of reducing municipal spending by the sharing of local responsibilities. Second, there are no spending interactions between municipalities belonging to the same inter-municipal community. This is in line with the goal assigned to cooperation in terms of internalization of spatial externalities. However, our results show that benefit spillovers remain highly significant outside inter-municipal communities, suggesting that inter-municipal communities remain too small.

Does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas

Charlot S., Paty S. and Piguet V. Does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas?, Regional Studies. The main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country using experience in French urban municipalities. A tax-setting model for local business tax is estimated, using spatial and panel econometric techniques, for the period 1993–2003. Controlling for population size, it is found that fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce tax competition and, as a consequence, to increase local business tax rates.

Cooperation among local governments to deliver public services: a "structural" bivariate response model with fixed effects and endogenous covariate

Cooperation among local governments has been encouraged to enable the aggregation of resources and improved public sector efficiency. However, if cooperation through the joint delivery of local public services is likely to be welfare enhancing for the agglomeration, but will lead to losses for one of the parties, it is unlikely that the losing municipality will cooperate. Using a unique panel dataset of 30,000 French municipalities for 1995-2003, we estimate the relationship between cooperation decision and the fiscal revenues raised to provide local public goods. We employ a new econometric strategy based on Lee (1978), developing a non linear method controlling for fixed effect, endogenous covariates and cluster standard error. We find evidence that a positive difference between the expected fiscal revenues of a cooperating locality and the actual revenues realized by an isolated locality significantly increases the probability of joining an inter-municipal community.

Assessing the impact of local taxation on property prices: a spatial matching contribution

This article provides empirical evidence on the impact of local taxation on property prices, controlling for the local public spending, using data on property taxation and real estate transactions, over the period 1994–2004. Our empirical methodology pairs transactions in the same spatial environments. Spatial differencing and Instrumental Variables (IV) methodology allow us to compare sales across municipality boundaries and to control for the potential endogeneity of local taxation and public spending. Our results suggest that the local Property Tax (PT) rate has no impact on property prices, while the amount of taxes paid appears to have a negative effect on property price.

A Note on Tax Competition and Leviathan

The central purpose of this paper is to determine the effect of interjurisdictional competition for capital on public decisions of Leviathan-type policymakers who are also concerned with re-election. We show that the supply of public goods is (in)efficient in a Nash-equilibrium when such policy-makers (do not) use freely their tax instruments. Moreover, tax instruments choices depend on the assumption concerning capital ownership. When the local stock of capital is owned by residents, policy-makers are not likely to use the tax on capital while absentee ownership leads them to use it as tax exporting allows them to increase their rents