Sor-hoon Tan

Political implications of confucian familism

The family could be mobilized as a political resource for economic ‘development’. What kind of family would be compatible with a knowledge-based economy? We argue that authoritarian Confucian familism is incompatible with the knowledge-based economy; but it is possible to construct a different model of the ideal Confucian family which will be compatible with such an economy: a family ideal that emphasizes internal strengths of relationships rather than building barriers to keep out ‘undesirable influences’, that advocates a respect for authority that is authoritative rather than authoritarian.

From Cannibalism to Empowerment: An Analects -Inspired Attempt to Balance Community and Liberty

Developed here is a Confucian balance between two key democratic ideals, liberty and community, by focusing on the Confucian notion of li (ritual), which has often been considered hostile to liberty. By adopting a semiotic approach to li and relating it to recent studies of ritual in various Western disciplines, lis contribution to communication and its aesthetic dimension are explored to show how emphasizing harmony without sacrificing reflective experience and personal fulfillment renders li a concept of moral empowerment of free individuals in community.

Confucian Democracy as Pragmatic Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity

This paper argues for the pragmatic construction of Confucian democracy by showing that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from the earlier failures of the iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of Chinas history, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie in transforming that tradition without destroying it. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with a proper appreciation of ones own past to nurture democracy as a way of life.

The Dao of Politics: Li (Rituals/Rites) and Laws as Pragmatic Tools of Government

In the history of Chinese thought, Confucianism is often contrasted with Legalism in terms of the former’s emphasis on li (ritual or rite) and the latter’s emphasis on fa (laws). However, others have argued that the Confucian li have served some of the same purposes as laws in the Western world. This article shows that through an overlap between Dewey’s concept of custom and the Confucian notion of li, and Dewey’s understanding of the relationship between custom and law, Dewey’s pragmatism could engage Confucian philosophy on the key questions of what kind of tools will achieve good government. It argues that pragmatically rituals and laws are complementary tools of government, but the perceived differences between them reveal important insights regarding coercion and moral transformation in relation to good government. Dewey’s insistence that the rational and aesthetic should not be separated in any satisfactory experience provides the basis for an argument that the aesthetic emphasis of li complements the rational emphasis of laws, and a balance between the two is required to achieve Deweyan democracy as a way of life, in which aesthetic elements of culture will be as important as the rational structure of a political system.

Why Equality and Which Inequalities?: A Modern Confucian Approach to Democracy

This article challenges the conventional view that Confucianism has no place for the value of equality by shifting the focus from direct justification of equality (Why equality?) to concerns about actual social and political problems (Which inequalities are objectionable?). From this perspective, early Confucian texts endorse some inequalities, in particular those based on virtue, while objecting to others, especially socioeconomic inequalities. Confucians do not consider equality or inequality as inherently valuable, but evaluate them in relation to issues of good government.

Experience as art

Abstract Chinese philosophy views experience as intrinsically aesthetic. This world view could be elucidated through a consideration of John Deweys aesthetics and features of Chinese art. Deweys philosophy of art starts with an understanding of experience as ‘live processes’ of living creatures interacting with their environment. Such processes are autopoietic in being self‐sustaining, ever‐changing, capable of increasing complexity, capable of generating novelty, direction and progress on its own. Its autopoietic character is a precondition of the aesthetic in the process of experience. An aesthetic experience is rhythmic, focused, consummatory, and reaches beyond the transitory boundaries of concrete existence. The aesthetic is not confined to what is conventionally identified as art. Most important, the ethical‐political, the natural and the cosmic all have an aesthetic aspect, as the paper attempts to show by examining classical Confucianism.

Early Confucian Concept of Yi (议)and Deliberative Democracy

Contributors to the debates about the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy and its implications for China’s democratization often adopt definitions of democracy that theories of deliberative democracy are critical of. Attention to deliberative democracy is timely given its importance in democratic discourses and recent experiments in “deliberative” or “consultative” democracy in China. Would Confucian understanding of political deliberation help or hinder deliberative democracy? This essay compares the concept of yi in the early Confucian texts with a contemporary concept of democratic deliberation. The differences between the concept of yi in early Confucian texts and the concept of democratic deliberation show that the presence of deliberation, even when they meet stringent norms, does not guarantee that the politics would be democratic. Rather, the political environment and processes must be democratized for deliberation to be democratic. This comparative study considers how the similarities between two concepts, and other aspects of Confucian philosophy might be deployed to close the gap between early Confucian view of ideal government and deliberative democracy. At the same time, it does not simply embrace all aspects of the chosen democratic theory, but argues that Confucian deliberative democracy may differ significantly, for example, in approaching politics from the perspective of a comprehensive ethical theory. In doing so, it offers a different conception of deliberative democracy and shows how the chosen theory is limited by certain assumptions specific to its own context and that the understanding of deliberative democracy needs to be expanded and modified to approach genuine universalism.

The Concept of Yi (义) in the Mencius and Problems of Distributive Justice

Abstract This paper examines attempts to find a conception of justice in early Confucian contexts, focusing on the concept of yi (translated as ‘appropriateness’, ‘right’, ‘rightness’, even ‘justice’) in the Mencius. It argues against the approach of deriving principles of dividing burdens and benefits from the discussions of concrete cases employing the concept of yi and instead shows that Confucian ethical concerns are more attentive to what kinds of interpersonal relations are appropriate in specific circumstances. It questions the exclusive emphasis in justice-centred ethical discourse on assessing actions, and even more narrowly actions of governments and other public institutions, and their consequences regarding distribution of rights and material resources and goods. Instead of applying some abstract principles of justice, whether of equality or some other priorities according to individual characteristics, distributive problems are approached from the perspective of the effect of any proposed distribution on interpersonal relationships. Principles of justice treat opportunities, resources, and goods that are supposed to be distributed as possessions or potential possessions of individuals always competing for resources and goods. Confucians treat them not as objects to be possessed by one and denied to others, but as facilitators of personal cultivation effecting appropriate interpersonal relationships constituting harmonious communities. The Mencius offers a different perspective on distributive problems by shifting our ethical attention from ‘who gets what?’ to ‘how should we relate to others?’ within a different conception of the good life and the ideal society or polity.

Beyond Liberal Democracy: A Debate on Democracy and Confucian Meritocracy

At the twenty-second World Congress of Philosophy held in Seoul, Korea, from July 29 to August 5, 2008, a panel was convened to debate the ideas for a ‘‘democracy with Confucian characteristics’’ in Daniel A. Bell’s Beyond Liberal Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). While all participants welcome the attempt to remedy the shortcomings of liberal democracy with Confucian teachings, Fred Dallmayr worries that Bell’s political thinking for an East Asian context may ‘‘point beyond democracy tout court.’’ For Sor-hoon Tan, Bell’s chapter 6, ‘‘Taking Elitism Seriously: Democracy with Confucian Characteristics’’ may not be so much an alternative to liberalism as it is a challenge to the democratic value of equality that overlooks the dangers of an imperfect meritocracy. Chenyang Li, on the other hand, approaches Bell’s proposal of combining a Confucianism-inspired Upper House of Talent and Virtue selected through competitive examinations with a lower house of democratically elected representatives from the concern that it surrenders the Confucian requirement of virtuous leadership. This feature review also concludes with a spirited reply from Daniel Bell.

Balancing Conservatism and Innovation: The Pragmatic Analects

While many consider Confucianism a conservative philosophy, others have argued that Confucius himself was innovative and even revolutionary. This chapter examines the conservative and innovative elements in the Analects within the hermeneutical context of understanding Confucius’ teachings as a pragmatic project of solving real problems of his time. It locates Confucius’ respect for the ancients and his commitment to transmitting the culture of previous dynasties within the Master’s critical reflection on what was excellent and valuable about the inheritances of the past that gave it authority in the present, and how the unsatisfactory aspects of the present could be changed by learning from the ancients. It shows that this learning is not simplistically aimed at replicating the past. Confucius was no slavish copy cat. In learning from the past, he balanced commitment to tried and tested excellences and values exemplified in the achievements of past personalities and civilizations with an appreciation of the demands and needs of new circumstances of the present. The result is innovation that Confucius himself did not always recognize and that became apparent only with longer range historical perspective. The study of the tension between conservatism and innovation and the need to balance them for efficacious change is contextualized by contemporary debates about conservative thought and the significance and direction of the revival of Confucianism in China.