Sören Häggqvist

Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms : Myth and Reality

The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and that the currently popular homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent that fails to vindicate the Kripke–Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for anti-descriptivist semantics. 1 Introduction 2 From Semantics to Metaphysics 3 Metaphysics, Part I: The Demise of Micro-essentialism   3.1 Original micro-essentialism   3.2 Placeholder essentialism 4 Metaphysics, Part II: Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory 5 Prospects for Natural Kind Term Semantics 1 Introduction 2 From Semantics to Metaphysics 3 Metaphysics, Part I: The Demise of Micro-essentialism   3.1 Original micro-essentialism   3.2 Placeholder essentialism   3.1 Original micro-essentialism   3.2 Placeholder essentialism 4 Metaphysics, Part II: Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory 5 Prospects for Natural Kind Term Semantics

Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals

Abstract In The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Tim Williamson has offered a sophisticated account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology. More recently, he has also engaged in a variant of the so-called ‘expertise defence’ of traditional philosophical methodology. In this paper I argue that if Williamson’s account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology is right, this seriously undermines his version of the expertise defence.