Daniel Cohnitz

Meta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in The Study of Reference

We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta-internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.

The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge

Modal epistemology tries to explain our apparent knowledge of modal propositions. In everyday reasoning, but also in scientific reasoning and especially when doing philosophy, we seem to be relying on modal judgments, judgments about what is necessary, what is impossible and what is possible. When deliberating upon which course of action to take for reaching a desired goal, we take into consideration only those courses that we think are possible for us to take; when distinguishing accidentally true generalizations from lawlike statements in the sciences, we make judgments about which of these statements state necessities or support counterfactuals; when reflecting on whether knowledge is true justified belief, we consider whether it is possible for a person to have a true justified belief that would not qualify as knowledge, etc. Of course, the modalities involved in these three examples are of different kinds. When deliberating about alternative courses of action in our everyday life, we consider possibilities in a much more restricted sense than the possibilities we take into consideration when doing philosophy. However, the epistemological question of how we can know modal propositions can be asked in the same way for all kinds of modality.

Ørsteds „Gedankenexperiment“: eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung? Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‚Gedankenexperiment' und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts

Es wird häufig darauf hingewiesen2, dass Hans Christian Ørsted den Ausdruck ‚Gedankenexperiment‘3 erfunden hat. In der Tat scheint er (mit) der erste zu sein, der mit ‚Gedankenexperimenten‘ oder ‚Gedankenversuchen‘ eine Methode bezeichnen wollte, die sich sowohl in den Naturwissenschaften wie auch in der Mathematik finde, und für die Immanuel Kants Naturlehre aus Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft die „schönsten Beyspiele“4 liefere. Obzwar er damit ein neues Wort gebildet hatte, kann man sich fragen, ob es Ørsted gelungen ist, dieses auch mit einem klaren Inhalt zu füllen. Zunächst kann man feststellen, dass ihm sehr wahrscheinlich nicht gelungen ist, ein neues Thema in die Wissenschaftsphilosophie zu bringen. Ørsted blieb nach allem, was wir wissen, ohne Wirkung, und die Begriffsgeschichte des Gedankenexperiments beginnt erst mit Ernst Mach.5 Letzteres wäre zunächst unproblematisch, zumal es innerhalb der Wissenschaftsgeschichte häufiger zu unabhängigen Entdeckungen kommt. Hat Ørsted denn seine Redeweise von ‚Gedankenexperimenten‘ mit einem Inhalt gefüllt, den man sinnvoll

Brief aus Estland

Abstract This personal letter describes the history and current situation of philosophy in Estonia. We sketch the development of academic philosophy since the foundation of Tartu University in 1632, and describe the current philosophical landscape. We discuss the challenges we are facing in trying to find a balance between the responsibility that a discipline in the humanties in a small country has with respect to local culture and society on the one hand, and our ambitions to build up an internationally collaborating department with an international graduate programme on the other. We close with a description of the relation between academic philosophy and Estonian society and the role that the Center for Ethics in Tartu plays in supporting that relation.

Understanding a Sentence Does Not Entail Knowing its Truth‐Conditions: Why the Epistemological Determination Argument Fails

The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentences meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. If the premise is understood in the sense required for the argument to go through then it should be rejected by a deflationist.

Two-Dimensionalism and the Metaphysical Possibility of Zombies

Two-dimensionalism is a formal framework used in formal semantics, epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The technical background dates back to the early seventies, in particular to Krister Segerberg’s paper “Two-Dimensional Modal Logic”. The mathematical tools developed in that tradition can be used to model the relations between two semantical properties of concepts or expressions, which, according to two-dimensionalism, can be conceived to be two kinds of intensions. I shall present the general ideas of two-dimensionalism, and give a brief reconstruction and discussion of one application in the philosophy of mind.