Srinath T. V. Setty
University of Texas at Austin
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by Srinath T. V. Setty.
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems | 2011
Prince Mahajan; Srinath T. V. Setty; Sangmin Lee; Allen Clement; Lorenzo Alvisi; Michael Dahlin; Michael Walfish
This article describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of Depot, a cloud storage system that minimizes trust assumptions. Depot tolerates buggy or malicious behavior by any number of clients or servers, yet it provides safety and liveness guarantees to correct clients. Depot provides these guarantees using a two-layer architecture. First, Depot ensures that the updates observed by correct nodes are consistently ordered under Fork-Join-Causal consistency (FJC). FJC is a slight weakening of causal consistency that can be both safe and live despite faulty nodes. Second, Depot implements protocols that use this consistent ordering of updates to provide other desirable consistency, staleness, durability, and recovery properties. Our evaluation suggests that the costs of these guarantees are modest and that Depot can tolerate faults and maintain good availability, latency, overhead, and staleness even when significant faults occur.
ieee symposium on security and privacy | 2013
Victor Vu; Srinath T. V. Setty; Andrew J. Blumberg; Michael Walfish
We consider interactive, proof-based verifiable computation: how can a client machine specify a computation to a server, receive an answer, and then engage the server in an interactive protocol that convinces the client that the answer is correct, with less work for the client than executing the computation in the first place? Complexity theory and cryptography offer solutions in principle, but if implemented naively, they are ludicrously expensive. Recently, however, several strands of work have refined this theory and implemented the resulting protocols in actual systems. This work is promising but suffers from one of two problems: either it relies on expensive cryptography, or else it applies to a restricted class of computations. Worse, it is not always clear which protocol will perform better for a given problem.We describe a system that (a) extends optimized refinements of the non-cryptographic protocols to a much broader class of computations, (b) uses static analysis to fail over to the cryptographic ones when the non-cryptographic ones would be more expensive, and (c) incorporates this core into a built system that includes a compiler for a high-level language, a distributed server, and GPU acceleration. Experimental results indicate that our system performs better and applies more widely than the best in the literature.
symposium on operating systems principles | 2013
Benjamin Braun; Ariel J. Feldman; Zuocheng Ren; Srinath T. V. Setty; Andrew J. Blumberg; Michael Walfish
When a client outsources a job to a third party (e.g., the cloud), how can the client check the result, without re-executing the computation? Recent work in proof-based verifiable computation has made significant progress on this problem by incorporating deep results from complexity theory and cryptography into built systems. However, these systems work within a stateless model: they exclude computations that interact with RAM or a disk, or for which the client does not have the full input. This paper describes Pantry, a built system that overcomes these limitations. Pantry composes proof-based verifiable computation with untrusted storage: the client expresses its computation in terms of digests that attest to state, and verifiably outsources that computation. Using Pantry, we extend verifiability to MapReduce jobs, simple database queries, and interactions with private state. Thus, Pantry takes another step toward practical proof-based verifiable computation for realistic applications.
european conference on computer systems | 2013
Srinath T. V. Setty; Benjamin Braun; Victor Vu; Andrew J. Blumberg; Bryan Parno; Michael Walfish
The area of proof-based verified computation (outsourced computation built atop probabilistically checkable proofs and cryptographic machinery) has lately seen renewed interest. Although recent work has made great strides in reducing the overhead of naive applications of the theory, these schemes still cannot be considered practical. A core issue is that the work for the server is immense, in general; it is practical only for hand-compiled computations that can be expressed in special forms. This paper addresses that problem. Provided one is willing to batch verification, we develop a protocol that achieves the efficiency of the best manually constructed protocols in the literature yet applies to most computations. We show that Quadratic Arithmetic Programs, a new formalism for representing computations efficiently, can yield a particularly efficient PCP that integrates easily into the core protocols, resulting in a server whose work is roughly linear in the running time of the computation. We implement this protocol in the context of a system, called Zaatar, that includes a compiler and a GPU implementation. Zaatar is almost usable for real problems---without special-purpose tailoring. We argue that many (but not all) of the next research questions in verified computation are questions in secure systems.
networked systems design and implementation | 2010
Indrajit Roy; Srinath T. V. Setty; Ann Kilzer; Vitaly Shmatikov; Emmett Witchel
network and distributed system security symposium | 2012
Srinath T. V. Setty; Richard McPherson; Andrew J. Blumberg; Michael Walfish
symposium on operating systems principles | 2015
Chris Hawblitzel; Jon Howell; Manos Kapritsos; Jacob R. Lorch; Bryan Parno; Michael L. Roberts; Srinath T. V. Setty; Brian Zill
usenix security symposium | 2012
Srinath T. V. Setty; Victor Vu; Nikhil Panpalia; Benjamin Braun; Andrew J. Blumberg; Michael Walfish
operating systems design and implementation | 2010
Prince Mahajan; Srinath T. V. Setty; Sangmin Lee; Allen Clement; Lorenzo Alvisi; Michael Dahlin; Michael Walfish
hot topics in operating systems | 2011
Srinath T. V. Setty; Andrew J. Blumberg; Michael Walfish