Stefan Palan

Inducing Low-Carbon Investment in the Electric Power Industry Through a Price Floor for Emissions Trading

Uncertainty about long-term climate policy is a major driving force in the evolution of the carbon market price. Since this price enters the investment decision process of regulated firms, this uncertainty increases the cost of capital for investors and might deter investments into new technologies at the company level. We apply a real options-based approach to assess the impact of climate change policy in the form of a constant or growing price floor on investment decisions of a single firm in a competitive environment. This firm has the opportunity to switch from a high-carbon “dirty” technology to a low-carbon “clean” technology. Using Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic programming techniques for real data, we determine the optimal CO2 price floor level and growth rate in order to induce investments into the low-carbon technology. We find that a carbon price floor can be used to induce earlier low-carbon technology investment and show this result to be robust to a large variety of input parameter settings.

Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment

We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the allocator mechanism differs between two treatments. In the coordinator treatment, the randomly selected allocator can set a uniform contribution for all group members, including herself. In the dictator treatment, the allocator can choose different contributions for herself and all other group members. We find that subjects willingly submit to authority in both treatments, even when competing with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The allocator groups achieve high contribution levels in both treatments.

Insider behavior under different market structures: experimental evidence on trading patterns, manipulation, and profitability

We conduct laboratory experiments incorporating different market structures and insiders who compete with imperfectly informed traders. The insiders possess perfect information regarding the fundamental value of the tradable asset, whereas the imperfectly informed participants receive a noisy signal of fundamental value. In addition to the two trader types, we vary the market design by using either a stand-alone continuous double auction market or a continuous double auction market preceded by either a transparent or a nontransparent opening call auction. The results provide insights into whether and how insiders try to stay undetected, how their profits are accumulated and what market structures are advantageous for insiders.

Collaborative decision systems in economics and in complex societal and environmental applications

The EURO Mini-Conference on “Collaborative Decision Systems in Economics and in Complex Societal and Environmental Applications” took place from October 17 through 19, 2013 in Graz, Austria (https://eurominiconferencegraz2013.wordpress. com/). It was organized by the EUROWorking Groups of DSS, E-CUBE, MCSP and ORAFM together with the main organizers Dr. Fatima C.C. Dargam, Prof. Dr. Stefan Pickl and Prof. Dr. Ulrike Leopold–Wildburger. Prof. Leopold–Wildburger is the head of the Institute of Statistics and Operations Research at the University of Graz, which managed the local organization.1 The conference’s purpose was to bring together researchers in the areas of Decision Support Systems, Operations Research, Methodology of Societal Complexity, Experimental Economics, and their respective areas of applications. These researchers shared and discussed their own and their respective disciplines’ different approaches during the conference. The conference focused on the problem of decision-making and its relation to societal, economic, and environmental contexts. The conference

The value of a fallback option

Fallback options are relatively common in the business context. If for example a firm fails to acquire a certain target firm—a first-best solution—it may decide to attempt the acquisition of another takeover target—a second best solution. When a decision maker tries to obtain the first-best solution, she may frequently choose different levels of effort to invest into its pursuit. This level of effort is generally influenced by the availability of a fallback option in case she fails to succeed in obtaining her first-best solution. Using a second price auction mechanism, we experimentally test whether subjects react to the existence and attractiveness of this fallback option by changing their bidding behavior. Our results show that subjects only partially adjust to the existence of the fallback option according to the theoretical prediction.

A Good Beginning Makes a Good Market: The Effect of Different Market Opening Structures on Market Quality

This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only improves market efficiency and liquidity at the beginning of the trading day when compared to the stand-alone continuous double auction, but also causes positive spillover effects on subsequent trading. Concerning the design of the opening call auction, we find no significant differences between the transparent and nontransparent specification with respect to opening prices and liquidity. In the course of subsequent continuous trading, however, market quality is slightly higher after a nontransparent call auction.

Earnings management and participation in accounting standard-setting

Recent economic and political science research suggests that the way public policy is set, and in particular the participation of those affected by it, impacts upon the outcome of the policy. Accounting standard setting has long offered such a possibility to participate via the due process approach followed by major standard setters. We review the literature on areas close to financial reporting and find arguments for why the possibility to participate in standard setting may have a positive effect on diminishing distortion of financial reporting. We also discuss reasons why such a compliance effect may be less pronounced in financial reporting. We conclude that the existence of this effect is an open question and conduct a lab experiment to examine whether the possibility to participate in accounting standard setting leads to reduced earnings management. Our results indicate that this is not the case. We interpret this result in light of recent evidence that enforcement and incentives are better predictors of accounting quality than financial reporting standards.

Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field

Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food’s preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.

Does Investor Risk Perception Drive Asset Prices in Markets? Experimental Evidence

We explore how individual risk perception influences prices and trading behavior in a market setting. Specifically, our study lets experimental participants trade assets characterized by varying shapes of return distributions. While common mean-variance models predict identical prices for most of our assets, we find trading prices to differ significantly. Assets that are perceived as being less risky on average (despite having identical volatility) trade at significantly higher prices. Individually, traders who perceive a certain asset to be less risky are also net buyers on average. With regard to different risk measures, our results show that the probability of a loss is the strongest predictor of transaction prices and risk perception. All these results hold also for experienced traders and when traders can trade two assets at the same time.