Stefan Roski

Simplicity and Economy in Bolzano's Theory of Grounding

This paper is devoted to Bolzano’s theory of grounding (Abfolge) in his Wissenschaftslehre. Bolzanian grounding is an explanatory consequence relation that is frequently considered an ancestor of the notion of metaphysical grounding. The paper focuses on two principles that concern grounding in the realm of conceptual sciences and relate to traditionally widespread ideas on explanations: the principles, namely, that grounding orders conceptual truths from simple to more complex ones (Simplicity), and that it comes along with a certain theoretical economy among them (Economy). Being spelled out on the basis of Bolzano’s notion of deducibility (Ableitbarkeit), these principles are revealing for the question to what extent grounding can be considered a formal relation.

Bolzano and Kim on grounding and unification

It is sometimes mentioned that Bernard Bolzano’s work on grounding anticipates many insights of the current debate on metaphysical grounding. The present paper discusses a certain part of Bolzano’s theory of grounding that has thus far not been discussed in the literature. This part does not so much anticipate what are nowadays common assumptions about grounding, but rather goes beyond them. Central to the discussion will be a thesis of Bolzano’s by which he tries to establish a connection between grounding and (deductive) unification. The paper spells out this thesis in detail and discusses the assumptions on which it rests. Next to this mainly historical aim, the paper also presents reasons why philosophers who are not interested in the historical Bolzano should find the thesis interesting by relating it to a certain view on unification and explanation that has been put forward by Kim. A final part of the paper provides a critical evaluation of the thesis against the background of current accounts of grounding.

Sustainable Internationalization? Measuring the Diversity of Internationalization at Higher Education Institutions

Sustainability and internationalization are considered to be core values of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), but their relationship is rarely investigated. The current study develops a framework to create a sustainable internationalization policy for an HEI; it analyzes how to measure the sustainability of an internationalization policy in two steps. First, this study presents a theoretical framework for a cost-benefit analysis of HEIs’ sustainable internationalization policies using three sustainability pillars (economic, ecological, and social), each with examples for their own measurable indicators. Second, this research operationalizes the economic pillar of the framework to enable a specific measurement of the economic sustainability of internationalization. The empirical analysis identifies the distribution of funding for internationalization as a promising indicator. To demonstrate the implementation of this part of the framework, this study analyzes how German HEIs distribute their monetary investments in internationalization activities to countries worldwide. Using data from the German academic exchange service (DAAD), this research investigates the distribution using descriptive statistics. In a second step, the methodology of the Lorenz curve is empirically applied to the distribution of funding. Universitat Hamburg is used as a case study to visualize the different funding tendencies among German HEIs. The findings suggest that the distribution of resources for internationalization says more about the sustainable character of an HEI than the absolute amount of invested resources. To evaluate the sustainability of an HEI’s internationalization strategy, it is therefore necessary to look at the distribution of target countries in addition to the mere absolute level of funding.

Bolzano on Necessary Existence

Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of Bolzano’s notion of necessary existence, which has so far received relatively little attention in the literature. We situate Bolzano’s ideas in their historical context and show how he proposed to correct various flaws of his predecessors’ definitions. Further, we relate Bolzano’s conception to his metaphysical and theological assumptions, arguing that some consequences of his definition which have been deemed counterintuitive by some of his interpreters turn out to be more reasonable given the broadly Leibnizian background of his metaphysics. Finally, we consider some difficulties that arise from Bolzano’s evolving views on freedom, which, at least in his early thought, was intimately linked with contingency. In an appendix, we discuss a recent debate on Bolzano’s notion of necessary truth between Textor and Rusnock that has some bearing on our overall line of interpretation of Bolzano’s notion of necessary existence.

A Priori Knowledge in Bolzano, Conceptual Truths, and Judgements

According to Kant, a true judgement can be called a priori in case it can take place absolutely (schlechterdings) independent of experience. Propositions that are knowable in this way are called a priori propositions by him (Kant 1787 B, 3–4). As is well known, the class of those a priori propositions that are synthetic was particularly important for Kant. In contrast to analytic propositions, they are supposed to contain nontrivial information about the world and yet be irrefutable by experience. Not many of his critics were satisfied with Kant’s way of drawing this distinction. Peter Strawson, for example, writes in his commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason: