Stéfanie von Hlatky
Queen's University
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Archive | 2013
Stéfanie von Hlatky
1. Introduction: Why are Allies so Unpredictable? 2. A Theory of Asymmetric Security Cooperation 3. Exceeding Expectations: The UK and the War on Terror 4. Canada-U.S. Relations and the War on Terror 5. Australia: Regional Power, Global War 6. Conclusion: Overcoming the Great Asymmetry
European Security | 2010
Michel Fortmann; David G. Haglund; Stéfanie von Hlatky
Abstract The paper looks at Frances return to NATO, looking at the impact of its ongoing reintegration in the alliances military structure from a strategic, a political and an operational perspective. We address three main questions: (1) How will Frances reintegration affect other NATO countries? This question will be answered from the perspectives of Canada, the UK, Germany and the United States; (2) How will France cope with the transition? French experts will assess the French debate on NATO, the operational dimension of Frances reintegration of the command structure and Frances role in transatlantic relations; (3) How will the decision affect the future prospects for allied action? This question will be addressed by looking at the nuclear dimension of NATO, burden-sharing, NATOs transformation and the impact of Frances reintegration on European defence.
European Security | 2010
Stéfanie von Hlatky
Abstract This article asks whether Frances return to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)s integrated military command could translate into a bigger role on nuclear issues within NATO. As NATO prepares its new strategic concept, its nuclear doctrine is bound to change as several allies have expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The presence of American theater nuclear weapons in five NATO countries remains controversial. First, I argue that the removal of NATOs nuclear weapons does not mean the end of extended nuclear deterrence, by making a distinction between extended deterrence and collective-actor deterrence. Second, I compare the nuclear postures of NATO, France and the USA to show that harmonization is possible. Finally, I outline several options for a new nuclear doctrine under NATO and formulate some policy recommendations.Abstract This article asks whether Frances return to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)s integrated military command could translate into a bigger role on nuclear issues within NATO. As NATO prepares its new strategic concept, its nuclear doctrine is bound to change as several allies have expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The presence of American theater nuclear weapons in five NATO countries remains controversial. First, I argue that the removal of NATOs nuclear weapons does not mean the end of extended nuclear deterrence, by making a distinction between extended deterrence and collective-actor deterrence. Second, I compare the nuclear postures of NATO, France and the USA to show that harmonization is possible. Finally, I outline several options for a new nuclear doctrine under NATO and formulate some policy recommendations.
Contemporary Security Policy | 2018
Stéfanie von Hlatky; Justin Massie
ABSTRACT The decision to employ force abroad is often a contentious political decision, where partisanship plays a crucial role. Prior to military intervention, political parties usually make their ideologically distinctive preferences clear and seek to implement them once in power. What remains unclear, however, is how ideology affects the decision to use military force. This article contends that alliance and electoral calculations constrain the ability of political parties to implement their ideological preferences with regards to the use of force. It examines a “most likely” case for the partisan theory of military intervention, namely Canada’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq and its decision to commit forces to the war against the Islamic State. It finds that only in combination with alliance and electoral calculations does executive ideology offer valuable insights into Canada’s military support to U.S.-led coalition operations, which contributes to our understanding of allied decision-making.
Asian Security | 2015
Stéfanie von Hlatky; Jessica Trisko Darden
AbstractA basic trade-off in military cooperation exists: States must respond to the dominant ally’s demands and act as a reliable partner while simultaneously making a decision that is acceptable to domestic audiences. We argue that compensatory burden-sharing strategies are imperfect but dependable solutions to manage foreign policy decisions at the domestic and alliance levels. Our theoretical expectations are tested using the US-Japan and US-Republic of Korea alliances and, in particular, the contribution of each country to the war in Afghanistan. We find that foreign aid commitments to third parties are made as a form of compensation when alliance expectations are substantial, but the secondary allys ability to contribute militarily is highly constrained. Foreign aid has therefore served as an alliance management tool.Abstract A basic trade-off in military cooperation exists: States must respond to the dominant ally’s demands and act as a reliable partner while simultaneously making a decision that is acceptable to domestic audiences. We argue that compensatory burden-sharing strategies are imperfect but dependable solutions to manage foreign policy decisions at the domestic and alliance levels. Our theoretical expectations are tested using the US-Japan and US-Republic of Korea alliances and, in particular, the contribution of each country to the war in Afghanistan. We find that foreign aid commitments to third parties are made as a form of compensation when alliance expectations are substantial, but the secondary allys ability to contribute militarily is highly constrained. Foreign aid has therefore served as an alliance management tool.
European Security | 2014
Stéfanie von Hlatky
This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliances nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATOs Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliances nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliances nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATOs Deterren...
Archive | 2018
Jeffrey Rice; Stéfanie von Hlatky
This chapter provides an overview of historical trends in international military operations undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces. It then proceeds to outline the Trudeau government’s role in military operations through an analysis of three major military operations: Operation IMPACT, which involves the deployment of special forces personnel with the mandate of training Kurdish forces in North-Eastern Iraq in their campaign to retake Mosul; Operation REASSURANCE, the deployment of conventional forces to Eastern Europe; and Operation UNIFER, the special training mission to assist Ukraine in combating Russian aggression. Prime Minister Trudeau is not a reluctant warrior, but he puts the emphasis in a different place from the Harper government—on the creation and professionalization of local forces and the offering of tactical and strategic support where possible but steering clear of kinetic operations. Although Canada does play an important role in international military operations, its overall impact is predicated in large part on the contribution of its other middle- and great-power allies. Canada’s presence can only be felt when it is among other nations.
International Journal | 2018
Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé; Stéfanie von Hlatky
In the wake of the Canadian government’s pledge for a renewed role at the United Nations (UN) notably by reengaging in peacekeeping activities, this special issue focuses on Canada’s added value to peace operations. Our aim is to identify the goals, challenges, and stakes for Canada’s reengagement in peace operations as a central component of foreign and defence policy. One of the first questions to ask is how can Canada contribute to peace operations which are now characterized by more complex security environments, in a way that is consistent with its interests, resources, and capacity? The second question relates to Canada’s engagement in peace missions in the context of a continuously evolving technological landscape. Finally, we address defence planning, equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, and managing personnel, as they relate to UN operations. The time is ripe to revitalize the debate on peace operations and analyze Canada’s capacity in this area.
Defence Studies | 2018
Stéfanie von Hlatky; Jeffrey Rice
Abstract Why does joint defence production of advanced weapons systems, which appears like a logical choice at first, become harder for both the primary production state and its allies to manage and justify as the acquisition process runs its course? To answer this question, we analyze the multinational politics of the F-35 JSF with a focus on how secondary states who have bought into the program are affected by domestic politics within the primary production state. We find that US congressional and bureaucratic politics, cuts to US defence spending, and a desire to retain tight control over the program has locked allies into a program with which they have little leverage. Potentially losing the ability to fight along side the US if they don’t follow through, coupled with inter-Alliance pressures, leaves secondary states who are involved with the F-35 program, vulnerable to the whims of US domestic politics.
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal | 2018
Sara Greco; Stéfanie von Hlatky
ABSTRACT Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATOs) creation in 1949, Canada has been a consistent contributor to the Alliance but has frequently been criticized as a free rider. This article asks: what fuels this perception about Canada’s commitments to NATO? To answer this question, we introduce a typology of burden-sharing commitments inspired by the conceptual literature on power (hard, soft and smart) to explain why Canada’s role within NATO may be understated or even inaccurately portrayed. This framework also offers insights into Canada’s reputation at NATO. We show Canada’s contributions to NATO are more consistent than is usually acknowledged, though contextual factors significantly impact perceptions about those commitments. We also suggest strategies through which Canada can aspire to be a “smarter” contributor to NATO. The implication of our argument is to consider the spectrum of contribution types (with our typology) to reframe the nature of Alliance commitments and burden-sharing debates.